Language in Ernst Bloch’s Speculative Materialism: A Reading of Anacoluthon by Barron, Nathaniel Jerzy Philip
[1] 
 
Language in Ernst Bloch’s Speculative 
Materialism: A Reading of Anacoluthon 
 
 
By 
 
 
Nathaniel Jerzy Philip Barron 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at the University of Central Lancashire 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2017 
 
  
STUDENT DECLARATION FORM 
 
 
 Concurrent registration for two or more academic awards 
  
Either *I declare that while registered as a candidate for the research degree, I have not been a registered 
candidate or enrolled student for another award of the University or other academic or professional 
institution 
 
 
 
 
 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 Material submitted for another award 
 
Either *I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other submission for an 
                 academic award and is solely my own work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Collaboration 
 
 Where a candidate’s research programme is part of a collaborative project, the thesis must indicate in 
addition clearly the candidate’s individual contribution and the extent of the collaboration.  Please state 
below: 
 
 
 
Signature of Candidate   _________NJP BARRON_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Type of Award                __________Ph.D.____________________________________________ 
 
            
 
School                             __________School of Nursing_____________________________________________ 
 
[2] 
 
 
For  
 
 
 
 
Robina  
23.03.1932 
- 
24.03.2012 
 
 
 
& 
 
 
 
Bridget 
11.11.1923 
- 
26.06.2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[3] 
 
 
 
‘Philosophy will always, to my way of thinking, be an aid to discovery 
rather than a matter of strict demonstration.’—Gabriel Marcel, The 
Mystery of Being, p. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘To think is to transgress.’—Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, p. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[4] 
 
CONTENTS 
 
ABBREVIATIONS OF BLOCH’S WORKS………..……..6 
INTRODUCTION……………………....………………......7 
§1. Question—Thesis………..…………..........................7 
§2. The Contemporary Conjuncture...…………………..10 
§3. Method….………………………………....................34 
§4. Outline of the Work.…………….…………………….39 
 
1. MATTER……………...………………………………...42 
Chapter Introduction…….…………………….................42 
§1. ONTOLOGISING KANT….……………………..…...44 
§2. TENDENCY…………..……………….………………57 
§2.1. Possibility……….…….…….………………….65 
§3. LATENCY...…...………………………………………81 
Chapter Conclusion……...……………………………...107 
 
2. ANALOGY….…………...…………………………….108 
Chapter Introduction…………...……………….............108 
§1. METAPHYSICS.………………...…………………..110 
§1.1. Bloch’s Critique of Metaphysics..……….....114 
§1.2. Not-Yet Being………….……………………..121 
§1.3. That-What……………...……….…...............130 
[5] 
 
§2. THE ANALOGY OF BEING.…...………..…………137 
§2.1. Aristotle-Aquinas-Przywara…………………138 
§2.2. Excursus. Analogy and Language……...…155 
§3. A UTOPIAN ANALOGON………..………………...162 
Chapter Conclusion……………………………………..175 
 
3. ANACOLUTHON..……………………………………177 
 
Chapter Introduction..……………………….................177 
§1. LANGUAGE AS UTOPIAN MATTER…...….........180 
§2. ANACOLUTHON AS STARTING POINT..............184 
 §2.1. Anacoluthon as Trace……..………………..185 
 §2.2. Preliminary Definition…….………………….189 
 §2.3. Adorno-Steiner-Mieszkowski…...…………..194 
§3. BLOCH’S ANACOLUTHON……....……………….204 
 §3.1. That-ness……………………………………..206 
 §3.2. What-ness…………………………………….215 
Chapter Conclusion……………………………………..218 
 
 
CONCLUSION….………………...……...……………...219 
 
REFERENCES….…………….…………………………231 
 
 
 
 
 
[6] 
 
ABBREVIATIONS OF BLOCH’S WORKS 
 
S                 Spuren              
GUz            Geist der Utopie. Zweite Fassung  
EZ               Erbschaft dieser Zeit  
PH              Das Prinzip Hoffnung 
M               Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz  
SO             Subjekt-Objekt. Erläuterungen zu Hegel  
LA               Literarische Aufsätze  
PA               Philosophische Aufsätze zur objektiven Phantasie 
TE               Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie  
AC               Atheismus im Christentum. Zur Religion des Exodus des Reichs  
EM            Experimentum Mundi. Frage, Kategorien des Herausbringens 
GUe             Geist der Utopie. Erste Fassung  
TL                Tendenz-Latenz-Utopie  
LM                Logos der Materie. Eine Logik im Werden. Aus dem Nachlas 1923-1949 
PHE             The Principle of Hope 
HT                Heritage of Our Times  
SU                Spirit of Utopia  
LE                 Literary Essays 
T                  Traces 
ACE             Atheism in Christianity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[7] 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
§1. QUESTION-THESIS 
 
The essence of the world is gay spirit and urge to creative forms; the Thing in Itself 
is the objective phantasy. (PA, p. 5) 
[Das Wesen der Welt ist heiterer Geist und Drang zum schaffenden Gestalten; das 
Ding an sich ist die objektive Phantasie.] 
 
What follows is a piece of theoretical philosophy which aims to 
employ Ernst Bloch’s metaphysical materialism to begin to reflect on the 
materiality of language in a utopian context. It amounts to a speculative-
linguistic appraisal of Bloch’s key utopian philosophical categories. Indeed, 
inasmuch as underlying Bloch’s materialist philosophy is a model of reality 
which views the world’s essence as ‘gay spirit’ and as ‘urge to creative 
forms’, and which considers Kant’s Thing In Itself (Ding an sich) precisely as 
an ‘objective phantasy’ (ibid.), my line of questioning is as follows: how can 
the materiality of language be speculated on within this, the utopianism of 
Bloch’s philosophical framework?1  
One cannot respond to such a question as this without first providing one’s 
interpretation of Bloch’s framework. If in order to subject this framework to a 
                                                          
1 Of course, the notion that matter is gay spirit and urge to creative forms and that the Thing in Itself 
constitutes an objective phantasy requires unpacking. It should be noted that Bloch’s formulation here 
arrives very early on in his philosophical career: a text of 1902 entitled “On Force and its Essence 
[Über die Kraft und ihr Wesen]”. Bloch (1885-1977) was around seventeen years of age at the time of 
its composition. The notion of “objective phantasy,” Hudson (1982, p. 71) writes, originates from the 
writings of the Catholic theologian Jakob Frohschammer (1821-1893), principally his work Die 
Phantasie als Grundprincip des Weltprocesses (1877). Little work has been attempted that sheds light 
on this deep influence. Regrettably my study does not change this unfortunate state of affairs. 
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speculative-linguistic appraisal one is required to grapple with the manner of 
this framework as such—a task still in its infancy—so then to my mind, both 
questions are of a piece. The study below paves the way for this 
concomitant questioning to be responded to. It is in its architectonic 
structured as such. 
More specifically, negatively formulated, neither is my study an attempt to 
argue for or against the cogency of Bloch’s philosophical arguments in 
themselves, nor for or against the plausibility of my theorisation of 
language’s materialism as it will be derived from the categories of Bloch’s 
philosophy. It may seem then that the scope of this study is rather limited. 
Part of my study’s originality, however, lies in a positive formulation of its 
intention: it creatively extends Bloch’s philosophy towards a materialist 
speculation on language; and contrariwise, brings contemporary 
philosophising of language to a point whereby it may begin to speak Bloch’s 
conceptual language. Indeed, my original contribution to philosophical 
knowledge is to have modestly carried this task through: to have opened up 
Bloch’s corpus utopicum2 to questions pertaining to the materialism of 
                                                          
2 “Corpus utopicum” expresses the idea that Bloch’s corpus is itself not yet complete; it bears life and 
thus is open to utopian realisation. Jameson touches on this line of thought: 
 
[T]he neglect of Bloch is due to the fact that his system, a doctrine of hope and ontological 
anticipation, is itself an anticipation, and stands as a solution to problems of a universal 
culture and a universal hermeneutic which have not yet come into being. It thus lies before 
us, enigmatic and enormous, like an aerolite fallen from space, covered with mysterious 
hieroglyphs that radiate a peculiar inner warmth and power, spells and keys to spells, 
themselves patiently waiting for their own ultimate moment of decipherment. (1974, pp. 158-
9) 
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language, and, relatedly, to have opened up contemporary and nascent 
speculation on the materiality of language to Bloch’s neglected oeuvre.3 
With the study-question provisionally laid-out (it will undergo a degree 
of refinement as this Introduction progresses) it is appropriate to touch on 
my study’s general thesis. My argument will be as follows. The categories 
which constitute Bloch’s materialism, together with my reading of the overall 
metaphysical outlook they establish, allow me to conceptualise what I shall 
call a “utopian cadence” of language. Whilst Bloch himself does not speak of 
language in such specific terms as these, I show that the philosophy he 
fashions grants just such a speculative-linguistic application. Now, to bring 
the specificity of this utopian-linguistic cadence into view, to communicate it, 
I will read the rhetorical-syntactical figure of anacoluthon. As deriving from 
an old Greek term, the word literally translates as “not following” and is 
assigned to the plane of syntax, of syntactical construction. Whilst Bloch 
treats of anacoluthon only once in his corpus, I shall read this figure as 
possessing a substantial importance to any speculative-materialist 
conception of language Bloch’s thought might implicitly contain or permit to 
be developed. With Bloch one can read the figure of anacoluthon utopically.4  
                                                          
3 My response to the study-question is provisional rather than conclusive. If there were time and space 
enough a whole polyphony of paths of inquiry would open up on the question of how best to think 
language within the horizon of Bloch’s little studied materialism. It will soon become clear that this 
openness is inextricable from Bloch’s materialism itself, wrought through as it is with openness and 
searching. The type of philosophical thinking that Bloch encourages indeed is exploratory rather than 
definitive.  
 
4 Like Schelling and Hegel before him, Bloch nowhere articulates a unified philosophical appraisal of 
language; indeed, much as have Adorno’s been described (Hogh, 2017), Bloch’s reflections on 
language can be termed fragmentary in nature. A similar state of affairs is witnessed in Bloch’s 
approach to aesthetics. Kessler (2006, p. 29) claims Bloch’s aesthetic theory does not stand as a 
separate object over against his philosophy but is integral to it, or as Vidal (2012, p. 13) says, is 
immanent to Bloch’s corpus (see also Freeman, 2006, p. 231), signals that the importance of 
fragmentation to Bloch’s way of thinking and expressing, such that any theory of language Bloch might 
[10] 
 
§2. THE CONTEMPORAY PHILOSOPHICAL CONJUNCTURE  
[…] reason […] stretches its wings in vein in thus attempting to soar above 
the world of sense by the mere power of speculation.—Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason (A 591-B 619) 
At this point I would like to sketch out the intellectual context within 
which my study finds itself. My aim to think language’s materiality with the 
aid of Bloch’s philosophy arises from and is nourished by definite 
philosophical conditions, conditions which remain live but which, as I shall 
show, however paradoxically, exhibit a marked unfamiliarity with Bloch’s 
utopian mode of thought. Given that my study does not appear out of the 
blue but in some sense is a determinate response to what is presently front 
and centre for philosophical thought, so then the provision of a schematic 
map of the conditions of which I speak will enable me to disclose the 
pertinence of what will be my line of questioning and indeed, furthermore, 
will help me to better indicate what my original contribution to philosophical 
knowledge consists of.  
In the first instance, continental philosophy is found at a new juncture 
in its history, a juncture that may be described, to employ a phrase from 
Bloch himself, as ‘a new blossoming of materialism’ (TL, p. 267). Below I will 
briefly outline the pertinent features of this new blossoming of materialism, 
which has become known as “new materialism” and/or “speculative 
materialism.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
be said to possess would therefore have to be performed in and through his philosophical explications, 
as opposed to constituting a standalone “element” of his open system. This fact has at least one far-
reaching methodological consequence; namely, it allows me freely to draw on all areas of Bloch’s 
corpus to answer my study-question. 
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That materialism as an approach to philosophising the world could have 
blossomed once more speaks to the idea that it could have died. The sap of 
materialism is given with what has recently become known as the 
speculative-materialist turn (Bryant et al., 2011, p. 1). Largely inspired by the 
French thinker Quentin Meillassoux (2016, p. 117) and his self-stated 
‘original reactivation of materialism’, the new turn to speculation has re-
discovered the legitimacy of posing to the world’s essence materialist-realist 
questions.5 More fundamental still, reality’s nature is back on the agenda. 
It is important to my study to note that such philosophical exploration has, to 
a large extent, been put under erasure during much of the previous century. 
Under the dominance of post-structuralist tendencies of thought, but also the 
direction of analytically informed philosophies of language, the longstanding 
notion that human beings possess the capacity to grasp wider reality’s true 
nature was thought, at root, to be a preposterous notion to hold to.6 
Philosophers who count as belonging to the new speculative turn see 
themselves as counterpoints to a linguistically-inclined scepticism termed the 
“linguistic turn,” a movement of thought to which both post-structuralism and 
analytical philosophy of language definitely belong. As Hogh (2017, p. 3) 
writes, a consequence of this long dominant sceptical philosophical 
programme was the radical separation of linguistic from non-linguistic reality. 
                                                          
5 For want of space I cannot go into any real depth on Meillassoux’s contribution to—or instigation of—
the new speculative turn. Nor is his conception of the absolute (qua the necessity of absolute 
contingency) much important to my reading of Bloch. For works on or by Meillassoux, see Harman’s 
Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making (2011), Paul J. Ennis’ Continental Realism (2011), and 
indeed Meillassoux’s first work that set him on the path to notoriety, After Finitude: An Essay on the 
Necessity of Contingency (2009).  
 
6 For works within the “linguistic turn,” see Rorty’s (ed.) The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical 
Method (1992). For an overview of post-structuralism, see Belsey’s Post-Structuralism: A Very Short 
Introduction (2002). For an account of analytical philosophy, see Dummett’s Origins Of Analytical 
Philosophy (1993). 
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Significantly, these new speculative philosophers trace this linguistic form of 
scepticism, in which language only refers to itself and as such remains 
independent from the world of which it is ostensibly a part, back to the wide-
ranging effects of Immanuel Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophical 
thought. It is to Kant’s laying down the philosophical conditions for such a 
sceptical approach to breathe that I now briefly outline.  
The general thrust of Kant’s philosophy can be clarified for present purposes 
by pointing to the following short but no less infamous passage. The 
passage in question concerns Kant’s desire to shift philosophical focus from 
the object (dogmatic metaphysics) to the subject (transcendental 
philosophy), such that the philosopher shall now concern herself ‘solely’ with 
reason’s ‘own inner constitution’ (A 695), not that of the object itself. Indeed, 
the objects of philosophical thought, says Kant in the passage in question, 
are to be approached no longer such that our—the human being’s—
knowledge conforms to these objects’ nature—a tendency Kant calls 
dogmatic metaphysics—but rather such that these objects ‘conform to our 
knowledge.’ (B xvi; my emphasis) In shifting the point of departure for 
philosophy from object to the human subject’s reason, Kant thereby is 
propounding an ‘unavoidable ignorance of things in themselves’; in the 
process Kant is found to severely restrict human reason’s capacity to 
respond adequately to metaphysical questions, questions which Kant 
concedes are all so natural to human curiosity (metaphysica naturalis) (B 
xxix & B 22). Kant thus enseels philosophical thought within its own 
[13] 
 
categories of human experience (B xvi.).7 This slightly confusing fruit of the 
Kantian project is clearly visible in Kant’s notion that human reason finds 
itself in a ‘peculiar fate’ he says, in which, ‘burdened by questions’ 
‘prescribed by the very nature of reason itself’ (i.e. reason just is 
speculative), ‘it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its 
powers, it is also not able to answer’ (A vii.). Kant repeats such claims in the 
Appendix to his “Transcendental Dialectic”: 
[…] all those conclusions of ours which profess to lead us beyond the field of 
possible experience are deceptive and without foundation; […] human reason 
has [however] a natural tendency to transgress these limits, and [therefore] 
transcendental ideas are just as natural to it as the categories are to the 
understanding […]. (A 642) 
Not even the most ‘severest criticism’ (ibid), Kant says, can thwart this 
natural tendency towards transgression of limits.8 This point returns me to 
the contemporary moment, because the underlying motivation of the 
contemporary turn towards a speculative-materialism is at root a desire to re-
confer upon philosophical thought speculation’s canonical intent: to know 
reality as it truly is. And therefore, whilst in some sense born-up by the limits 
which Kant designated as philosophical thought’s unquestionable horizon, 
contemporary speculative philosophers seek to move out into that horizon so 
as to discover something new (Bryant et al., 2011, pp. 1-3; Grant, 2006, p. 1-
21). The emergent speculative turn is thus more than willing to overcome 
                                                          
7 Reason, Kant says, must ‘never soar beyond its limit, outside which there is for us nothing but empty 
space.’ (A 702) 
 
8 Curiously, transgressing limits is delivered up to philosophical form in Bloch’s materialism (as Kessler 
[2006, p. 22] notes, the transgression of limits is a ‘Grundstruktur’ of Bloch’s philosophy). In this light, 
the transgression of limits would have to feature in a Blochian approach to language. 
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what Puntel (2011, p. 33) terms ‘Kant’s negative charges’ against 
metaphysics; it is willing to ‘utter the unconditional’, as Adorno (2001, p. 39) 
has elsewhere described this speculative tendency; it is willing  ‘to make a 
statement about […] what the Being is that lies behind all things’ (ibid.). 
Placed within this context it is important to stress in passing that the recent 
speculative movement’s apparent unity of thought glosses over what in truth 
is a fractured, heterogeneous content. Once speculative thought escapes 
Kantianism’s restrictions there thus is witnessed its renaissance of 
expression, in which the absolute undergoes a diffraction of philosophical 
determination (see Shaviro, 2016, pp. 30 & 33-9 & Niemoczynski, 2013, p. 
15). As Bryant (2016, p. 71) writes, while philosophers of the turn are united 
on the front of re-grappling with questions of realism and materialism, 
nevertheless they produce ‘quite distinct positions that are in many respects 
opposed’ vis-à-vis ‘what constitutes the real or the material.’ But as Kant 
himself had written long before this moment: ‘seemingly infinite variety need 
not hinder us from assuming that behind this variety there is a unity of 
fundamental properties’ (A 653), however asymptotic such properties may 
serve to be. And, indeed, such a fundamental property uniting the diverse 
responses of a renewed speculation—these responses’ affinity or continuity, 
or to borrow from Kant, their ‘common horizon’ (A 658)—is simply the failure 
of Kant’s own efforts to ward off human reason’s natural tendency towards 
speculation—to ‘discipline’ (A 709) reason’s natural attraction towards 
transgressing the limits of possible experience. Indeed, Kant’s failure here is 
precisely a necessary failure, and this, somewhat paradoxically, by his own 
admission and estimation, even if such a failure was what Kant sought so 
hard to disallow. It is within this experimental space of failure, of 
[15] 
 
incompleteness, of dissatisfaction, this ‘empty intervening space’ (A 659) 
exposed by Kant himself, that there has emerged the present blossoming of 
new shapes of speculation, shapes that cannot be equated with or simply 
reduced to forms and figures of times gone by. In sum, differing absoluta—
i.e. conceptions of the absolute—mark speculation’s contemporary 
landscape.9 
I may now return to the main focus of my study. Against the backdrop 
outlined above the following question presses: Where do Bloch and a 
speculative-materialist philosophy of language figure in the horizon of this 
emerging philosophical landscape? The answer, simply and briefly, is that 
they do not. They do not possess any sort of substantial standing in current 
debates and in fact are almost non-existent in such debates as they 
currently stand. This precisely is what suggests to the contemporary moment 
two limits of its recent re-turn to speculation; if not dispensation of the former 
(Bloch), then at least the latter’s omission (language) ought to keep 
contemporary speculation from resting satisfied with itself. Despite rare 
exceptions, of which I shall momentarily discuss, it is safe to say that neither 
Bloch nor a speculative-materialist approach to language are much 
countenanced in contemporary speculative research; and this, I assume, 
makes of the two allies. Such limits, then, certainly give rise to my study, 
which will aim to overcome them: ‘To think is to transgress.’ (PH, p. 2)  
                                                          
9 An overcoming of Kant’s iconoclasm therefore produces—to employ Barber’s (2010, p. 167) curious 
formulation—a ‘polyiconicity’; that is, a proliferation of absoluta (see Barber, 2012). As Whistler (2012, 
p. 117) insightfully notes, the fundamental orientation of the new speculative turn is kataphatic in 
essence (as opposed to apophatic). 
[16] 
 
Detailing these inter-related limits will help to refine my study’s 
motivations and also better distinguish its original contribution to knowledge. 
I shall take each in turn. 
[1] Against this backdrop it is apparent that Bloch’s materialism is 
discounted from figuring as a legitimate inheritance for contemporary 
speculative philosophers. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the 
contemporary blossoming of speculation is indifferent to a philosopher who 
throughout the 20th century upheld speculation’s importance and therefore 
its spirit. The distinct lack of interest in Bloch found among those who count 
as contemporary speculative philosophers is curious but by no means 
inexplicable. Curious because Bloch described his philosophy as 
speculative-materialist long before the term became vogue (M, p. 377; see 
also Moir 2013a, p. 121 see also Moir, 2013b). Not inexplicable for the 
reason that Anglo-American scholarship that would seek to investigate the 
depth of insight and the implications of Bloch’s philosophical intervention 
remains, in my view, in its infancy. Significantly, neglect of Bloch is an 
overriding feature of his reception in Germany; for all intents and purposes 
Bloch’s body of thought remains a largely under-articulated moment of 20th 
century German philosophy—within Germany itself. It can be argued, in 
sum, that the implications of what I shall term Bloch’s utopian revolution for 
ontology, for epistemology, for the philosophy of history, political philosophy, 
and for aesthetics are yet to be fully explored and, as such, have so far 
[17] 
 
failed to inform present speculative concerns. All in all, then, Bloch’s 
influence is hardly radiant.10 
Despite this neglect the fact of the matter remains that whilst Bloch is a 
curious sort of speculative philosopher he is a speculative philosopher. His 
guiding convinction being that 
Philosophy seeks the whole, its task is the Totum, the totality, the universal 
hanging-together of appearances, the one handle, the one view of the world. 
(1985d, p. 17) 
[Die Philosophie geht aufs Ganze, ihre Aufgabe ist das Totum, die Totalität, 
der universale Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen, der eine Griff, der eine 
Blick auf die Welt.] 
There is, however, a peculiarity to the speculative in Bloch’s way of thinking. 
The peculiarity in question is rooted in Bloch’s throwing into doubt a 
longstanding position in the philosophical tradition; namely, that the totality 
towards which speculation aims is already in existence. This “one view of the 
world” of which Bloch speaks in the passage above (i.e. totality) is, to his 
lights, not yet in existence. This move has momentous ontological 
                                                          
10 Proof of a disavowal of Bloch in English scholarship can be found with Bowie’s (2003) otherwise 
comprehensive introduction to German philosophy, from Kant to Habermas; Bowie elides even a 
mention of Bloch. More specific to the contemporary turn to speculation one find Bloch referred to not 
once in what are arguably the speculative turn’s three key texts: New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, 
and Politics (2010), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (2011), and 
Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity since Structuralism (2016). However, if the 
French 20th century philosopher Giles Deleuze can count as ‘an immediate progenitor of the 
speculative turn in Continental philosophy’ (van Tuinen, 2016, p. 95), how much more so can the 
same be said of Bloch? And to Germany: whilst a steady flow of publications exist in Germany through 
such journals as the Bloch-Almanach and Vor-Schein, Bloch-reception in Germany remains 
conspicuously absent (see Hermann-Sinai & Tegtmeyer, 2012, p. 10). Although the details of why this 
is the case do not concern me here, suffice it to say that Bloch thought speculatively during an 
historical juncture in which speculative modes of thought were considered intellectually obsolete both 
East and West of the dividing ideological-political line. 
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repercussions. From this move Bloch suggests something ground-breaking: 
the one view of the world that is so far lacking cannot be merely the 
philosopher’s dark spot—it too must be the world’s dark spot. The lack of 
speculative achievement, the lack of the human mind having achieved the 
aim of its most natural desire is in truth rooted in an ontological lack.  
The above is a very brief appraisal of Bloch’s position on the nature of 
speculation. My account shows well, though, that unquestionably Bloch 
attempts to provide his own singular path beyond Kant’s restrictions, as 
outlined above: ‘the concept of the Absolute’ Bloch writes, ‘can find a new, 
an unsuspected strength.’ (SU, p. 171) This new strength in speculative 
thought, however, is found only in exiting the old, as even Kant himself had 
attempted according to his own manner, i.e. the object of philosophy must 
orbit the human mind, not the human mind these objects. In truth, for Bloch, 
all things, including the human mind, orbits the not-yetness of speculative 
totality. As Moir (2013b, p. 169) writes, if ‘Bloch’s materialism is speculative 
insofar as it presupposes both a concept of totality just as it does one of 
finality’, then what offsets Bloch’s form of speculation from the philosophical 
tradition is that he conceives totality as the finality of its own process.  
In Chapter I, I will elucidate this conception of totality in more detail. It can be 
said to constitute a novel approach to teleology; an “open teleology,” 
perhaps. Indeed, both Holz (2008, p. 14) and Moir (2013a, p. 121) stress 
that Bloch’s form of speculation is materialist in that it derives from 
“speculari” (to look out) as opposed to “speculum”; the latter, derived from 
Augustine and taken up by Hegel anew, denotes mirror thinking (cf. Whistler, 
2013c). Bloch’s speculation is guided by a totality not already present, by a 
[19] 
 
totality that cannot be, therefore, simply reflected by thought.11 It is in this 
sense that Bloch is closer to Kant than, as one will find, is often made to be 
the case. Bloch suggests—perhaps somewhat hyperbolically—that all 
hitherto philosophy up to his own seat in the tradition has neglected this 
perspective on the nature of speculative totality. It is suggested by Bloch that 
the history of philosophy has ultimately been blind to the future tense of the 
really real: ‘an overwhelmingly static thinking did not name or even 
understand this condition’ of reality, ‘the voice of tomorrow.’ (PHE, pp. 6 & 
117; my emphasis). The ‘blossoming field of questions’ that opens up once 
adequate attentiveness is lent to a futural idea of totality leads philosophy 
away from a contemplative gaze and turns it toward a way of speculating 
which sees future in things and in the world and indeed in the very notion of 
totality itself (PHE, p. 6). As Bloch writes: ‘Philosophy will have conscience of 
tomorrow, commitment to the future, knowledge of hope, or it will have no 
more knowledge.’ (PHE, p. 7) A conclusion can be drawn from this: a 
speculative-materialist approach to the philosophy of language must, in the 
horizon of Bloch’s thought, integrate within its approach this outward-looking, 
transgressive, utopian conception of speculative totality. 
Bloch, then, is a speculative philosopher because he rejects the idea of 
gnoseological limits on what thought can think—whether that be a priori 
                                                          
11 It is an interesting question to pose whether Bloch’s approach to speculation allays doubts as to the 
very possibility of speculative materialism. Doubts as to the compatibility of speculation and 
materialism are raised by Toscano (2011, p. 87-9), for instance, for whom the Hegelian inheritance of 
contemporary speculation (i.e. sympathy for the Hegelian critique of Kantian restrictions on reason) 
problematises the legitimacy of contemporary speculation’s suggestion that it be materialist. If 
materialism is to be authentic it must, claims Toscano (ibid., p, 89), posit an extra-logical reality such 
that being and thought are not identified. The question of whether Bloch’s identification of being and 
thought (and language) in a shared non-identity, a shared incognito, might give Toscano the 
opportunity to re-think the manner in which he frames the problem at hand is not one I pursue here, 
but is, nevertheless, a question that requires attention in itself. 
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categories of the sort one finds in Kantianism or by socially determined 
ideological configurations. This is certainly not to suggest that Bloch does 
not recognise limits at all but only that such limits, for Bloch, ought to be 
grasped ontologically and not solely epistemologically. There is always a 
really real surplus at work in any and every limit:  
Philosophies are their age expressed in ideas, but their great themes, because 
they can never be exhausted and cannot even be wholly formulated in a single 
epoch, lie far beyond each respective age (PHE, p. 885). 
And the ‘most central of these themes’, Bloch says, ‘is Verum Bonum.’ (ibid.) 
The Verum Bonum (the Truth and the Good) is the red thread of 
philosophical diversity.12 This is why, in my view, a Blochian approach to 
philosophising language would ideally have as one of its central concerns 
the precise manner in which an intending of the Verum Bonum permeates 
the very fibre of language.13 I will suggest throughout this study that such an 
                                                          
12 To give a brief indication of what is meant by Verum Bonum I need only mention the traditionally 
conceived transcendentals of being, i.e. the One, the Good,  the True, and their proximity to reflections 
on the affirmative divine attributes (the “unity,” “truth,” and “goodness” of God—beauty (“pulchrum”) 
also counting among them for some (see Aertsen, 2012, p. 6). Bloch’s relation to theology and equally 
theology’s relation to Bloch has been consistent as much as it has been contested (see Herrmann-
Sinai & Tegtmeyer, 2012; Bloch, 2009; Moltmann, 2014, p. 124). The issue of the transcendentals of 
being and of transcendentalism is not one I touch upon in any detail in this study. My reading of 
anacoluthon in Chapter III, however, runs along a similar logic to that given by Freeman in the context 
of Bloch’s theory of aesthetics: 
 
Because a focus on the primal ontological ground for human experience informs 
Bloch’s aesthetic, it is “transcendental” aesthetic. By transcendental here I mean that 
Bloch claims to offer insight into the structure of the world and the human by analysing 
cultural phenomena not just in terms of their formal or sociological characteristics but 
for evidence of the way in which they reveal the universal structures of being itself. 
(2006, p. 235) 
 
In other words, for me, anacoluthon linguistically reveals the transcendental structures of being itself. 
Incidentally, the notion of “transcendental materialism” has traction with the recent speculative turn, 
particularly Johnston’s work (2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2014d). The notion of a 
“transcendental materialism” also echoes the work of the Blochian scholar Zimmermann (2004). 
 
13 Philosophy is not ideological “all the way down” but rather in touch with the existence of an 
extraterritoriality (a domain beyond the given) (Blechman [2008, p. 182] speaks of the simultaneity of 
‘historical inscription and transcendence’ in Bloch’s philosophy). In my view, Bloch seems to be 
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intending can be found present in language in anacoluthic discontinuities of 
speech. 
The point to stress once more, however, is that Ernst Bloch is a 
speculative philosopher but one hitherto having suffered neglect. In a 
strange twist of fate, Jürgen Habermas’ (1970, p. 325) reproach directed at 
Bloch, namely that Bloch unacceptably ‘skips Kant’ and thus regresses to a 
pre-Kantian, dogmatic standpoint—that Bloch is too speculative, that he 
freewheels, runs amok, or careers ahead with speculation (Kant’s 
disparaging word for this was “Rasen” [M, p. 471])—is now the very real 
basis for the contemporaneity of Bloch’s materialism (see Thompson, 2013, 
p. 10).14 In fact, Bloch’s relevance is slowly becoming a question. There is a 
growing suspicion of his importance for present philosophical concern. 
Žižek’s recent claims are perhaps best representative of this growing 
tendency. Bloch is, he writes, 
one of the rare figures of whom we can say: fundamentally, with regard to what 
really matters, he was right, he remains our contemporary, and maybe he 
belongs even more to our time than to his own. (2013, p. xx) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
suggesting that this transcending surplus is philosophy’s very impetus, no matter the epoch, such that 
in its very capacity to account for the situatedness that each time anew gives birth to and constricts it, 
philosophy is capable of transgressing the limits of its socio-historical situatedness and in fact already 
has done so in the very act of recognising such limitedness: ‘To think is to transgress’ (PH, p. 2), as 
Bloch says (a statement which announces the whole purport of his philosophy and one that could well 
be transposed into a rudimentary premise for a materialist theory of language: “To express is to 
transgress”). The lodestar of this noetic and linguistic trangressionism is the Verum Bonum—this is the 
invariant of direction of noetic and linguistic creation. But to transgress can only really be philosophy’s 
first intention if philosophy’s first impression is the transgressive dynamic of being itself.  
 
14 Indeed, the new speculative turn’s proclaimed instigator, namely Meillassoux (2009, p. 7), describes 
his project as a return to ‘the absolute outside of precritical thinkers’. That said, Bloch’s and 
Meillassoux’s respective speculative approaches are in instances incompatible (see Moir, 2012a). It 
ought to be made clear that, contra Habermas’ claim that Bloch skips Kant, there is every indication to 
indicate that Kant is very important for Bloch’s materialism (see my discussion of Kant and Hegel in 
Chapter II). 
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My study redresses this lacuna in the research programme of contemporary 
speculation by exploring Bloch’s underappreciated oeuvre, doing so with an 
eye to philosophy of language. I contribute an answer to the question of in 
just what sense Bloch’s philosophy can be described as living philosophy.  
[2] The speculative turn also exhibits a marked aversion to questions 
orbiting the place of language in its renewal of materialist-realist lines of 
philosophical inquiry. As is the case in its lack of interest in Bloch, this 
apparent reluctance on the part of contemporary speculative philosophers to 
broach questions concerning the materialism and realism of language is not 
entirely inexplicable. The recent turn to speculation is after all a self-
proclaimed counterpoint to modes of thought which take language or 
discourse as philosophy’s Archimedean point. As a determined attempt to 
purge philosophy of teaching a logico-linguistic pre-determination of being or 
nature (Grant, 2006, p. 19), it is not surprising that contemporary speculation 
is hesitant to grapple with the place of language within its prgramme. It must 
be noted, though, that this tendency easily leads to a point of blinding 
accepting the notion that language constitutes an irredeemable enemy of 
speculation tout court. As Avanessian has cogently written, in these 
circumstances, the speculative turn becomes such an unmitigated offensive 
against ‘linguistic monism’ (Barad, 2007, p. 44) that an impression of the 
mutual exclusivity between speculation, on the one hand, and language on 
the other, presents itself as necessary and thus as insurmountable. As he 
writes: 
The renewed interest in […] materialism in contemporary Continental 
philosophy comes with a polemic […], it directly opposes or objects to the 
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theoretical projects of the linguistic turn. Ontology, it would seem to follow, is 
inaccessible to any kind of philosophical endeavour anchored in a philosophy 
of language or in linguistics. (Avanessian, 2016, p. 199)  
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that those who treat of language as 
an object of speculative inquiry appear fundamentally counterintuitive to 
(contemporary) speculation’s inherent purport, i.e. to escape a philosophical 
entrapment in that which is all too human. Despite all of these concerns, 
however, there are voices emerging within the speculative turn itself which 
announce a desire to overhaul this obvious limit (indeed, recognising the 
limit is in the very least the commencement of its overcoming).  
Whistler (2010), for instance, firmly articulates the need to overcome this 
unwillingness to speculatively engage with language. Lest contemporary 
speculation fail on its own terms to think absolutely, Whistler argues that this 
new movement of thought ought not to ignore language as an object of its 
inquiry (ibid., p. 3). To back-up this claim Whistler refers to Grant’s notion of 
an “extensity test.” To be speculative is to be extensive (Grant, 2006, p. 19; 
cf. Siebers, 1998, p. 73) and a philosophy will be extensive if and when it 
encompasses the universe within its concepts, including, crucially, an 
understanding of itself (indeed its linguistic expression or articulation) 
through such concepts.15 What an employment of this extensity test allows 
the recent speculative turn to reveal is its elimination of linguistic inquiry 
(Grant, 2006, p. 21). Contemporary speculation turns out not to be 
                                                          
15 This notion of an “extensity test” has some basis in Bloch’s philosophy. For Bloch, “to think” means 
“to transgress,” but transgression is not for its own sake. Philosophical thought always aims at 
overcoming the world’s ‘uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit]’, indeed, as part of that, the uncanniness of the 
philosopher’s questioning Ich, a darkness and an unknowing which always just is philosophy’s 
commencement (Bloch, 1985d, p. 17). As Bloch writes: ‘Philosophy seeks […] the one view of the 
world.’ (1985d, p. 17) The strangeness of Bloch’s philosophical intervention is that he inscribes this 
“seeking for the one view” as the process of being itself. 
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speculative enough, then; insofar as language is a part of the world any 
disavowal of the linguistic renders contemporary speculation contrary to its 
very notion of thinking absoluteness.  
Against this backdrop there arises the opportunity to subject language to 
speculation. As Avanessian notes, there exists an opening through which to 
think language speculatively as ‘an object in the same dimension as other 
objects.’ (2016, p. 205)  
[C]an language be transformed from the universal medium in which philosophy 
takes place into a regional object on which philosophy speculates? (Whistler, 
2010, p. 338; cf. Whistler 2012, pp. 100-1) 
Despite the evident infancy of this question—at least for contemporary 
speculation—there has been some moves made to respond to it. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly these have been provided by the same authors who have 
best identified contemporary speculation’s “linguistic limit.” Both thinkers 
dispute the conviction which posits the existence of an unbridgeable 
opposition between philosophy of language and speculation (in fact, it could 
be said that to presuppose such opposition inadvertently reasserts the 
linguistic turn’s notion of an insurmountable rift between language and 
world). But Avanessian and Whistler—these are authors I am referring to—
offer different ways of proceeding within this new found opening in 
speculation. Below I briefly outline these respective responses and offer 
passing analyses. I ought to stress that whilst I find both responses to the 
problem at hand as coming short, and for different reasons, I think that their 
respective attempts to grapple with the place of language amidst the renewal 
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of speculation prove to be important stimuli for my project of thinking 
language’s materialism in and through Bloch’s thought. In fact, it could be 
said that both Avanessian’s and Whistler’s responses serve as foils for my 
study. Nonetheless, ultimately my claim will be that both Avanessian and 
Whislter’s respective solution to the problem, despite the merits of each, are 
‘deficient in utopian thought and lacking an adequately prospective view’, to 
borrow a sentence from Bloch (LE, p. 55). With the help of Bloch’s 
philosophy it is possible to contribute to addressing this deficiency.  
To begin, it would be well to say that the ontological presuppositions which 
underlay Avanessian and Whistler’s respective contributions fundamentally 
place into question an ontology of objects, the latter of which, as Puntel 
(2011, pp. 121-2) importantly claims, is subservient to a subject-predicate 
propositional form for its own articulation.  
[a] I start with Avanessian. The basic direction of Avanessian’s (2016, p. 
199) thinking is to propose and begin to develop a ‘speculative ontology of 
language’. This project is motivated by the following conviction: 
I believe contemporary speculative philosophy can and should be 
accompanied by a realist or materialist linguistics, a poetics or a theory of 
language that reflects the unavoidable relation of thought, language and the 
world. (ibid., p. 204) 
Avanessian’s thesis is somewhat peculiar because it draws an ontology from 
the nature of language itself (as opposed to reading language into an 
already standing ontological speculation, as my method will proceed below 
with Bloch). Avanessian’s commencing claim is that far from being 
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antithetical to ontology, ‘language always already contains an ontological 
thesis’: ‘the world that language mediates is made up of relations, not of 
objects.’ (ibid., p. 199) From this distinction, in which relations maintain an 
ontological precedence over objects, Avanessian then asserts that language 
therefore possesses ‘an immanent knowledge and can thus claim for itself a 
higher degree of realism than our perception, which presents us with things 
alone.’ (ibid.) What is being proposed here is the idea that language 
registers or stages the nature of the real (as opposed to the linguistic turn’s 
position, which holds the real to be inaccessible to the human being who is 
always already encircled within language). It ought to be noted in passing 
that Avanessian’s view here is not entirely original. It is also held by another 
speculative philosopher, namely Puntel (2008, p. 6), who equally asserts 
that ‘[a]mong the most important implications of language […] are its 
ontological implications.’ Nevertheless, Avanessian is one of the few 
scholars to have seriously treated of this idea (and continues to do so), and 
his underlying premise that language does not restrict speculative access to 
the real but rather serves as a window out onto the real, is a crucial premise 
for my study. 
However, it is worth dwelling with Avanessian’s proposals for one more 
passing moment so as to draw out a number of specific points of difference 
between his and my own approach to the problem at hand: to think 
language’s materiality. For instance, whilst I follow Avanessian’s overriding 
presupposition that ‘a speculative ontological approach to the capacities and 
mechanisms of language can capture its realist ontological dimension’ 
(2016, p. 200), I differ with him—placed as a I am within the horizon of 
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Bloch’s philosophy—in what the realist dimension compositionally consists of 
that language is said to capture. For Avanessian, the ontological dimension 
that language captures within itself consists of ‘a realism of relations.’ (ibid., 
p. 199) And yet, while I show that, for Bloch, a speculative ontology of 
language also would show that, far from being arbitrary in its relation to 
matter (pace the “linguistic turn”), language in fact expresses, in and through 
its capacities and mechanisms, the very compositional nature of matter (that 
is, ontology), the ontological composition (or disposition) that is so 
expressed in and through the capacities and mechanisms of language is 
different in Bloch’s philosophy than that which underlies Avanessian’s line of 
inquiry. Briefly put, Bloch’s materialism—the rudiments of his ontological 
composition—proposes not so much a realism of relations (plural) as a 
realism of relation (singular): the relation between incompleteness and 
realisation (and the process from one to the other). On my reading of the 
fundamental composition of Bloch’s materialism (covered in Chapter II), such 
is what language refers to and what therefore it expresses in its own 
“capacities” and “mechanisms.”16 In sum, Avanessian’s contention that a 
speculative ontology of language must come ‘to a different understanding of 
referentiality’ (ibid., p. 201) is one that is supported by Bloch. Nevertheless, 
Bloch provides an alternative referentiality to that provided by Avanessian.  
[b] The ontic-ness which language captures within itself is, with Bloch, 
a much more temporal-dynamic ontic-ness. This is, I believe, much more in 
                                                          
16 This point is picked up in Chapter III, where I develop a reading of anacoluthon as it appears in 
Bloch’s philosophy. I argue that anacoluthon for Bloch is a linguistic phenomenon expressing 
Avanessian’s claim that ‘language leads us right into the world’ (2016, p. 199), but to a world in 
process toward what has not-yet become. Herein lies my difference with Avanessian. Language does 
not apprehend a relational ontology so much as a processual ontology with a direction of futurity. 
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keeping with Whistler’s (2010) alternate proposal vis-à-vis a speculative-
materialist approach to language.  
As mentioned, Whistler also sees the contemporary turn to speculation as 
erring on the topic of the place of language within it. So as to overturn this 
state of affairs he takes his cue from the German idealist philosopher F.W.J 
Schelling, particularly the latter’s Naturphilosphie.17 For present purposes, 
the pertinence of this approach resides in the fact that the broad tendency of 
Bloch’s thought has been dubbed indeed a Marxist unfolding of Schelling’s 
philosophy. Habermas’ (1970, p. 319) suggestion that Bloch constitutes a 
‘Marxist Schelling’ perhaps is the most explicit example of this line of 
thought.18 As will be shown, the nub of my contention with Whistler’s account 
of a speculative approach to language is found on the site of what type of 
Schellingian Bloch precisely may be said to be and what this may mean for 
an interpretation of Bloch’s materialism. 
                                                          
17 Whistler has developed fuller accounts of Schelling’s naturalistic approach to language and indeed 
to the symbol. See Whistler’s Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the System of 
Identity (2013a) and ‘Naturalism and Symbolism’ (2016). At no point do I touch on Bloch’s theory of 
the symbol, despite its belonging together with what can be described as his speculative-materialist 
approach to language.  
 
18 Just what Habermas exactly means by this he does not make entirely clear. There is no doubt, 
however, that Habermas employs the characterisation as a disparagement, even if against his own 
intentions he is onto something: 
 
In Schelling’s “System of Transcendental Idealism” the unconscious assumes the 
double meaning of an impulsive subconscious of the “dark foundation of nature” and a 
winged superconsciousness out of the “voluntary favour of a higher nature”; likewise, 
Bloch separates the nightly dream’s unconsciousness from the day dream’s, the no-
longer-conscious from the not-yet-conscious of the future. In this view, the romantic 
pathos of an antiquarian approach misses an entire sphere of ciphers, symbols, 
mythical elements which appear not only in legends but in viewing nature and art, in 
dreams and visions, in poetry and philosophy. (Habermas, 1970, p. 318)   
 
I must make clear that my intention is not to explore this Schellingian inheritance in Bloch’s thought, 
nor its Marxist inheritance for that matter. Habermas’ point, however, is an insightful one and does 
come to bear on my critical analysis of Whistler’s approach to the materialism of language (see below, 
especially fn. 23). For work on Schelling in the context of the recent speculative turn, see Corriero & 
Dezi’s (eds.) Nature and Realism in Schelling’s Philosophy (2013). For work on Bloch’s inheritance of 
Schelling in relation to philosophy of nature, see Zimmermann’s Nothingness as Ground and Nothing 
but Ground: Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature Revisited (2014). 
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For now I return to Whistler. Whistler unfolds his piece on a speculative 
reflection on language from, in the first instance, Schelling’s critique of Kant, 
that same Kant who is said to have reduced all questions of nature to the 
ethical organism alone—recall that philosophy to Kant’s lights is said only to 
be concerned with the subject, not the object. Whistler attempts to properly 
think through Schelling’s naturalistic treatment of language, a move that sets 
out an alternative to this, Kant’s ‘ethicisation of nature’ (ibid., p. 340; see also 
Guyer, 2000, p. xxxviii)), and therefore may be said to re-orient thought back 
towards the object. A damaging result of the Kantian treatment that ethicises 
nature is the result of “phenomenalism”: that is, the process of ‘a reduction of 
nature to what can be experienced’ (ibid.). Nature’s reduction to the 
experiential alone inevitably leads to a ‘theory of bodies’ that is underpinned 
by a ‘disinclination to go beyond the given and uncover its conditions.’ (ibid.) 
Bloch has much sympathy for the broad tendency of this Schellingian 
critique of the Kantian approach to nature (or matter), in which phenomena 
are not posited as exhausting the generativity that produces their existence. 
Bloch would concur that philosophy’s maintaining an interest ‘in natural 
phenomena’ alone—in place of ‘productive nature’—will ultimately prevent 
philosophy from being philosophy, i.e. from getting at that which ‘exceeds 
such phenomena’ (ibid.). It ought to be highlighted in passing that the 
echoes here with Avanessian are plain: bodies/objects ought not to be given 
ontological precedence. The difference is that Avanessian holds relations to 
be the ontological point of departure, while for Whistler’s Schellingian 
approach ‘dynamics’ (ibid.) serves as the starting point for speculation on the 
nature of nature (and thus on the nature of language). Not then “relations 
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before objects” but “dynamics before bodies.”19 As Whistler writes: ‘Central 
to this change in perspective is a tireless concern with how the phenomenal 
is generated; it is this which is of interest, not phenomenal bodies 
themselves.’ (ibid., pp. 340-1)  
How, then, to Whistler’s mind, is the naturalistic generation of language’s 
phenomenality to be grasped in the Schellingian context? For a Schellingian 
‘speculative linguistics’ (ibid., p. 342) any speculation on language is 
incorporated into the abovementioned generative approach to philosophising 
nature. In this fashion, words constitute the objects of language and 
therefore are treated as physical phenomena (products or bodies, as it 
were), just like any other natural bodies or products. Language is seen as a 
product of nature’s productivity, then, language is the continuing result of 
‘dynamic forces […] which generate other natural phenomena’ (ibid., p. 343). 
It is this recourse to treating of the word as a natural product (think of the 
implications of this for religion) that provides Schelling the room to think the 
natural generativity of language at a more fundamental level. And Schelling 
tends to think this linguistic generativity through recourse to geology: 
Can words, Schelling asks, be thought of on the model of natural objects, 
produced by dynamic forces analogous to those which generate other natural 
phenomena (like mountains)? And in so asking, he raises the possibility of 
treating the formation of words on a geological model. (Whistler, 2016, p. 103) 
Insofar as the science of geology excavates the earth’s layers to discover 
the deep past to which these layers belong, so then can language be 
                                                          
19 This claim certainly resonates with Bloch, and interestingly does so close to a discussion of 
language: ‘Genuine realistic poetry deals with process, from which the facts have been artificially 
isolated and reified.’ (LE, p. 114)  
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treated, as a natural product, in the light of a philological geology in which 
the present phenomenal state of language is traced back to the deep past: 
‘Both sciences [i.e. philology and geology] proceed beyond the 
phenomenally given to the forces which generate them, and, as such, both 
venture into empirically inaccessible depths.’ (ibid., p. 345)  
To my mind, the crucial points which ought to be drawn from Whistler’s 
approach to a speculative-materialist appraisal of language are the following. 
It has to be stressed that, in the context of Bloch’s materialism, Whistler’s 
Schellingian-inspired response is pertinent due to its prioritising generativity. 
However, what is problematic in this response is that it is seen to direct 
language-speculation towards that which lies in the primordial past, i.e. the 
generativity of (linguistic) phenomenality is subterraneanly located, and 
therefore the movement of speculation directs itself down and back (into the 
past), and not, as is the case with Bloch’s form of speculation, out and 
beyond (into the future). As Bloch himself writes, it is ‘the horizon of the 
future’ which ‘gives reality its real dimension’ (PHE, p. 285; emphasis 
removed). The form-ation of words will be seen to proceed forwards for 
Bloch: ‘The legitimate will to remember the ground [das Entsinnenwollen auf 
den Grund], the primum agens of origin, finds its fund in the Now’; ‘its 
Wherein [Worin] and Whence [Woher] is only detectable ex fundamemto in 
the Whither [Wohin] and What-for [Wozu].’ (TE, p. 215) One has to speculate 
‘ahead [nach vorwärts]’, not back (TE, p. 216). Once more: 
the Omega of the Where To explains itself not with reference to a primally 
been Alpha, supposedly most real of all, of the Where From, of the origin, but 
on the contrary: this origin explains itself first with reference to the Novum of 
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the end, indeed, as an origin still essentially unrealised in itself, it first enters 
reality with this Ultimum. (PHE, p. 204)  
In the horizon of what is most vital for Bloch’s philosophical thought, 
Whistler’s speculative account of language pales into the primordial. If it be 
true, then, that Bloch is Schellingian in scope, he remains, and resolutely so, 
a Marxist Schelling: for Bloch, what has not yet become determines the 
direction of his speculation. The generativity that produces phenomenality, 
i.e. the ‘unconscious production of givenness’, as Bloch (1985c, p. 200) is, 
for Bloch, futurally directed.20 In sum, the attractiveness of Whistler’s 
approach lies in its prioritising dynamics over objects (generativity over what 
is generated).21 This will be an important feature of my reading of 
anacoluthon. The downside, however, is the temporal direction Whistler 
prioritises in this generativity. With an eye to my discussion in Chapter II on 
analogy, one could say that Whistler’s approach to linguistic generativity is 
protological, whilst Bloch’s remains eschatological. Nevertheless, Whistler’s 
(2012, p. 99) ‘hyper-realist attitude to sense’ (his hyper-naturalistic approach 
to language) serves as a springboard with which my own study proceeds. 
                                                          
20 See PA, p. 119, where Bloch intimates a form of speculation in which the inexperiential side of 
phenomenality possesses an ‘aurora bearing [aurorische Seite]’, which, as such, Bloch coins as ‘not-
yet-conscious [Noch-Nicht-Bewußt]’; this is opposed to the archaic ‘no-longer-conscious [Nicht-Mehr-
Bewußten]’, which evidently directs Schelling’s geological approach to linguistic generativity, and 
which in Bloch’s eyes is tied to the Freudian thematic. Disputation with Freud (and Frued’s apparent 
repetition of Platonic anamnesis’ backward logic) cuts right across the whole of Bloch’s philosophy. 
For a study that situates Schelling’s connection with the Freudian notion of unconscious, see Ffytche’s 
The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche (2012). 
 
21 Part of my argument in Chapter III will be to show that anacoluthon displays within language the 
primacy of the process of language over the product of language, the forming over what is formed. 
This relates to Schelling’s philosophy of nature, in which, as Bloch (1985c, p. 203) says, Schelling 
challenges natural researchers not to forget nature’s productivity over its product (this echoes A.N. 
Whitehead’s [1978, p. 21] designation of Creativity as ‘the universal of universals characterising 
ultimate matter of fact’). To gloss the point in Schellingian terms: anacoluthon marks the slippage in 
language between the ‘infinite productivity’ and the ‘finite products’ of nature, within language (Bloch, 
1985c, p. 203). Bloch unequivocally politicises this Schelling-motif by relating it to Marx’s analysis of 
the reification of human labour into fixed commodity-objects (ibid., pp. 203-4).    
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Whistler’s approach allows me to query the legitimacy of speculative 
linguistics laid upon utopian foundations. Is there not room to think a futural 
physics in which the vitality of nature is truly vital because open to the new? 
Could not the generativity of linguistic phenomenality be thought futurally? 
Can a futurally-directed processuality/generativity be the matter of 
speculation on language? Bloch’s materialism allows me to explore this 
notion. 
I am not the first to have spotted the potential that Bloch’s philosophy 
possesses for philosophising language in an original register such as I have 
just quried above. Steiner (1975, p. 209), a literary theorist, is one of the few 
commentators to have fully recognised that Bloch’s philosophical 
axiomatic—i.e. the notion that speculative totality or fulfilled Being (totum 
esse) is not-yet in being but constitutes that which all things urge towards—
as a potential site through which to renew philosophy of language. In an 
important remark, Steiner writes: Bloch’s ‘semantics of rational apocalypse 
have general philosophic and linguistic application.’ (1975, p. 217; my 
emphasis)22 However, whilst it is clear to Steiner’s mind that Bloch’s utopian 
philosophy could significantly inform philosophy of language, Steiner’s 
remarks are suggestive at best. Their implications go undeveloped. Indeed, 
just what a linguistic application of Bloch’s philosophy entails (Steiner’s 
intuition) must systematically draw on the categories of Bloch's materialism, 
but this is just what (perhaps unsurprisingly) Steiner does not attend to. My 
                                                          
22 Elsewhere Steiner (1996, p. 24) speaks of Walter Benjamin’s ‘messianic linguistics’—Benjamin 
being, like Adorno, a close associate of Bloch’s. In my mind this gives a degree of justification to 
explore the possibility of a “utopian-materialist linguistics,” and it is precisely toward developing the 
beginnings of such a linguistics that Chapter III devotes itself through providing a reading of 
anacoluthon. 
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study makes good on Steiner’s intuition by setting out a linguistic application 
of Bloch’s philosophy. It will be an application which sees language as 
immersed in and expressive of the world as urge to creative forms, with the 
Thing in Itself as the objective phantasy: ‘the true poetic correlate’—as ‘Marx 
once called it’—is, Bloch avers, ‘the “dream of a thing” in the world.’ (LE, p. 
114; my emphasis) A speculative philosophy of language, then, just is a 
utopian philosophy of language.23  
§3. METHOD 
Having laid-out my study-question, its thesis, and the contemporary 
backdrop which lends to it its proper departure point and direction of travel, I 
now will make two remarks concerning my study’s broad methodological 
approach. 
[1] My approach to reading Bloch’s corpus is akin to montage, a concept 
or artistic practice Bloch associates with porosity (LE, p. 454).24 With regard 
to montage, Bloch writes that ‘[o]nly the artificial and abstract viewpoint 
produces continuity—it does not engender breaks in style, which has led to 
montage.’ (LE, p. 118) The porous technique of montage is such that a 
variety of disparate elements break into a frame where they would not 
usually belong, thus engendering a fragmented image but an image seeking 
to portray a core truth of reality: reality qua discontinuity. In this light Bloch 
                                                          
23 I will have occasion to return to Steiner’s intuition in more detail (Chapter III). This is because 
Steiner’s (1965, p. 341) claim that Bloch’s expressionistic style of language belongs to the 
‘Pythagorean genre’ inadvertently lends support to my reading Bloch’s materialism as a form of 
analogic metaphysics. As I show in Chapter II, Pythagorean speculation is the conceptual inception of 
analogy. 
 
24 “Porosity” and montage intersect on the site of a fluidity of boundaries: ‘Walter Benjamin’, Bloch 
writes, ‘has described Italy as “porous,” implying not a classical but a baroque interplay: an object that 
lacks boundaries, but that is nonetheless bound together.’ (LE, p. 451)  
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calls montage, especially as employed by ‘Leninist of the stage’ Bertolt 
Brecht, ‘a force of production.’ (HT, pp. 229 & 206) In order to undertake the 
necessity of creativity (recall, Bloch did not possess an explicit philosophy of 
language), I draw on the whole breadth of Bloch’s corpus, bringing together 
all number of comments and observations on diverse subject-matter; always 
with an eye to their significance for the study’s question (language turns out 
to be omnia ubique). As Bloch casts my approach: ‘the montage of the 
fragment out of its old existence is the experiment of its refunctioning into a 
new one here.’ (HT, p. 207) Bloch’s corpus thus becomes ‘a kind of 
laboratory, an open experimental space’ (HT, p. 226) for the speculative-
materialist philosopher of language.25 
 Perhaps nothing brings one into closer contact with a thinker than translating him 
into one’s mother tongue.—McInerny, 2003, p. 3 
[2] The final remark is a note on translation. A large portion of Bloch’s 
collected works have yet to undergo translation into English.26 This therefore 
makes confrontation with the original texts a necessity. The problem 
                                                          
25 The drawback of this montage-like approach lies in its failure to treat of the variations of themes and 
categories which inevitably took place as Bloch developed his philosophy from its early to more 
mature stages (a point made by Geoghegan, 1996, p. 27). Is something not lost if such differences are 
readily glossed over? My approach, however, treats of the corpus as a unity. Any conceptual 
variations witnessed through the development of Bloch’s philosophy constantly harbour an 
unchanging intention—an invariant of direction. One owes it to the task of philosophy to treat Bloch’s 
works in such manner that what is being searched for in them is precisely a core of truth. That from the 
earliest to the latest stages of Bloch’s entanglement with the human mind’s perennial questions there 
is mediated—amidst the variations, digressions and detours—an enduring insight, dark perhaps but 
always there, vitally informing (see Boldyrev, 2014, pp. 7-8).  
Bloch’s works evoke a sense of chronological stillness despite stylistic changes or 
reformulations of his philosophical and political stance. His aim is at a collection of evidence 
toward hope, the Noch-Nicht, the utopia whose latency and tendency Bloch tries to map as 
his own philosophical and literary cosmology. (Weissberg, 1992, p. 33) 
 
26 Although a recent contract with the publishing house Brill now means that many of Bloch’s most 
precious contributions to philosophy will over the coming years be finding their way for the first time 
into the English language (Thompson, 2013a, p. 11). 
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becomes one of how best to approach the task of translation, especially 
when the topic under consideration here is the speculative-material nature of 
language as perceived within the horizon of Bloch’s philosophy. Could 
something be lost on Bloch’s view of language if it be incorrectly transfigured 
over into English? 
One can get a bearing on this problem by turning to the manner in which 
Hegel has evoked problems for his English translators. Indeed, it has almost 
become a reflex action to claim that Hegel is for the most party unreadable 
and that the ‘peculiarity and flexibility’ of Hegelian syntax confirms the 
obscurity of its philosophical content. It is said that ‘Hegel is one of the 
philosophers about whom the question of readability is almost immediately 
raised.’ (Cassin, 2004, p. 386; cf. Adorno, 1993, p. 89) Hegel’s language 
problematicity lies in its unexpected employment of everyday speech (one 
could say, then, that it is almost montage-like in this respect): 
[With Hegel] ordinary language is rapidly enveloped and invested by 
phenomenological or speculative discourse, and this is shown by ruptures, 
anacolutha, and other anomalies that rapidly increase, to the confusion of the 
reader. (ibid., p. 388; my emphasis)27 
Such use of language for Hegel befits the movement of the Thing in Itself—
rupture, contradiction. This is an important point because it serves to 
                                                          
27 A more fluid, open form of syntax is common to German philosophy. As Forster (2002, p. ix; my 
emphasis) notes, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803) was against ‘any grammatical or lexical 
straitjacketing of language’; this led, Forster suggests, to Herder’s seemingly ‘emotional and 
grammatically undisciplined’ form of expression; to this effect Herder ‘artfully’ employed ‘rhetorical-
grammatical figures’ such as ‘anacoluthon, aposiopesis, brachylogy, chiasmus, hendiadys, oxymoron, 
and hysteron proteron.’ Of an earlier thinker within the German tradition, Parecelsus (1493-1541), 
Weeks (2008, p. 40) notes of the integral place of ellipse and anacoluthon: Paracelsus, he writes, ‘is 
above all a writer of the voice’ (ibid., p. 41; my emphasis). 
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compound the problem of how best to translate him. Hegel was a constant 
non-contemporary interlocutor for Bloch, and the problems with translating 
Hegel seem to spill over into Bloch’s own philosophy. Bloch’s style is 
portrayed—particularly by its detractors—as especially taxing.28 Much of the 
problem relates to Bloch’s association with German Expressionism; in fact, 
he is considered the philosopher of this avant-garde movement.29 The 
difficulty lies, I think, in the manner in which Bloch’s style of expression is 
inextricably bound to of the compositional structure of his materialism. As I 
will hope to show, Bloch’s processual, incomplete conception of matter 
militates against a type of philosophical clarity that can be pocketed as one 
easily does a coin. This does not entail esoteric consequences, but it must 
be said that Bloch’s at points oneiric idiom (the same is said of Hegel’s [ibid, 
                                                          
28 For example, Bloch’s ‘reader feels as though he were amid the fumes of an alchemist’s laboratory’; 
Bloch is ‘a preacher of intellectual irresponsibility’ whose prose is ‘verbiage of intolerable complexity.’ 
(Kolakowski, 2005, pp. 1124 & 1143-4) Interestingly, Kolakowski is repeating Stalinist criticism 
directed at Bloch. Bloch’s Marxist re-visionism was said to translate into a mystical, irrational, and 
obscurantist style of language (see Kessler, 2006, p. 33). That a vehement anti-Stalinist (Kolakowski) 
relies upon similar criticism as the vulgar Marxists ought to give pause for thought; it is analogous to 
orthodox Marxist critiques of Expressionism which, mirroring the Nazis’ judgement of the avant-garde 
movement, perceived it as degenerate.  
 
29 For a pertinent study on the historical context of German Expressionism, see Bushart’s (1990) Der 
Geist der Gotik und die expressionistische Kunst, in which the tendencies of socialism, utopianism, 
expressionism and gothic revival (tendencies all discernible in Bloch’s first book) are woven into an 
illuminating explication of the immediate post-First World War production of German art. Steiner is well 
aware of these tendencies:   
As early as the essays of 1912-17 and Thomas Münzer, Bloch makes of the act of 
writing a peculiarly individual and urgent deed. Though strongly influenced by 
Expressionism, Bloch’s earlier prose has its own abrupt lyric insistence. In Bloch’s 
mature style, there are pages we can set beside Hölderlin and Nietzsche for their 
subtle brightness. Like few other masters of German, he has broken the generically 
ponderous, clotted norms of German syntax. (1985, p. 113; my emphasis) 
Adorno is also attuned to Bloch’s rich, versatile, free expressionism: 
The tempo is more than the mere medium of a subjectively excited delivery. Its 
intensity is that of something to be expressed, the breakthrough that, explicitly or 
implicitly, forms the theme of every sentence Bloch ever wrote, a breakthrough he tries 
to evoke through the figure of his speech. This tempo is comparable to the 
expressionist tempo, which abbreviates. Philosophically, it indicates a change of 
attitude toward the object. The object can no longer be contemplated peacefully and 
with composure. (2008, p. 216; my emphasis) 
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p. 387]) does produce a number of problems concerning the translation of 
his work.30 The best way to tackle this problem is to approach the task of 
translation as Bloch’s contemporary Walter Benjamin perceived it. Without 
going into the specificities of Benjamin’s (1999a) approach, the point made 
at very end of his essay can be cited to highlight my general approach. The 
following passage from Rudolf Pannwitz’s Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur 
is drawn on by Benjamin: 
“The basic error of the translator is that he preserves the state in which his own 
language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be powerfully 
affected by the foreign tongue. […]. He must expand and deepen his language 
by means of the foreign language.” (ibid, pp. 261-2) 
Benjamin speaks of translation producing ‘birth pangs’ in one’s own 
language (ibid., p. 256); the afterlife of a work, through its translation, effects 
the recipient language such that it undergoes a stepping beyond itself into 
new expression.31 As will become clear during the progression of my study, 
this process echoes the very nature of Bloch’s materialism.32 
                                                          
30 This is, I think, compounded by Bloch never writing in English, despite having lived in America in 
exile. Evidence exists to suggest that Bloch held a low opinion of English. Reflecting on the life of the 
German language in a foreign land (the German emigres in America), Bloch writes that 
great philosophers can have broad effects without their language (the most concrete 
example is the continued existence of Hegel), but they can only be understood in the 
“original,” that is, in their place of linguistic origination. (1994, p. 383) 
[große Philosophen ohne ihre Sprache zwar weitergetrieben werden (das konkreteste 
Exempel ist das Fortleben Hegels), aber verstanden werden können sie nur im 
“Original”, das heißt in ihrer sprachlichen Ursprungsstelle.] 
31 Moir & Siebers (2011) scrutinise the manner in which Bloch’s thought informs not only an approach 
to the praxis of translation but also reveals a truth-content of the process of translation itself. Querying 
the notion of “translation as utopia,” they write that 
 
It is not unconditionally the case that translation is hope, but the parallels permit closer 
consideration. For example, just as does hope, so translation presupposes a still 
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§4. OUTLINE OF THE WORK 
My thesis is arranged into three parts. In the first instance a good 
amount of groundwork is required before I can begin to speak of any 
linguistic application of Bloch’s materialism. My study’s first two chapters, 
then, are of a propaedeutic nature. Together they elucidate the central 
categories that make up Bloch’s materialism. Summarised schematically, in 
Chapter I, I will present and critically discuss the fundamental categories 
constituting Bloch’s materialism. These categories number six in total—they 
are, I will argue, crucial to fostering a Blochian approach to language’s 
materiality. There I unpack the philosophical positions, inheritances and 
novel philosophical effects they entail. If for Bloch’s materialism the essence 
of the world is gay spirit and urge to creative forms, then at this early stage 
of the study I elaborate the categories through which Bloch thinks this to be 
so. In sum, I argue in Chapter I that Bloch’s materialism can be understood 
as a dialectic between incompleteness and realisation. 
I then proceed in Chapter II to submit Bloch’s materialism to an original 
interpretation. I show how Bloch’s materialism can be seen to constitute an 
experimental form of analogic metaphysics. Reading this materialism as an 
experimental form of analogic metaphysics allows me to make sense of what 
Bloch means when he says that the Thing in Itself is the objective phantasy; 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
outstanding totality. Without, so to speak, the concept of the “translation of the 
untranslatable”—that is, […] the “hope for the unexpected”—no translation would be 
possible at all, because all translation is an attempt to come nearer to this 
untranslatable, or is at least an attempt to represent it in absentio. (ibid, p. 185) 
 
32 I do not translate works which have already undergone translation into English—The Principle of 
Hope being the foremost in this case (see abbreviations list for an indication as to the works). All other 
translations of are my own; they are of those works that remain available only in German (the vast 
majority of works, it must be said). I have sought transparency. Wherever I translate Bloch at length I 
provide the original passage in parentheses underneath. 
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it also allows me to bring closer together matter and language. To 
substantiate my reading and to bring into view its consequences, I will 
sketch the analogy of being as it has appeared at key stages in the history of 
philosophy, i.e. ancient Greek, medieval, and modern. This will open up a 
path through which to conceptualise language as a transgressive process; 
the utopian cadence I mentioned above.  
In Chapter III, I develop the implications of the previous two chapters’ 
findings for a speculative-materialist approach to language that can be 
described as Blochian. To achieve this I will narrow my focus by reading the 
rhetorical figure of anacoluthon. This figure of speech serves as a nodal 
point in which my analogic reading of Bloch’s materialism becomes visible 
and meaningful for a speculative-materialist approach to language. My 
argument will be that anacoluthon is a figure of language that embodies the 
findings of the previous two chapters. Anacoluthon constitutes a linguistic 
expression of the incompleteness, the processuality and the urge for 
realisation that marks Bloch’s conception of the world’s ontology. The figure 
expresses the urge to creative forms in a transgressive process of speaking 
into the new.33 I refer to this transgressive process of speaking into the new, 
exemplified by anacoluthic interruptions, as a process of “je über hinaus”: a 
process of ever-beyond-and-out toward that which is not-yet. Bloch’s new 
materialism is a materialism of the new; I read language as showing, in 
anacoluthic expression, the same ontological disposition. Linguistic 
                                                          
33 In the context of Bloch’s philosophy, Zimmermann (2004, pp. 656 & 660) speaks of an Unsagbaren-
Sagbaren dialectic. This dialectic between the sayable and the unsayable is, Zimmermann implies, the 
root of process for Bloch. As such, the transgressive process unique to language of which I speak of is 
transgressive because its purpose is always one of expressing that which remains unexpressed or, as 
the case may well be, inexpressible. I understand Zimmermann’s assertion to be correct, and I further 
its insight by reading anacoluthon in tandem with it. 
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production is utopian, and the anacoluthon gives one to think this in a 
concrete manner. As Bloch writes: ‘Every production intends an element of 
the seventh day of creation, as the statement of the previously unsaid, the 
human hearing of the previously unheard’ (PHE, p. 982).34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Bloch assigns creativity a fundamental place within his conception of matter, so much so that one 
can say with Bloch utopia stands as a newly founded transcendens of being, a thesis comparable to 
Fetz’s (1990) claim that A.N. Whitehead’s process philosophy proposes the notion of “creativity” as a 
new transcendental of being. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MATTER 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The persistent presence of the concept of matter throughout the 
Western philosophical tradition (from the pre-Socratics to the present day) 
leaves commentators no choice but to designate it a topos of philosophy 
(Lange, 1908, p. 3). As McMullin (1965, p. 1) argues, ‘to trace the story of 
matter is almost to trace the story of philosophy itself’; matter is ‘the oldest 
conceptual tool in the Western speculative tradition’, and whether the case 
be ancient or modern, ‘an initial judgement about the role attributed to 
matter’ is ‘decisive in orienting a philosophical system as a whole.’ (ibid; my 
emphasis) Such claims ring true when they are applied to Bloch’s 
philosophy. From beginning to end, Bloch’s thought concerns the concept of 
matter and the role attributed to this concept unmistakably orients Bloch’s 
philosophical thought in its (open) totality (see Münster, 1987, p. 571).  
The upshot of this for my study is that a speculative-materialist philosophy of 
language that wishes to speak in Blochian tones must first grasp the role 
that Bloch attributes to matter. In what follows, then, I will provide an 
exposition of the categorial lineaments of Bloch’s materialism, i.e. the main 
categories that make up his concept of matter. It consists of three parts, 
division immanent to Bloch’s materialism. In §1 I will deal with the broad 
departure point of Bloch’s materialism, best described, I think, as an 
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“ontologisation of Kant,” which, as such, hardly resonates with Kant’s 
intention of confronting central questions in epistemology.35 Having dealt 
with what I consider to be the broad starting point of Bloch’s materialism, in 
§2 and §3 I will then deal with the substantive categories which make up this 
move; namely, the categories of “tendency” and “latency,” respectively. As 
well as treating of each in a substantive fashion, both the genealogies and 
the really real dialectical interaction between tendency and latency will be 
dealt with, too.36 I will show that, whilst tendency describes the processuality 
of matter’s searching for its own what-ness, latency deals with the nature of 
what-ness when what-ness is conceived of as really not-yet. In the same 
spirit of coherency I will also analyse three other Blochian categories which 
feed into this approach: “Front,” “Novum,” and “Ultimum” (PHE, pp. 198-205; 
Siebers, 2012a, p. 412). In a letter to the theologian Paul Tillich, Bloch 
describes these three categories as the ‘most un-thought through 
[undurchdachtensten]’ (1985b, p. 827) in the vast expanse of philosophy’s 
ongoing history. Their consideration will serve to better illuminate the stakes 
of the tendency and latency categories. All these categories—tendency, 
latency, Front, Novum, Ultimum—will be crucial to my linguistic appraisal of 
Bloch’s speculative materialism.37 
                                                          
35 Put schematically, I understand by “ontologisation of Kant” the gesture by which Bloch inscribes the 
question of what matter is into the constitution of matter itself, such that matter in itself is a searching 
for its own what-ness (TE, p. 209). For an equally significant ontologisation of Kant, see Heidegger’s 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1997).  
 
36 Bloch’s philosophy did not begin de novo. In spite of Holz’s (1975, p. 121) legitimate claim that only 
by way of bracketing oneself from the presuppositions of the tradition of materialism can one then 
glimpse the proper import of Bloch’s concept of matter, it is nevertheless only through a knowledge of 
that tradition that this process of breaking free actually occurs. All this is to Bloch’s temper of mind: 
any suspension of tradition relies upon tradition.  
 
37 While I treat of each category analytically as if each stood alone, I do so only for the purpose of 
clear elucidation. In truth all Blochian categories presuppose each other—each is pregnant with the 
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§1. ONTOLOGISING KANT 
 The starting point of Bloch’s materialism, to my mind, consists of an 
ontologisation of Kant’s Copernican turn in philosophical thought. As I have 
briefly stated Kant’s position in the Introduction, this turn consists of the 
objects of philosophical thought being scrutinised no longer as if our 
knowledge conforms to the nature of such objects—a metaphysical 
tendency Kant terms dogmatic metaphysics—but as if they ‘conform to our 
knowledge.’ (B xvi; my emphasis) It constitutes a shift, whereby the subject 
of thought is given precedence over the object of thought. Philosophical 
thought thus no longer deals with objects (or things) as they are in 
themselves, Kant declares, but instead deals with objects as they are for the 
human mind. What does it mean, then, to claim that Bloch ontologises this 
Copernican turn? It lays in Bloch’s inscribing incomprehensibility into 
matter’s own ontological constitution. The question of what matter is thus 
becomes a question matter fundamentally asks of itself. As Bloch writes: 
What is matter? This question is […] the own most question of all matter itself, 
its resolution-experiment in progress. It is the What-problem of human contents 
together with not only our sustaining but cosmically enormous, encompassing 
nature. (TE, p. 209) 
[Was ist Materie?, diese Frage ist…das eigenste, das noch in seinem 
welthaften Lösungsversuch befindliche aller Materie selber. Es ist das 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
next. Furthermore, the porosity between categories relates to the speculativeness of Bloch’s thought: 
these categories do not exist beyond the reality of which they speak, rather they immanently emerge 
from reality’s process. Blochian categories are thus forms of being-there (Daseinsformen), existence-
vocations/determinations (Existenz-bestimmungen) (EM, p. 66). As such their ‘contents widen and 
change in the course of history and in the light of the new’, i.e. the Novum (Siebers, 2012d, p. 162).  
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Wasproblem des menschlichen Inhalts samt dem der uns nicht nur tragenden, 
sondern kosmisch so ungeheuerlich umgebenden Natur.] 
As I will outline further in Chapter II, for Bloch, the basis of the really real 
incomprehensibility of what matter is resides in matter’s really real 
incompleteness, i.e. matter’s “what-problem,” the ‘kernel of the world’ (PA, p. 
146), is not yet resolved according to Bloch because matter’s essence has 
yet to finish its journey. Keeping in mind that my claim of Bloch ontologising 
Kant could well constitute a thesis in itself, below I will briefly attempt to 
unpack my claim a little further. 
[1] If Kant’s influence in the history of philosophy is ‘vast and protean’ 
(Gardner, 2015, p. 1), then in Bloch Kant receives a new, utopian inflection. 
To substantiate the claim in question here I can turn to Bloch’s notion of the 
‘darkness of the lived moment [Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks].’ (PA, 149) 
Writing to Adorno in 1935, Bloch puts a seal on his guiding philosophical 
insights: ‘the darkness of the lived moment, the form of the inconstructable 
question, not-yet-conscious knowledge, and a new utopian substance’ 
(1985a, p. 435). As a systematic thinker—even though the art of his system 
is an open architectonic—Bloch thinks these insights as related and 
cohering. But it is the first insight—the darkness of the lived moment—that 
constitutes Bloch’s starting point proper and in a sense is that which his 
other key insights circulate around. Thus Bloch’s philosophy and the world 
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itself circle the same “thing.”38 To clarify the ‘root idea [Grundgedanke]’ of his 
philosophy Bloch opts to employ an ocular analogy: 
What is very near, what immediately rises up before my eyes, I cannot see. It 
must give a distance there. Then can it first be objective. Otherwise it is not yet 
once shaped, much less representational. In proverbs it is simply felt: what he 
weaves, no weaver knows - at the foot of the lighthouse there is no light – the 
prophet is never honoured in his own land… (TL, p. 340). 
[Was sehr nah ist, was unmittelbar vor meinem Auge aufragt, kann ich nicht 
sehen. Es muß ein Abstand da sein. Dann erst kann es gegenständlich sein. 
Im anderen Fall ist es noch nicht einmal zuständlich, geschweige 
gegenständlich. In Sprichwörtern ist es sehr einfach gefühlt: Was er webt, weiß 
kein Weber – Am Fuß des Leuchtturms ist kein Licht – Der Prophet gilt nichts 
in seinem Vaterland…] 
A blind spot is the birthplace of (Bloch’s) philosophy just as it is the origin of 
the capacity to see the world. What makes one’s visual field possible is not 
in one’s visual field but rather is extraterritorial to it (Bloch sometimes enlists 
the verb “ausstehen” to make this point, literally: “out-standing”—both in the 
sense of “standing outside of” and “yet to be given”).39 Philosophy, then, is 
an attempt to step outside or beyond itself so as to see itself in an 
uncontrived manner (recall that Bloch’s speculation is based not on the 
                                                          
38 This returns me to the speculative peculiarity of Bloch’s materialism, namely that the identity of 
thought and being resides in a real non-identity: ‘the centre in itself is still night, incognito, ferment, 
around which everyone, everything, and every work is still built.’ (SU, p. 173) 
 
39 As Zimmermann (2001, p. 17; my emphasis) importantly notes, Bloch conveys his philosophical 
point of departure with an ‘optical analogy’. This is an old motif of philosophy of course. In the 
Metaphysics for instance, Aristotle writes: ‘For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the 
reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.’ (993b1, 10-15) 
 
[47] 
 
mirror-thinking of speculum but the logic of speculari: “to look out”).40 The 
theologian Jürgen Moltmann (1978, p. 73) quite correctly describes Bloch’s 
corpus as an overture to a future arrival, namely, to an overcoming of this 
blind spot: to a point where the weaver knows what is woven, where the 
lighthouse illumines its nearest nearness. The possibility of this future arrival 
is the semantic content of Bloch’s philosophy; it is central for developing a 
utopian ontology of language. 
One of the philosophical peculiarities of Bloch’s thought is to have lent to this 
blind spot an immense degree of importance in the task of understanding 
both the world and the subject who thinks the world. This peculiarity can be 
grasped, I think, as an ontologisation of Kant’s approach to the question of 
what matter is in itself. There is, however, a problem that arises with this 
analysis of Bloch’s philosophical departure point. The problem bears of what 
I have suggested in the Introduction, namely that the speculative turn in 
Continental philosophy is fundamentally kataphatic in direction.  
In a well-known remark from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1962), Ludwig 
Wittgenstein names the inexpressible “mystical”: ‘Not how the world is, is the 
mystical, but that it is.’ (6.5.)  Expressing that the world is, is in some sense 
what constitutes the stakes of Bloch’s “blind spot.” But the approaches of 
Bloch and Wittgenstein radically diverge on the point of this inexpressibility: 
‘Whereof one cannot speak,’ Wittgenstein writes, ‘thereof one must remain 
silent.’ (7.) Bloch is party is the recent speculative-materialist turn in 
Continental philosophy in that he, too, seeks to counterpoint this tendency of 
                                                          
40 This point comes across quite clearly in a composition titled “What is Philosophy, as Searching and 
Attempting?” (PA, pp. 395-401) 
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apophatic thought, even if, as I will show, apophaticism remains present in 
his philosophy to some extent.41 As does Kant, Bloch certainly endorses an 
incommunicability; the darkness of the lived moment constitutes an 
‘innermost speechless in-itself [innerste sprachlose Ansich]’ (TE, p. 13). But 
there is an important point that needs emphasising if one is to begin to 
speak within and about Bloch’s materialism. For without an attempt being 
made to represent the dark spot, even if in a radically negative index as with 
Wittgenstein, one would not know of its existence. Only in the act of 
expressing what is real and true about oneself is this dark spot, as it were, 
brought into the light of day. Bloch intimates this when he ties expression to 
coming up against an inadequacy in relation to what was meant but missed. 
It is a recurring motif of his materialism: ‘What we are in ourselves is dark, 
too close. What we become outwardly [äußerlich] […] so often is not in 
accordance with who we are.’ (PA, p. 13) This blind spot so close to home—
a space Bloch also at times calls ‘hollow being’ (ibid., p. 20)—is indeed a 
space of real emergence; not only of speech, but of that which is and of that 
which could become. This process of becoming-outward is thus an important 
one in the horizon of Bloch’s materialism. Incognito moves out of itself and 
thereby expresses itself, both in the sense that it expresses that it is 
incomplete and in the sense that it searches to transgress its own 
incomprehensibility. 
In that matter’s ambiguity is placed not merely over on the epistemological 
side but registers matter’s ontological condition, so then irrational expression 
                                                          
41 As Freeman writes, for Bloch ‘the temporal now is intrinsically unfixed and can only be expressed 
through approximation and negation’; the ‘open process of movement toward an unknown […] cannot 
be described in positive terms.’ (2006, p. 129) Thus an apophatic element weaves what is on the 
whole Bloch’s affirmatory philosophical outlook. 
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is not given license. In Bloch’s mind, matter’s incompletion opens up space 
for experimental expression, both of itself and of the philosopher whom 
speaks of it: ‘the word matter originated from mater, meaning a fruitful world-
womb experimenting with forms, figures, shapes of existence’ (M, p. 17).42 
Bloch discusses this point around the notion of preciseness. Matter’s 
incompleteness does not entail one adopt the most austere (Entsagung) 
philosophical language imaginable, nor for that matter does it entail (pace 
Wittgenstein) silence. As Bloch writes somewhat elusively: 
Vagueness can be identical with expression of the highest precision; because 
materiality, that in itself is not yet determined, likewise cannot be expressed in 
the usual sense of preciseness, otherwise one falsifies it. (TL, p. 293) 
[Vagheit kann nämlich der Ausdruck von höchster Präzision sein; denn 
Sachhaftes, das an sich selber noch nicht bestimmt ist, kann auch nicht im 
üblichen Sinn präzis ausgedrückt werden, oder man verfälscht es.] 
Bloch’s determinations of matter therefore necessarily carry a ‘precise 
vagueness’ (TL, p. 293); in other words, Bloch avoids attributing to matter a 
preciseness that would seek in a contrived manner to overturn matter’s real 
objective incompleteness. In a curious inflection this point Bloch shares with 
Kant, albeit owing to quite different reasons and based upon quite different 
registers of philosophical concern.43 Whilst for Kant, on the one hand, the 
                                                          
42 As Bloch characterises his thought as ‘model-like thought [modellhaftes Denken]’ (TE, p. 12), in the 
sense of experimental probing (a notion Bloch dis-relates from positivism and empirical science and 
which, in fact, he considers congruent with the really real, incomplete substance of the world). 
 
43 As Bloch says, one of the earliest insights of speculative-materialist thought is ‘the view that the 
world is not as it sensuously appears’ (M, p. 24 & 25). Mutatis mutandis, this is precisely Kant’s 
position: matter as it is in itself is not what it appears to be for the human being, whose a priori 
categories of the understanding and whose pure forms of intuition (space and time) limit matter’s 
“whatness” to the field of the human’s possible experience. 
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problem is decided epistemologically, in that the philosopher is said to be 
incapable of reaching beyond both her forms of intuition and her categories 
of understanding in order to witness matter as it is in itself; on the other 
hand, for Bloch, matter’s “in itself” remains undetermined in its core essence; 
matter’s ontology is as of yet incomplete and thus it “what-ness”—an 
important category for Bloch, as I will show in Chapter II—cannot be 
foreclosed by any all-encompassing definition. This general ontological 
determination of matter comes to the fore in Bloch’s materialism-book, Das 
Materialismusproblem, Seine Geschichte und Substanz. The impression of 
this book is the idea that the history of materialism represents a falsification 
of matter’s true nature in that what (at least at present) cannot be defined—
because still undergoing self-determination—was always being restrictively 
defined.44 Nevertheless, I think it is correct to say that Bloch sees this history 
as indirectly foregrounding the idea that, like utopia, matter’s proper content 
is an “indefinite something” which self-creates various real responses to its 
own real mystery, not merely conceptual responses—again, one can read 
this ontologically if one so chooses.45 Thus, Bloch gives one to think the 
history of materialism as a history of coming up against an unknown and 
                                                          
44 For Plato, matter does not denote a definite material existent but existent privation as such, i.e. that 
which is radically extrinsic to and thus devoid of potentiality for true, pure being. To Plato’s mind, 
matter is erotic desire for its contrary (the Good, the One) and is therefore that which longs for its own 
demise. Aristotle, on the other hand, conceives of matter as more than an irremediable privation of 
being but pure potency for essential being (Eslick, 1965, pp. 43-50; FitzGerald, 1965, p. 65). Primary 
matter for Aristotle is not ‘an original, pre-existing stuff’ but ‘an intrinsic, constitutive inadequacy 
(potentiality) in actual, existing being.’ (Luyten, 1965, p. 111) I devote a separate subsection to this 
Aristotelian theorisation of matter as possibility in Chapter I; Aristotle’s notion of matter as incomplete, 
as possibility, is fundamental to Bloch’s materialism, even if the two philosophers diverge on their 
reading this possibility. 
 
45 “Indefinite something” is borrowed from Edith Stein and her analysis of the Aristotelian notion of 
prime matter (Urstoff). Stein writes of prime matter: it is ‘an “indefinite—yet not wholly indefinite—
something.”’ (2002, p. 177) This resonates with Kant. As Stein’s footnote reads: ‘When we speak of an 
“indefinite something” in everyday language, we do not refer to something which is in itself indefinite, 
but to something which we cannot define.’ (ibid., p. 578, fn. 115; my emphasis)  
 
[51] 
 
likewise a real process of attempts to articulate this unknown—and again, 
not merely conceptually. In sum, this history unwittingly attests to matter’s 
really real plasticity. The philosophical contents of this history, although not 
utter misapprehensions to be simply discard, nonetheless restrict what in 
truth remains an ongoing, experimental process. Once more, as Bloch 
writes, matter is ‘a fruitful world-womb experimenting with forms, figures, 
shapes of existence’ (M, p. 17). 
[2] The above remarks bring me back to Habermas’ (1970, p. 325) 
contention that Bloch simply ‘skips’ Kant. Here Habermas’ contention may 
act as a foil by which to outline my own. For in truth, contra Habermas, Kant 
stands as a vital figure in the creation of Bloch’s materialism, not least 
because the classical German philosophical tradition structures much of 
Bloch’s conceptual insights. So then, rather than skipping Kant’s 
philosophical revolution in any crude sense of the term, Bloch plays with 
Kant’s findings—he skips with them. From this Bloch provides a Copernican 
revolution of his own: a utopian turn. If Kant’s philosophy articulates the 
viewpoint that matter as it is in itself stands as a limit and so a highly 
problematic concept, then this limit is restricted to an epistemological register 
alone. Transgressing beyond this Kantian insight, Bloch boldly extends the 
notion of limit and unknowing-ness over and out into ontology—speculari, 
not speculum. Thus, when Kant describes matter as a concept both limiting 
and problematic, thereby suggesting matter constitutes a ‘concept of a 
noumenon’ (A255/B310-11), so then there is much here that plays to the 
motif of Bloch’s materialism. Bloch, however, makes of this noumenon an 
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objective phantasy, i.e. that which is ontologically imagined and, to Bloch’s 
mind ontologically sought for, and thereby ontologically not yet real.  
For Kant, matter (as a limit concept) is limiting in its curbing ‘the pretentions 
of sensibility’ to know the thing in itself (A255/B310-11)—matter’s conceptual 
content orbits the human mind and therefore what matter is in itself cannot 
be known. And yet, one does find Kant stating in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement that ‘the possibility of a living matter’ is a concept which ‘contains 
a contradiction, because lifelessness, inertia, constitutes [matter’s] essential 
characteristic’ (5: 394), but one of the premises of that work is that 
mechanical causation amounts to an inadequate explanation of the self-
organising matter of organic nature. To my mind, Bloch’s position can be 
understood as rendering productive Kant’s negative epistemology; insofar as 
Bloch ontologically broadens Kant’s agnostic definition of matter so he 
develops a philosophical sensitivity toward a new, processually open 
concept of matter. If matter cannot be defined as such because in itself there 
is something extra to what it currently is, then this outstanding element is not 
simply unknowable for the human mind but is really extraterritorial to the 
present state of matter’s existence—a residue or surplus of indeterminacy. 
Kant calls this indefinite but not wholly indefinite something—not wholly 
indefinite because known as indefinite—‘the transcendental matter of all 
objects as things in themselves.’ (A143/B182) And he quickly calls attention 
to the point that whilst matter’s “in itself” remains an indefinite field laying 
beyond the limits of sensibility (the limits of possible human experience), this 
indefinite field is no arbitrary invention; the “beyond-ness” of what for 
sensibility is experienceable is definitely there, it is only inaccessible to 
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sensibility. Kant’s central claim here, then, is just that matter as it is in itself is 
indefinite for human experience, since the a priori categories of the 
understanding and the pure forms of intuition necessarily impose their 
structures onto any human comprehension of matter. As Bowles writes of 
this: 
Kantianism maintains that a rigorous ontology, that is, the attempt to purge our 
own contribution from what we comprehend and let things be as they really 
are, will only ever lead to blindness. If the formal structures of experience are 
removed, then the ability to grasp something also vanishes. This is why for 
Kant to try to think matter is to confront the impasse: that the content of form, 
pure nakedness, is always beyond our reach. (2000, p. 2; my emphasis) 
Bloch offers his own speculative route beyond Kantianism, then, by claiming 
that this blindness at the heart of Kant’s proposal does not fall on the human 
being’s side alone, as Kant claims, but rather is a cornerstone of matter 
itself. This move puts a new—and what Bloch thinks is a utopian—spin on 
Kant’s critical project, which intended to demarcate the limits of reason in 
order to ward off attempts to come to and decide upon this fundamental 
blind spot. If it is ‘at such moments of incomprehension [those moments 
when human experience experiences its own limits] that matter is 
encountered’, as Bowles (ibid, p. 3) asserts in the context of Kantianism, 
then it is Bloch’s claim that matter is in itself indefinite and that it is only 
because of this—matter’s real indefiniteness—that matter is indefinite for 
human experience. One could say: through us matter encounter’s its own 
incognito, its own lack of what-ness. 
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Sensation, Kant says, cannot immediately be in touch with transcendental 
matter, because, on Kant’s insistence, sensation is always already 
conceptual. Owing to this, transcendental matter is the non-conceptual 
element of the concept; but it is also ultimately extraterritorial 
(incomprehensible) to the conceptual. At the same time, however, 
transcendental matter is both the condition of possibility and thus the 
impetus of conceptual responses, for synthesis ‘occurs because it meets 
something’ different, because it encounters something other than its 
conceptual scheme (Bowles, 2000, pp. 5-6). Consequently, when Kant says 
that without material nothing whatsoever can be thought, in that one’s 
concepts would be contentless (A 77), he is asserting that without a limit to 
the conceptual that indicates a beyond—indeed without 
incomprehensibility—there would be no process of conceptualisation at all. 
This goes back my objection to Wittgenstein: the blind spot is not completely 
redundant in what it does but is key to the whole operation of conceptual 
expression—and, for Bloch, ontological expression. Something beyond the 
concept is what gives rise to the concept. More still, incomprehensibility is 
what prevents the process of conceptualisation from completing itself. 
Incomprehensibility—Bowles also calls this the ‘non-conceptual factor’ (ibid., 
p. 2)—is therefore both the source and the termination—or death—of 
conceptualisation (indeed Bowles identifies matter’s incomprehensible 
beyond with death and annihilation; with Bloch, quite differently, this beyond 
of the real is the principle of hope). As Bowles writes in a passage with 
definite Blochian tones, and which more positively frames his previous 
identification of incomprehension with death and annihilation: 
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It is precisely because synthesis has, as it were, shut down that we are able to 
waken to a new day in which we and the world are more open. The systole and 
diastole of synthesis do not mark an auto-affection: as though synthesis were 
sufficient unto itself and the breakdown comes from within. For Kant, the heart 
beat would not fire without the provocation of matter. Matter intrudes when 
form fails, when the capacity to comprehend the world deserts us (ibid., pp. 12-
13; my emphasis). 
Bloch’s ontologisation of Kant—his utopian turn, as it were—resides, in part, 
in how one reads this idea of form. As I will show later on in this chapter, 
form, for Bloch, is not that which is imposed upon matter, but that which is 
born from matter. Moreover, this relates to the idea that matter, as that which 
in itself is ultimately non-synthesisable, is as such that which ‘makes us 
create anew.’ (ibid., p. 14) An inherent creativity is at work here: the concept 
of matter is inhibited by that which it does not know; this unknowing 
produces the conditions and allows conceptuality to step out beyond itself.46  
Bowles’ reading of Kant is particularly useful for my purposes since it allows 
me to throw into relief the intriguing yet difficult crux of Bloch’s position, 
namely, as I have claimed, his ontologisation of Kant. Bloch’s thought 
extends Kant’s findings beyond the limits of reason (to think is to transgress) 
and thereby constructs a new materialist ontology. The incomprehensibility 
of matter is not that condition which makes only human beings create anew; 
it is that condition which makes matter itself create anew: new forms and 
shapes of its own existence. Matter’s incomprehensibility goes all the way 
                                                          
46 Adorno intimated similar such tendencies. ‘Dissatisfaction with their own conceptuality is part of their 
[i.e. concepts’] meaning’, Adorno writes; indeed plain here is ‘the constitutive character of the 
nonconceptual in the concept’ (2004, p. 12). For Adorno, materialist philosophy (and thus his negative 
dialectics) is a conceptual transcending of the concept, is an attempt to think the non-conceptual by 
way of the concept (ibid., p. 15). 
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down (matter in itself is not just incomprehensible for human beings) 
because indeterminism (possibility) is a real and objective condition of 
matter. The peculiar and vitally important consequence of this model is that 
incomprehensibility is seen not simply as the wellspring of creative 
conceptual life, as Bowles’s reading of Kant holds, but as the very creative 
fount of being itself. In sum, Bloch can be said to displace the rudiments of 
Kant’s metaphysics of knowledge into the light of a new metaphysics of 
being (this is what is meant by “ontologisation”). It is for this reason that 
Bloch designates the concept of matter as indicating a really real problem, 
i.e. not merely an epistemological problem: 
 […] the substance of the world, the matter of the world, is itself not yet 
concluded, but is located in a utopian-open, that is, on a not yet self-identical, 
manifested footing. (TE, p. 102) 
[…die Weltsubstanz, die Weltmaterie ist selber noch nicht abgeschlossen, 
befindet sich noch in utopisch-offenem, das heißt, noch nicht selbstidentisch 
manifestiertem Stand.] 
Bloch propounds the idea that matter in itself is just this searching for its own 
good and proper attribution, is in itself just an intending after a ‘harmony with 
its own content’ (TE, p. 259). To return to the topic of language briefly and to 
my Introduction, it can be said that Avanessian’s intent to create a new 
approach to the problem of referentiality finds a response in Bloch’s 
materialism: Bloch’s materialism offers a new understanding of referentiality 
because he offers a new understanding of what language is referring to: 
incognito, mystery, incomprehensibility.  
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Having outlined what I consider to be the starting point of Bloch’s 
materialism, I will now turn to the two mutually implicating categories of 
tendency and latency, whose explication will flesh-out my reading of Bloch’s 
materialism as consisting of an ontologisation of Kant. 
§2. TENDENCY 
The importance of “process” for Bloch, understood as an ontological 
category, cannot be overstated. Bloch’s materialism holds process and 
development as intrinsic features of matter. Bloch’s category ‘tendency 
[Tendenz]’ acts as a counterpoint to concepts that conceive of matter’s inner 
constitution as immobile, thing-like, mere extension, and altogether 
complete—all of these notions are, by Bloch’s lights, subsumable under the 
idea Klotzmaterie (TL, pp. 250-60; M, p. 17). Tendency accords with Bloch’s 
intention to think process as an ‘existential mode of matter’ (LM, p. 176). To 
a large extent Bloch is guided by Heraclitus’ famous dictum that “everthing 
flows” or “everything is in a state of flux” (panta rhei), but Hegel’s dynamic 
conception of dialectical becoming is also key here. Echoing the Hegel’s 
notion that one must think substance as subject, Bloch indeed writes in The 
Spirit of Utopia that one must think ‘substance as process’ (SU, p. 160). 
Thus “tendency” confounds much traditional ontological philosophising in 
which substance is deemed unchanging, and thereby Bloch emphatically 
breaks with metaphysical substance doctrines (see Zimmermann, 2014, p. 
66). As such, Bloch is often considered a process philosopher insofar he 
considers process and dynamism as anterior to being (Geoghegan 1996, p. 
28). To Bloch’s mind being comes at the end of process, thus process 
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precedes being. As Hudson writes of this, Bloch’s materialism is akin to 
modern process philosophy insofar as the latter 
[H]as concentrated on the need to break with philosophies which conceive of 
the world as complete and unchanging, and [instead] develop[s] new 
categories for a world of becoming.  (1982, p. 69)47 
Processuality’s decisiveness is without question: ‘there is no process 
[Bewegung] without matter,’ Bloch says, ‘no matter without process’ (LM, p. 
122). The chiasmus indicates the inseparability—the convertibility—of matter 
and process. Matter “and” process really are just one: ‘process-matter 
[Prozeßmaterie]’ (M, p. 121). As Schneider (2006a, p. 65) writes of Bloch’s 
materialism: ‘Undoubtedly process [Bewegung] is a’where. […]. Relative 
forms of matter are bound to time, have history, are history.’ This emphasis 
on matter not simply as having history but being history, being process, 
expresses the crux of Bloch’s “first determination” of matter as tendency. 
Tendency attempts to re-think matter as lively and becoming, then, but in a 
manner peculiar to Bloch alone. Below I outline a number of important points 
concerning Bloch conception of matter’s processuality. 
[1] To bring the specificity of this first moment of Blochian matter into 
clearer view it may be helpful to formulate an objection to its positing a unity 
of matter and processuality. It could be reasonably objected, for instance, 
that mechanical materialism—a material theory Bloch finds in many respects 
                                                          
47 Henri Bergson and A. N. Whitehead are commonly associated with “process philosophy.” The extent 
to which Bloch’s processual conception of matter is easily mapped onto the likes of Bergson and 
Whitehead is uncertain, no studies have been undertaken. Any future investigation on this issue would 
have to contend, however, with Bloch’s often critical stance towards Bergson (see PHE, pp. 201-2). 
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anathema to his own—equally attributes movement to matter (M, p. 246).48 
This returns me once more to Kant, for Kant was keen to establish Newton’s 
mechanically derived Principia Mathematica (1687) upon metaphysical 
foundations. In the first instance, Kant (2004, p. 15) considers motion (or 
‘phoronomy’, Kant’s doctrine of motion) as matter’s first determination,49 and 
insofar as this is the case so then this would seem to parallel the Blochian 
prioritisation of process over any already completed material substance. But 
the type of motion so posited by Kant is in truth far from coterminous with the 
sort of process Bloch has in mind, and the difference pivots on the idea of 
inherence. For Bloch, process is constitutive of matter, that is, it pertains to 
matter’s very nature, it inheres within matter and therefore just is matter. In 
Kant’s Bewegungslehre, process figures at odds with this idea, insofar as 
Kant always only speaks of motion of bodies (ibid., p. 25). The mechanical 
materialists whom Kant represents consider motion as extrinsic to matter’s 
existence, as accidentally attributable to matter’s nature. In that this motion 
                                                          
48 By mechanical materialism I have in mind mathematically oriented materialisms of the early modern 
period. In relevant compendia, Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), René 
Descartes (1596-1650), and Isaac Newton (1642-1726/7) are customarily invoked as the most 
prominent figures of this scientistic tendency of materialist thought (see Wallace, 1977, pp. 300-1). 
Despite critiques of mechanical materialism arising frequently amidst Bloch’s positive expositions of 
his own concept of matter, so that it is tempting to designate Bloch’s concept an opus of this 
confrontation, it is key to stress that Bloch favourably perceives mechanism and does so for the 
following reason. Following Friedrich Engels, Bloch holds a fundament of materialism to consist in an 
immanence of philosophical explanation, i.e. materialism explains the world from out of the world; it 
avoids at all costs the postulation of a beyond that is transcendently bereft of matter and nonetheless 
is that principle by which is employed to explain matter’s very existence (M, p. 169). Thus, 
mechanism’s truth-content resides in its attempt to explain the world from out of the world. As an 
approach to the explanation of matter it is correct insofar as it adopts a ‘completely transcendence-free 
view of the world’ (M, p. 179), it exhibits an ‘urgent will toward an explanation of the world without an 
alien intervention [fremden Eingriff]’ (M, p. 180). Its defect is only that it explains the world incorrectly 
(LM, pp. 184 & 187). 
 
49 For detailed but competing accounts of Kant’s doctrine of motion, see Friedman (2013) and 
Sutherland (2014). It is important to note in passing the following: ‘One of the aims of the Phoronomy 
is to explain how the composition of motion can be constructed, thereby establishing a necessary 
condition of the application of mathematics to motion.’ (ibid., p. 687; my emphasis) I emphasise 
“constructed” here for the reason that Kant’s distinction between constitutive (or constructive) and 
regulative forms of analogy will be crucial for my analogic reading of Bloch’s materialism in the next 
chapter. 
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is considered motion of bodies from one place to the next, i.e. movement in 
space, so then these bodies are conceived already constituted in 
themselves, above and beyond any motion attributable to them via external 
causation. As Zammito (1992, p. 189) writes, ‘there were few ideas Kant 
struggled to keep divided more than life and matter. […] The radical removal 
of life from matter defined it into impossibility.’ For Bloch transgresses this 
divide insofar as he views process as immanent to matter’s nature; Bloch’s is 
an immanent dynamic materialism. Indeed on this point of immanence, 
Guyer writes that despite its highly scientistic oritentation, mechanism 
inevitably leads to a transcendent idea of the beginning of motion: 
[T]he characteristic defect of purely mechanical world-systems [is that while] 
they can adequately account for the transmission of motions [they] must 
postulate an extra-mundane first mover in order to account for the origination 
of motion. (2005, p. 84) 
Mechanism fails to explain the world as dynamically originating/producing 
itself, then, and it is for this reason that I have opted to discuss the 
mechanistic view of matter: simply because it allows me to gauge the 
specificity of Bloch’s own conception, both insofar as process constitutes 
matter’s nature and insofar as the origination of matter is conceived of 
immanently. Indeed, my decision here itself is immanent to the production of 
Bloch’s materialism to the extent that Bloch constructs material categories 
largely in opposition to mechanism’s dead, transcendentally reliant material 
theory.50 At the heart of the mechanist conception is, for Bloch, a real stasis, 
                                                          
50 This important point has an implicit bearing on language. Insofar as process does not inhere in 
matter by nature, so then mechanism remains caught in the strictures of conventional propositional 
logic whereby the subject-predicate form holds sway. Here matter remains inertly independent of the 
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then, an a-historicity unworthy of matter’s dynamism (TE, pp. 230 & 234; M, 
p. 17; LM, p. 185). As Bloch writes: 
[M]atter which is only understood mechanically [is understood as] a clod 
estranged from history, for which all of its real possibility has already become 
static reality, in the sense of a beginning frozen to death from birth as it were. 
(PHE, p. 237)51 
I return to the concept of possibility in due course, for it is central to Bloch’s 
materialism. For now, two consequences proceed from the intertwinement of 
matter and process, from the idea that process and matter are one: process-
matter. Firstly, in positing process as pertaining to matter’s very nature 
Bloch’s category tendency underlines matter’s incompleteness. This is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
attribute of process, such that process is merely one among a number of other qualities that may be in 
some sense attached to matter, the latter of which remains substantially different from any such 
attributable qualities. In some sense Bloch avoids this pitfall by his employment of the chiasmus 
already quoted above. In mechanism’s case, the subject of the proposition, i.e. “matter,” remains 
ontologically independent of its motion. Motion is merely predicated of the subject (matter), “tacked-
on,” as it were. Kant (2004, 480, p. 15) himself speaks of ‘the subject of motion, namely matter’. As 
Sells (1994, p. 25) writes of this issue: ‘Predications imply that a subject engages in an activity, that 
there is a “remainder” within the subject that is not that activity itself.’ But if matter itself is process 
without remainder, then conventional logic falls short of expressing the idea that matter and process 
are inextricably intertwined. Hegel is aware of this problem. He reads mechanism as positing an 
external communication of process to matter, as opposed to the position which holds process as 
spontaneous and self-generative feature of matter: ‘While […] motion is communicated to finite matter 
from outside, free matter moves spontaneously’, he writes (1970, §264 Zusatz, p. 49). Tellingly, in his 
1821/2 lecture “Materie und Bewegung”, Hegel describes this mechanistically construed external 
cause of matter’s process with a Böhmean descriptor (see fn. 12): ‘In der Mittheilung der Bewegung 
liegt der Quelle der Bewegung ganz außerhalb dem Bewegten.‘ (2012, §216 5-10, p. 258) The Quelle 
soliciting matter to move Bloch draws into the heart of matter itself. That said, Bloch does not 
necessarily deny matter’s mechanicity as such, but rather the claim that mechanism speaks of the 
essence of matter. In certain respects Bloch echoes Leibniz’s (2006, p. 125) train of thought. Although 
Leibniz himself was ‘convinced that everything in corporeal nature happens mechanically’, he 
‘continue[d] to believe that the very principles of mechanics, that is to say, the first laws of motion, 
have a more sublime origin than those that pure mathematics can provide.’ In other words, matter’s 
mathematicity and the motion thereby expressed by such mathematicity are merely expressions of a 
principle more sublime than they. One could say therefore that as a mode of matter, mechanism ought 
not to be reduced to matter per se.  
 
51 Mechanism is a “Medusa-like” treatment of matter (LM, p. 187), it propagates a ‘dead world picture’ 
(TE, p. 42) and tends toward re-establishing inorganicity at the very heart of matter. Its reduction of 
matter to static lifelessness is thereby akin to the Freudian conception of the death-drive and, 
ontologically-stylistically speaking, to pyramidal architecture, whose Eleatic-like pathos of ontological 
stasis seeks the transformation of vital life over into stone (M, p. 26). 
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Bloch’s general supposition here: no process would exist at all if matter were 
not substantially incomplete in what it is. The second implication is that 
tendency signals towards an uptake of the notion that matter is immanently 
self-causative.52 Thus, the critical upshot is that the category tendency 
provides speculative-materialist thought with the idea of an incomplete 
though self-causative and therefore living materiality.  
[2] If a very curtailed exposition of mechanism’s concept of matter has 
allowed me to establish the centrality of process for Bloch’s materialism in 
the sense that it is of matter’s very nature to be processual, I now want to 
pursue the question of the nature of the process so posited, for what is most 
striking about Bloch’s materialism is the kind of process at work in it. A good 
sense of the kind of process Bloch has in mind, then, can be garnered from 
the following key passage:  
Not only movement and such an apparently “anthropomorphic aspect” as 
contradiction (with movement itself as first contradiction) are [matter’s] modes 
of existence, but also such an apparently and so much greater 
“anthropomorphic aspect” as anticipation. (PHE, p. 336; my emphasis)  
These two further determinations indicate that process-matter is—at one and 
the same time—a discontinuous process (it is contradictory) and a process 
futurally directed (it is anticipatory), i.e. matter is a discontinuous-anticipatory 
                                                          
52 This point bears on Bloch’s apparent relation to modern process philosophy. As Hudson writes: 
‘modern process philosophy has often been characterised by subjectivism’ and reassertions ‘of the 
politics of the subject’ (1982, pp. 69-70). In connection with A.N. Whitehead, Fetz also notes that 
 
The elevation of freedom [through the concept of self-causation] to the status of a 
fundamental characteristic of every being is a clear expression of the fact that in 
Whitehead the modern shift towards the subject has attained metaphysical validity 
(1990, p. 197). 
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process, an anticipation of contradiction’s overcoming. This idea is actually 
borne out by the genealogical heritage of the category tendency. The 
relevant literature notes that Bloch derives Tendenz from Leibniz’s 
monadological metaphysics, one of the main ontological claims of which is 
that the most elementary constituents of reality—what he calls “monads”—
pass from confused to clear representations of themselves (M, p. 55). As 
Zeilinger writes: 
The root of the concept tendency […] lies in the old-Greek verb teinein, with 
the central meaning of “to stretch,” “to tension,” “to expand or extend itself,” “to 
tend toward something.” This meaning survives in the Latin tendere. Tendere 
[…] means “inclination,” “striving,” “direction,” “aim or purpose,” “intention,” and 
is akin to appetitus, conatus, and inclinatio. (2012, p. 555; my translation) 
According to Leibniz, the basic constituents of reality undergo a passage (in 
the form of monads) from confusedness to clarity/transparency; a monad 
actively appetites for, intends and anticipates a certain self-clarity of itself.53 
Crucially, this anticipation for self-clarification cannot be grasped merely 
anthropologically, rather this intending process must be considered as 
pertaining to reality itself. One, then, is here dealing with ontology first and 
foremost. Indeed, Leibniz speaks of anticipation both in the soul and in that 
which is other than soul: ‘one can say that in the soul, as indeed 
everywhere, the present is great with the future’ (1970, p. 580).54 This 
                                                          
53 Incidentally, according to Bloch, a red thread tying together the historically wide-ranging concepts of 
matter is the red thread of enlightenment (cf. Lange, 1908, pp. 4-6). There are, then, progressive 
political overtones to materialist philosophy in Bloch’s mind (TL, p. 267). 
 
54 This employment of purposivity in order to speak of nature remains present in German philosophy 
after Leibniz of course. Cf. Hegel’s exposition in the Philosophy of Nature. Having posited gravity as 
‘the substantiality of matter’, Hegel speaks of matter’s ‘nisus’, its striving ‘to reach the centre’ (1970, 
§262 Remark, p. 45); the ‘unity of gravity’, Hegel writes, ‘is only an Ought, a longing, the most 
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touches perfectly on the category tendency, which for Bloch indicates 
process with horizon, i.e. with future.  
Clearly, then, Bloch borrows Leibniz’s idea of confusedness futurally moving 
toward clarification. There remains, however, a fundamental difference that 
exists between Bloch and Leibniz on this topic. The difference boils down to 
the type of flow of this intending process that each thinker respectively 
proposes. Like with many other of the concepts he actively inherits from the 
history of philosophy, Bloch puts his own stamp on Leibniz’s idea of 
tendency. For Leibniz, the abovementioned ‘process of clarification 
[Aufklärungsgang]’ (M, p. 54) is reflected on as a smooth, linear process. 
The ‘first law [Urgesetz]’ of Leibniz’s conception of the world, i.e. continuity 
and pre-established harmony (lex continui natura non facit saltus [nature 
does not make a leap]) (Schneider, 2006b, p. 209) speak to this conception 
and are indicative of it. The birth of the future from the present is for Leibniz 
a continuous passage of clarification. On the other hand, Bloch conceives of 
tendency precisely as denoting a process of discontinuous leaps. This 
incorporation of discontinuity into matter’s processuality turns on the 
centrality that a certain conception of the future plays in Bloch’s materialism: 
a future not-yet there, not yet decided. Referring to Leibniz’s (1998, p. 268) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
unhappy nisus to which matter is eternally condemned.’ (ibid., Zusatz) Bloch’s notion of speculari 
appears present: 
 
[Insofar] as matter fixes a centre and strives to reach it, and this centre is a unifying 
point while matter remains a multiplicity, matter is determined as coming outside itself 
from out of its place. (ibid., §266 Zusatz, p. 54; my emphasis) 
 
The Kantian-ring to Hegel’s point here is more evident in the German: 
 
Dieses Streben nach dem Eins muß nicht angesehen werden als ein unbestimmtes 
Herumsuchen, sondern es ist die Materie, die sich dies Eins setzt, aber als einen Ort, 
den die Materie nicht erreicht, sondern den sie nur immer sucht. (2012, §215 15-25, p. 
259) 
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claim that monads ‘have no windows, through which anything could come in 
or go out’, Bloch writes that ‘figure [Gestalt] is only significant when in itself it 
has a window that heads towards the path of morning [auf die Strasse 
Morgen geht].’ (LM, p. 315) To recall Bowles’ reading of Kant that was noted 
in the Introduction, it becomes clear that, to Bloch’s mind, process-matter 
denotes a becoming whereby matter steps beyond itself into the new of 
itself. Thereby tendency indicates matter’s immanent transgression out 
towards a newness of itself (thus speculari implies novelty); so much so that 
one could argue process-matter is comparable to an open window open to 
openness as such. It is in this light that I will speak of process as harbouring 
within itself an outfall—an ultimate clarification of itself—that is in itself not 
yet decided—it is this which brings my discussion to the telic element in 
Bloch’s materialism. For, in light of the above, the internal generativity (the 
process) of matter, as thought by Bloch, may be described as anti-origin in 
its basic orientation—not a processuality that heads down and back, but out 
and beyond. And it is this thoroughly utopian gesture fundamentally that re-
configures how teleology is conceived of by Bloch. I return to this issue in §3 
of this chapter. First, however, I turn to the topic of “possibility.” 
§2.1. POSSIBILITY  
Where nothing more can be done or is possible, life stands still. (PHE, p. 224) 
At first blush, it is difficult to see where the relationship of materialism 
to utopia is to be found: ‘At first glance such a connection appears 
foreclosed.’ (TL, p. 265) The answer to this question, however, lies with the 
concept of possibility. For the anticipatory, proleptic, yet discontinuous 
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process which moves to what is not yet and which Bloch calls matter is born 
of possibility; matter’s process of self-clarification is merely another name for 
Bloch’s re-formulation of Aristotle’s classical determination of the movement 
of possibility to actuality.  
So far I have sought to show that Bloch’s materialism is, in the first instance, 
based on a really real in-determination of matter’s what-ness (Bloch’s 
ontologisation of Kant). It is this fundamental in-determination of its own 
essence which gives birth to matter’s contradictory, anticipatory process: 
matter just is a searching after a clarification of itself, a self-clarification 
which is not yet there. At the root of matter’s in-determination is discerned 
the place of possibility, indeed one finds a unique definition of possibility on 
Bloch’s part. Insofar as possibility constitutes the key to matter’s utopian 
dimension, so then possibility, or what Bloch at times calls ‘can-be [Kann-
sein]’ (TE, p. 216), is matter’s principal modality. Bloch sometimes 
formulates this idea in propositional form: ‘P is assigned to S in the mode of 
Can-be.’ (PHE, p. 226; see Zimmermann, 2014, p. 62) In other words, the 
self-clarification sought-for by the insubstantial subject of matter is a 
predicate bathed in possibility, both in the sense that it is not necessarily 
attributable to the subject, but also that it itself is a possibility having not yet 
been realised. It is important to say that Bloch’s re-formulation of possibility 
is as much peculiar as it is controversial, particularly when placed against 
Aristotle’s conception of the same notion, as I will show below. Indeed, a 
brief consideration of Bloch’s inheritance of Aristotelianism—a tradition of 
thought in which matter is conceived of precisely as possibility—is important 
at this stage, as is highlighting the differences between them (PHE, pp. 207-
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8; M, p. 235). At the most fundamental level of philosophical inquiry, Aristotle 
understands the change of one thing into another as consisting of a process 
of movement from possibility to actuality. In fact, in a sense, Aristotle’s whole 
philosophical problematic concerns how best to understand change, and he 
employs the modalities of possibility (or potentiality) and actuality to achieve 
this end. Like Bloch, then, Aristotle’s theorisation of matter pivots on a 
concern with how best to understand a process of becoming to realisation, 
and it is this point which unquestionably attracted Bloch to Aristotle and to 
the history of heretic interpretation of the one who knows.55 Now I will briefly 
survey the appropriate points of concern on this issue. 
[1] That “possibility” might constitute the ground of the world’s 
appearances is a notion that first entered into philosophical thought with 
Aristotle. As Bloch writes: ‘Aristotle was the first to recognise possibility in 
real terms, in the world-stock itself.’ (PHE, p. 235) Bloch carries this 
recognition forwards, but does so to such a degree that Aristotle would not 
have followed him.  
If for the Pre-Socratics not Zeus but water or other immanent material 
elements were what the world was said to be made of (TL, pp. 266-7), then 
Aristotle was the first philosopher to have provided a much more intangible 
though no less real, immanent substratum by which to think and clarify the 
world from out of itself—and this substratum was “possibility.” Significantly, 
                                                          
55 Bloch considers Aristotle a ‘process thinker’ (SO, p. 113) and few worthy of mention would seriously 
contest this characterisation. Gilson (2014, p. 44), for instance, claims that with Aristotle ‘“to be” 
becomes active, entailing ‘energy and efficacy’; for Adorno (2000, p. 56), relative to Plato Aristotle 
renders ontological speculation ‘incomparably more dynamic’.  
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Aristotle anchors his reflections on possibility in his thinking of matter.56 The 
coextensivity of process and matter that one finds in Bloch’s corpus is 
therefore but an echo of this early Aristotelian theorisation in which matter is 
determined as possibility. As the becoming of possibility towards actuality, 
matter just is process, then; it is the type of process Aristotle employs as to 
understand reality’s most fundamental features.  
To illustrate this point, I can place two important texts of Aristotle’s into 
dialogue, as so many thinkers have done before me. In the Physics Aristotle 
defines matter as ‘the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes 
to be, and which persists in the result, not accidentally.’ (192a1, 30) 
Possibility’s not persisting accidentally means that the thing in which 
possibility inheres has within itself, through possibility, ‘the principle of it 
owns production.’ (192b, 25-30) Unlike mechanical materialism, then, in this 
tradition of thought matter qua possibility announces a constitutively inhering 
generativity in the thing itself (possibility lays ‘in the things themselves’, 
Aristotle says [192b1, 30]). Any thing maintains the capacity to produce from 
within itself its own becoming other than what it presently is. In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle instils into this process a good degree of contingency 
when he writes that 
All things that come to be either by nature or by art have matter; for each of 
them is capable of both being and not being, and this capacity is the matter in 
each. (1032a1, 20-25; my emphasis) 
                                                          
56 As Brentano (1975, p. 27) states, for Aristotle, potential being and matter are ‘coextensive’; Stein 
(2002, p. 185; emphasis removed) makes much the same point: in Aristotle ‘potency and matter 
coincide.’ 
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Things have matter, which having is to possess a capacity to realise of 
oneself/itself that which oneself/itself presently is not; to have matter is to 
have an incompleteness which, inhering within it, is the possibility of 
realisation: the capacity of being and not being. Read against the Physics 
quotation above, the primary substratum in the Aristotelian problematic is 
none other than possibility. For the substratum from which a thing comes to 
be and which persists in the thing is matter, which Aristotle defines as the 
capacity of both being and not being. The cited passages provide traction to 
the claim that the primary substratum of a thing and of all things, according 
to Aristotle, is possibility, i.e. matter. Possibility is not simply a real force in 
the constitution of that which is (possibility is not nothing), but more so the 
most preeminent ontological modality. At least all this is what Aristotle’s 
account seems to suggest. 
But this turns out in fact not to be Aristotle’s position at all, or at least not his 
ultimate position. To show why this is so one ought to bear in mind that 
Aristotle’s formulation of matter/possibility comes in the context of his natural 
investigations, i.e. his surveys into the domain of the ‘perishable’, into that 
which comes to be and likewise passes away (192b1). Matter stands as the 
primary substratum of each thing only within this realm of perishability, but 
things are different when Aristotle moves his focus from the realm of change 
to the realm of metaphysical investigation, i.e. to that plane of investigation 
that, to his lights, concerns truth as the unchanging. Suffice it to say 
Aristotle’s apparent foregrounding of possibility as the primary substratum of 
the world gives way to actuality’s pre-eminence, in the sense that, in truth, 
actuality is the first and most real substratum of all that which is. Now that 
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which is already realised takes precedence over that which is incomplete 
and, as such, harbouring within itself the possibility of realisation. As 
Aristotle writes: ‘there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists 
actually’ (1049b1, 25-30; my emphasis); ‘one actuality always precedes 
another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover’ 
(1050b1; my emphasis); ‘actuality is prior to potentiality.’ (1049b1; my 
emphasis) Brentano’s remark of Aristotle’s theorisation that ‘[p]otential being 
cannot be defined except with the aid of the concept of actuality, for the 
latter is prior in both concept and substance’ (1975, p. 29; my emphasis), 
captures well actuality’s priority for Aristotle here. Furthermore, for the 
subsequent “leftist” interpretation of Aristotle, this devaluation of possibility 
is, with Aristotle, articulated in relation to the matter-form dyad: ‘matter exists 
in a potential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists 
actually, then it is in its form.’ (1050a1, 15) Given that, to Aristotle’s way of 
thinking, actuality assumes a priority in relation to possibility, the implication 
here becomes that form pre-exists matter and that matter’s process (qua 
possibility) is no more than a flow to a form eternally as what it is.57 For 
                                                          
57 In spite of Aristotle’s desire to avoid a Platonic dualism, form nonetheless is thus ‘dualistically 
separated from matter’, as Bloch says (PHE, p. 235; see FitzGerald, 1965, p. 73). Now, if it was the 
virtue of Aristotle’s anti-Platonism to have re-immersed forms in the things as the form-matter 
composite (Ricoeur, 2013, p. 223), then equally Aristotle’s erring was to have held onto the Platonic 
notion of form as, in some sense, pre-existing matter, and this right up to the highest form—God’s 
own. Thus Aristotelian form is form un-engendered: ‘certainly the forms are immanent and no longer 
transcendent’, it is an ‘immanent quiddity’, as Ricoeur explains; but ‘for all that they are no less entities 
removed from time’, ‘no less immutable than the Platonic real’ (ibid., pp. 226-7). Pryzwara makes 
much the same point:  
[…] Aristotle, who rejects the “pure eide” of Platonism in order to focus upon the “forms 
within matter”, understands these forms ultimately as a kind of “ideal reality” embedded in 
the pure motion and pure potentiality of “matter”, which, as such, cannot be the object of any 
philosophy. (2014, p. 469; my emphasis) 
 
As Hogh (2017, p. 3) notes, this longstanding assertion of a dichotomy between matter-form 
expresses itself in early analytic approaches to language which, on the whole, ‘determine language as 
an autonomous form’ separated from non-linguistic reality, i.e. nature/matter. This, Hogh suggests, is 
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Bloch it is precisely this relating of matter to form as 
incompletion/potentiality/imperfection to an already existent perfection that is 
the site upon which Aristotle falls foul of the novel idea he had nevertheless 
audaciously opened up for view.58 
Bloch considers possibility not only as a really real concern for philosophy 
and not just a subsidiary element to a much more preeminent actuality, but 
in fact as materialism’s first concern, because if matter just is possibility then 
any materialism worth its salt ought to be a philosophy of possibility. This is 
just another way of describing Bloch’s philosophical thought. The sticking 
point for Bloch here is, I think, that new ontological emergences cannot be 
given space or dignity in a conception like that of Aristotle’s, in which matter 
qua possibility ultimately is always already grounded on anterior 
actuality/form (see Fetz, 1990, p. 201). Even if this anterior actuality 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the theoretical site upon which analytic, structuralist and post-structuralist interventions converge 
(ibid). 
 
58 This point is mirrored in Bloch’s employment of the concept of entelechy, first coined by Aristotle in 
order to comprehend natural metamorphosis. Entelechy denotes a “having the goal in itself” and, as 
Bloch writes, names ‘the idea [the end] endeavouring to shape itself in matter’, concerning ‘the active 
principle of realisation’ ‘contained […] in the appearance’ (TL, p. 409). After criticising Plato’s 
separation of the Idea (essence) from ‘the flux-content of appearances’ (that is, form from matter), a 
dualism Bloch perceives as constitutive of the Platonic dialectic, Bloch writes that 
 
Aristotle is the first to teach a mediation between appearance and essence with his 
concept of the immanently developed form-idea (Entelechy) which actualises itself in 
appearing. (1983, p. 290) 
 
Goethe is a key figure in the reception of Aristotle’s concept of entelechy in Germany. Goethe’s (1999, 
p. 38) poem “Urworte. Orphisch” refers to entelechy as the ‘shaped form which develops as it lives 
[geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt]’ (see also SO, p. 128; LM, p. 149). As Nicholls (2006, p. 
185) writes, ‘entelechy is the source of what […] Goethe would later call the Bildungstrieb or formative 
drive—the locus of the organism, development, unfolding, and formation.’ The snag here is that 
Aristotle grounds entelechy on the idea of an immutability of species; the “idea” or “end” or “active 
principle” for which material appearances are shaped is immutable (such is why Aristotle has no 
conception of evolution) (see Barnes, 1989, pp. 21-2). On the other hand, Bloch refers to entelechy as 
an open shaping of appearances which he terms ‘incomplete entelechy [unvollendete Entelechie]’ 
(PHE, p. 223; my emphasis). Bloch’s refunction of entelechy emphasises the incompleteness of the 
locus of the natural generative process. That which generates is not in itself complete, is not yet what 
it is—this is precisely why it generates at all: it is ‘a latent goal working from a latent idea of shape.’ 
(PHE, p. 984) Incomplete entelechy is thus a thoroughly ‘utopian conception’, Bloch says (1983, p. 
304). 
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constitutes an immanent quiddity, its anteriority is suggestive of a quiddity 
that is already there and established and, as such, unchangeable. Such an 
anterior actuality as this remains utterly premature (M, p. 145). A reversal of 
this circumstance is what Bloch really perceives in the world: ‘the ocean of 
possibility is much greater’ (TL, p. 356). 
[2] Bloch finds much inspiration from the history of what he calls the 
subsequent “left” interpretation of Aristotle.59 A few substantive points on this 
history are warranted. In the first instance, this leftist tradition pivots on 
reversing the relation of priority that Aristotle claims is seen to obtain 
between form-matter/actuality-possibility (M, p. 498), such that the form pair 
are now held as the preeminent metaphysical substratum (PHE, p. 235).60 
Avicenna and Averroës, two ‘pantheistic-materialistic philosophers’ of the 
Islamic Golden Age, are held by Bloch as thinkers who commence this 
process of the sublation of transcendent divinity into matter’s active 
potentiality (PHE, p. 237; M, pp. 481-494; TE, p. 233; TL, p. 411). Indeed 
their dictum that ‘development is extraction of form from matter [Entwicklung 
ist eductio formarum ex materia]’ (M, p. 479) underscores two key shifts in 
which, for Bloch, the utopian function of materialism breaks through (TE, p. 
233).  
                                                          
59 “Left-Aristotelianism” is a ‘playful anachronism’ concerning parallels Bloch perceives between the 
bifurcation of Aristotelianism into a conservative Christian-scholastic school, on the one hand, and 
certain subversive Arabic interpreters, on the one hand; of course, the 19th century Hegelian split into 
leftist and rightist tendencies is also at work in this respect (Ely, 1988, p. 100).  
 
60 As Curtius (1979, p. 55-6) notes, obstacles lay in the way of the dissemination and cultivation of this 
dangerous brand of Aristotelianism; public and private study of the “new Aristotle” was forbidden by 
the Pope in 1215 AD due its irreconcilability with church dogma. This radical bent has been a 
permanent feature of materialist thought through the ages. 
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First, what this shift signals is that form is now considered as fermenting 
within matter such that matter is in itself understood as a self-forming 
process. No longer is there required a hypostisation of a form that, as 
externally and already actually situated above and beyond the travails of 
process-matter, somehow structures this process. Rather, matter is as it 
were per-formative of its forms; that is, forms emerge from or are given birth 
out of matter’s radical possibility (TE, p. 234; LM, p. 173). To employ a term 
from Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement—although Kant still holds 
onto the binary division of matter and form—one could say that matter of 
itself possesses a ‘formative power’ (5: 374), that is, matter is a self-forming, 
self-organising process. Second, and as such, matter is implicitly taken to 
constitute a forward forming developmental process—and indeed §3 of this 
chapter considers in some detail the teleological moment in Bloch’s 
materialism. For once possibility has been set-free from a subordination to 
an external, already constituted form, process-matter becomes open 
process; no longer is process-matter directed by an already actualised 
substratum which ultimately dictates the direction of travel, but nor of course 
is process-matter on the path of a ‘blind mechanism of nature’ (5: 376), to 
employ Kant once more. Taken together, these shifts in the Aristotelian 
problematic, given Bloch by the Arabic masters, constitute the beginnings of 
what Bloch will call ‘a futural materialism [ein Materialismus nach vorwärts]’ 
(TE, p. 233). Unshackled from comprehending matter within the purview of 
regressive tendencies, matter is now grasped—at least in dim outline—as a 
futurally-directed process of protention.  
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[3] In some sense, Bloch’s modal theorisation of possibility—to which 
I now turn—is a culmination of this history but also a novelty to it. I have 
hinted at Bloch’s admiration for the etymology of “matter,” a word derived 
from mater, meaning “mother.” (M, p. 17; TE, p. 231) The idea of matter as a 
womb or a motherly creative force has its roots in Renaissance thought, 
particularly with Giordano Bruno and Paracelsus, figures Bloch includes in 
the history leftist Aristotelianism, and as vital points in this history at that (M, 
p. 170). Bloch’s affinity with this tradition is located in his thinking process-
matter as a process of birth, creation, of novelty and of spontaneity. He 
writes that matter is 
[…] the fermenting womb of a substance which so to speak first gives birth to 
itself, i.e. develops, clarifies and qualifies itself. (LM, p. 173)  
[…der gärende Schoss einer Substanz, die sich gleichsam selbst erst gebiert, 
das heißt entwickelt, verdeutlicht und qualifiziert.] 
An emphatic sense of self-causation, self-creation, and self-clarification is 
evident here; so much is matter deemed a creative process of radical 
possibility that it is with Bloch analogised as a womb that gives birth to 
itself.61 To go into more depth on the nature of possibility as Bloch construes 
it, however, entails giving reasonably close attention to what Schmidt (1978, 
p. 66) refers to as the ‘Blochian Moduslehre’; that is, the twofold modal 
definition of possibility Bloch provides his readers. This theorisation is most 
clearly stated in the following passage: 
                                                          
61 As Siebers writes, the word matter ‘has its place in Bloch’s extended metaphor of pregnancy’, 
matter is seen by Bloch as ‘the world-womb, the birthplace of possibility.’ (2014, p. 3) 
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Matter can be defined in the following way: it is not the mechanical clod, but 
is—in accordance with the implicit sense of the Aristotelian definition of 
matter—both that which can become to the possibility of being, that is, what 
can appear in respectively determined historical-materialist conditions, and that 
which may become to the possibility of being, that is, the correlate of objective-
real-possibility, or pure beingness (TE, p. 233). 
[die Materie ist so zu definieren: Sie ist nicht der mechanische Klotz, sondern – 
gemäß dem implizierten Sinn der Aristotelischen Materie-Definition – sowohl 
das Nach-Möglichkeit-Seiende, also das, was das jeweils geschichtlich 
Erscheinenkönnende bedingungsmäßig, historisch-materialistisch bestimmt, 
wie das In-Möglichkeit-Seiende (Sein), also das Korrelat des objectiv-real-
Möglichen oder rein seinshaft]62 
Nowhere in this passage is being or full actuality attributed to matter; only 
two modes of possibility that are mutually implicating. Indeed, mention of full 
actuality or “pure beingness” Bloch restricts to the very end of the passage 
(actuality comes at the end, not the beginning—another sign of Bloch’s anti-
origin approach). But there is mention of a kind of relative actuality, namely 
the “respective historical-materialist conditions.” That these are also 
considered a mode of possibility paints a far from simple theorisation, but I 
think the point is that these two modes of possibility cannot and do not exist 
as one beyond the other. Each mode does not exist in such a self-reliant 
manner that it would be pure unto itself without requiring its counterpart. 
Rather, each respective mode presupposes the other and as such can be 
conceived of as two sides of the same coin. The ‘real possible,’ Bloch writes, 
                                                          
62 My translation of this passage is, as I take it, more in keeping with the spirit of Bloch’s definition than 
with its letter. 
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has two sides, a reverse side as it were, on which the measures of the 
respectively Possible are written, and a front side on which the Totum of the 
finally Possible indicates that it is still open. (PHE, p. 206) 
In the original definition quoted above, Bloch claims that the modal definition 
he provides is only really the proper explication of an implicit theorisation of 
Aristotle’s. To clarify Bloch’s definition in relation to Aristotle’s I employ the 
terminology Stein develops: 
What Aristotle called the relatively non-existing existent is the actual which is 
opened toward further determinations, and what he calls the relatively existing 
non-existent is what is as yet non-actualised and therefore merely possible. 
(2002, p. 186; my emphasis)   
Slippage of course pertains between Stein’s and Bloch’s respective 
intentions. Be that as it may, Stein’s elaboration of Aristotle’s position here 
not only clarifies the distinction between Bloch’s two modes of possibility, it 
also helps to illuminate their interwovenness.63 The upshot: the first mode 
Bloch conceives of as “that which can become to the possibility of being 
[Nach-Möglichkeit-Seiende]” concerns a “relatively non-existing existent,” i.e. 
an existent that while possessing degrees of actuality does not, however, 
constitute a condition of complete actuality in itself. While, for example, 
according to Marx, the capitalist mode of production exists, it cannot be 
taken as complete in itself for the reason it harbours within itself the 
conditions of possibility for radical transformation over into another social 
form, i.e. socialism. On the other hand, Bloch’s second mode of possibility, 
                                                          
63 Bloch sees the distinction along the lines of natura naturans and natura naturata (TE, p. 234; LM, p. 
173). A distinction between the products of a creative matter and that creative material productivity 
itself: product-production. “Product” and “production” do not, however, occupy ontologically separable 
realms. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is important here (see Bowie, 2003, pp. 74-5). 
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“that which may become to the possibility of being [In-Möglichkeit-Seiende 
(Sein)],” concerns “the relatively existing non-existent,” i.e. the ultimate and 
full realisation of possibility as such. As Bloch writes, all non-existing 
existents have their common path in the ultimate possibility that itself is non-
existent, or not-yet existent: 
[…] but all these forms are only themselves form-relations, interweaving in a 
universal process. And this process is determined through the universal 
orientation to a Unum, Verum, Bonum of the goal. (SO, p. 466)  
[…aber alle diese Gestalten sind selber nur dialektische Gestalt-Beziehungen, 
verschlungen in einem universalen Prozeß. Und dieser Prozeß ist determiniert 
durch die universale Ausrichtung auf ein Unum, Verum, Bonum des Ziels.] 
No concrete example of course can be given of this mode; it remains 
outstanding, extraterritorial and thus incommunicable: the not-yet what-ness 
for which there is becoming at all. Employing Weiss’ (1958, p. 35) term it 
could be argued that non-existent existents, as conceived of above, all 
together share a ‘common possibility’, the latter of which Bloch divides into 
two outcomes: first, the possibility of the All (pure beingness), second, the 
possibility of the Nothing (the latter of which Bloch does not mention in the 
passage above, but which indicates the contingency of the nature of 
process-matter’s ultimate outfall). Indeed, such division highlights just how 
seriously Bloch takes the category of possibility to be of the world, for it 
signals the extent to which a consummation of the ultimate possibility of is 
held open: it could become or not become. This as of yet undecided, 
ultimate possibility is, for Bloch, ‘the unresolved utopian tension constantly 
undermining everything shaped.’ (SU, p. 228) What undermines the already-
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become shaped-ness of matter is that which allows matter to open out 
towards a newness of itself. Matter’s shroudedness in incompletion, its core 
shapelessness, derives from the undecidedness of its ultimate possibility 
(SU, p. 192). As Bloch writes, because of this, its core incompletion, matter 
has not yet exhausted what it can become, and it is this claim that is the 
point of entry into utopian materialism:  
The womb of matter is not yet exhausted with hitherto becomeness; the most 
important forms of existence of its history and of its nature still stand in the 
latency of real possibility. (M, p. 524) 
[Der Schoß der Materie ist mit dem bisher wirklich Gewordenen noch nicht 
erschöpft; die wichtigsten Daseinsformen ihrer Geschichte und Natur stehen 
noch in der Latenz realer Möglichkeit.] 
The category tendency thus speaks to Bloch’s notion that the world’s 
essence is an urging to creative forms, i.e. a driving process towards forms 
novel to hitherto achieved becomeness: 
Tendency is the energetic of matter in action, driving forth in all its already 
attained forms towards exodus forms, towards the tendentially implied of the 
entelechially intended end as is not yet become, but which is utopistically 
latent. (Bloch, translated by Moir, 2013a, p. 134; my emphasis) 
[4] Bloch’s notion of “Front” crystallises this conception of matter as a 
process towards what is not yet. In a sense, the notion of the Front concerns 
that state or moment or condition between the two modes of possibility that I 
have commented on above. Indeed, when Bloch writes that ‘deeply 
ingrained habits of thinking cling to a world without Front’ (PHE, p. 5), he is 
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merely claiming that previous concepts of matter relinquish the real 
openness of matter’s what-ness. To cling to a world without Front is not only 
to cling to a world without possibility but to cling to a world without that 
undecided ultimate possibility, that which in its in-existence tensions already 
become shapedness. This ultimate possibility is the very pathos of Bloch’s 
thought, its guiding star, and thus Bloch’s philosophical thought thinks on the 
Front of already become existents. The “relatively existing non-existent,” this 
cognate for utopia (utopia is not nothing, it exists as an absence of 
completeness), is, as Schmidt (1978, p. 305) writes, the threshold-condition 
[Schwebezustand] of conditionedness [Bedingtheit]’ as such, the borderline 
of material shapedness. To stand within this threshold-condition is, for Bloch, 
to stand on the Front of the world process.  
A front indeed implies a border or a limit and is of course often a term 
associated with warfare (Geoghegan, 1996, p. 36), e.g. all was quiet on the 
Western Front. In this sense, what lies on the other side of the front is an 
undecided territory between oneself and one’s enemy. Within the confines of 
war, then, a frontline is that which demarcates a no man’s land between and 
over which two warring factions vie for victory. Bloch, however, perceives the 
Front not as that which lies between oneself and one’s enemy but as that 
“limit space” of really real, worldly undecidedness. It is a “space” that is a 
really real “no man’s [Niemand] land”—not only is no human being yet to be 
found there, but it does not even exist as an already constituted space.64 
This space of experimental probing not only translates into, for example, 
                                                          
64 Thus, Bloch rejects mechanism’s suggestion that matter’s motion merely consists of a change of 
place, a suggestion that presupposes the simultaneity of all possible space and time. This point feeds 
into Bloch’s concept of “non-contemporaneity [Ungleichzeitigkeit],” of which I cannot treat here. 
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anthropological speculation, in the sense that it could be said that, for Bloch, 
the human being is that already become form of possibility most open to 
openness as such, that the human being evinces the most intense bordering 
upon a tensioning of real incompleteness; the notion in question here of a 
condition of radical undecidedness assumes, for Bloch, a much more 
expansive ontological register: it implies a threshold-condition within the real 
itself. Thus the real itself, i.e. matter, is an Odysseus-like ‘homecoming 
[Heimkehr]’ towards an ‘un-determined X’ (PA, p. 72); Odysseus—‘no-one 
[Niemand]’—and ‘no where [Nirgendwo]’—utopia—are one and the same 
(PA, p. 73). 
A good sense of what this being on the Front of process-matter is like can be 
found in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (a very important text for Bloch). In 
the Preface Hegel writes:  
Spirit is indeed never at rest but always engaged in moving forward. But just as 
the first breath drawn by a child after its long, quiet nourishment breaks the 
gradualness of merely quantitative growth—there is a qualitative leap, and the 
child is born—so likewise the Spirit in its formation matures slowly and quietly 
into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, 
whose tottering state is only hinted at by isolated symptoms. The frivolity and 
boredom which unsettle the established order, the vague foreboding of 
something unknown, these are the heralds of approaching change. The 
gradual crumbling that left unaltered the face of the whole is cut short by a 
sunburst which, in one flash, illuminates the features of the new world. (1998, 
p. 50) 
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To stand on the Front of the material world-process is, for Bloch, to live and 
act and create and commence and speak on and in the foremost edge of 
futural time with the aim of real realisation: ‘the ontological truth in process 
becomes visible on the front of realisation’, as Siebers articulates this idea 
(2012d, p. 163): 
The being that conditions consciousness, and the consciousness that 
processes being, is understood ultimately only out of that and in that from 
which and towards which it tends. Essential being is not Been-ness; on the 
contrary: the essential being of the world lies itself on the Front. (PHE, p. 18) 
§3. LATENCY 
What’s the point of it all? (TL, p. 314) 
[wozu das alles?] 
Through the category tendency Bloch invites his readers to view matter 
as a process possessing Front; that is, tendency for Bloch denotes a 
process of unfinished development angled into a region of real 
undecidedness—ultimately Bloch is no determinist. Whilst this open 
processuality will be an important idea to set to work when eventually I arrive 
at my reading of the syntactic figure of anacoluthon (Chapter III), which 
denotes a break in the flow of syntax and will be read as probing, 
experimental linguisticality, I need to consider a second moment of Bloch’s 
materialism; that of purposiveness, or teleology, and ask how the openness 
and purposiveness of process are related. 
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If Bloch’s view of matter sees it as open process it is crucial to emphasise 
that real process—ontological process—is possible for Bloch only in a reality 
conceived of as incomplete and yet directed in it incompleteness, that is, 
directed in its processuality. Bloch’s categorisation of matter as process 
therefore conceives of this process not merely as Heraclitean becoming, as 
becoming without the possibility of termination, but instead, as Gross (1972, 
p. 122; my emphasis) observes, as ‘in process of becoming itself, of 
achieving its own structure and proper form.’ Process seeks a kind of 
completion of itself and it is this dimension of a directedness towards 
completion, towards a proper form of itself, that enables one to speak of a 
teleological moment (from the Greek telos) in Bloch’s materialism. To speak 
of purpose (Zweck) or purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) is inevitably to place 
oneself in ‘the historical metaphysical problematic of purposive causality, or 
teleology,’ says Moder (2017, p. 275), ‘such as it is known in Thomas 
Aquinas and other Aristotelian traditions.’ A theory of language derived from 
Bloch’s materialism must tarry with the nature of this goal-quality of process-
matter and, indeed, the manner in which it differs from the above mentioned 
tradition. This will be my concern immediately below. 
To do this I will consider in just what way ‘the flow of the real’ is teleological 
for Bloch (PHE, p. 222). Below I will expound Bloch’s considered concept of 
a utopian teleology, without, however, glossing over its difficulties or indeed 
its ambiguities. My aim is to sketch a model of this form of teleology so as 
then in later chapters to conceptualise language within its general theoretical 
framework. To fulfil this task I refer to Aristotle and to Kant along the way, 
and to the example of musical improvisation; Aristotle and Kant because 
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their respective concepts of teleology are perhaps the most influential in the 
Western philosophical tradition, therefore these may act as a benchmark 
against which to measure Bloch; musical improvisation because it offers an 
example by which to render more palpable what remains a very difficult 
moment of Blochian materialism, a moment sometimes bordering on the 
obscure, if not the questionable. Indeed, it is my estimation that the nature of 
purposiveness claimed of process stands as the most difficult, yet significant, 
moment of Bloch’s materialism, because it invites readers of teleology to 
rethink the categories and dilemmas of teleological explanation and 
overcome them dialectically, as it were. 
What follows consists of three points. First, I provide a descriptive account of 
Bloch’s teleology. Second, I consider how this account fares with customary 
teleological explanation as found in Aristotle’s work. This will involve 
highlighting the problematic nature of Blochian teleology. Finally, I will try to 
render concrete what a utopian form of teleology, such as Bloch forwards, 
amounts to by turning to the example of musical improvisation, relating this 
to Bloch’s category of “latency.” 
[1] As I have alluded to above, there can be no question that teleology 
features in Bloch’s materialism, the problem is simply one of its precise 
nature or form. Münster (1982, p. 18), a longstanding commentator of 
Bloch’s materialism, speaks of a ‘goal quality’ inscribed in tendency’s flow: 
there is in that flow a teleological directedness endogenous to its process 
such that a questioning dimension that asks “Whereto?” can be said to 
structure it and be part of it. Against this backdrop, Bloch enlists such terms 
as impetus (Anstoß), drive (Trieb), hunger, need (Bedürfnis) and longing 
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(Sehnsucht) to cast matter in his specific processual view of the world. All 
these terms of course clearly connote a sought-for goal or purpose and 
suggest that matter lacks something (Nicht-Habens) and that matter longs to 
transcend and overcome this lack (EM, p. 73). Within this context, Bloch 
recurrently reminds his readers that in process-matter’s productivity there is 
present an invariant of direction: ‘things have been thought as process and 
so precisely as purposive’; ‘[i]n each process is direction’ (LM, p. 366); 
‘[t]here would not be any process at all if there were not something that 
should not be so.’ (Bloch, 1988, p. 17) Bloch extends this perspective of a 
persistent orientation to the broadest of philosophical terms: 
[T]he world is full of propensity towards something, tendency towards 
something, latency of something, and this something means fulfilment of the 
intending. (PHE, p. 18; my emphasis) 
Before I give an account of the precise nature of this purposive process, it is 
important to differentiate the teleological process conceptualised by Bloch 
from that provided by Kant. I feel this is necessary to do so for the reason 
that Kant’s account of teleology has been influential to understandings of 
teleological explanation, and so from the outset I would like to highlight the 
point that Bloch’s teleology operates in an entirely different register from 
Kant’s. This point relates back to an earlier thesis of mine, namely: Bloch 
ontologises Kantianism. 
In the First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant (2000) 
writes that ‘a formal purposiveness’ is simply what human beings ‘assume’ to 
be there working in nature as a whole but that laying behind this assumption 
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is a complete lack of theoretical proof, such lack of proof itself being 
impossible to overturn, says Kant, given the human mind’s limited 
architectonic, of which Kant had expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
In accordance with this starting point Kant then claims that natural 
purposiveness cannot be posited ‘in the object at all,’ but must be done so 
‘strictly in the subject’ alone (20:216). This amounts to saying that natural 
purposiveness does not and cannot stand as an ‘objective concept of nature’ 
but is ‘derived merely from the subjective relation of nature to a faculty of the 
mind’, namely the faculty of judgement (20:218). To paraphrase Kant here, 
teleology is not ‘a property of the object outside me, but merely a kind of 
representation in me’ (5: 365). This thesis is born of Kant’s desire to 
establish the legitimacy of human freedom, however threadbare, against the 
efficient causality of natural science. This in turn relates to Whistler’s 
valuation of Kant’s philosophy of nature as an ethicisation of nature. In Kant 
the human being and its freedom becomes the measure of all things. If 
nature is said to harbour an end towards which it ‘specifies itself in 
accordance with a certain principle (or idea of system)’ (20:215), as Kant 
puts it, then, in the first instance, not only is such a specification-towards-an-
end a process inexorably leading to the human being as the ultimate form of 
free life as such (5: 380)—‘that nature must be conceived of as an arena for 
the realisation of our moral ends’ (Guyer, 2005, p. 353; see also p. 171), but, 
in the second instance, just such an end is said to be no more than an 
anthropocentric, practically useful projection onto an unknowable nature in 
itself (ibid, p. 281), i.e. this projection cannot be objectively proven but rather 
is merely a practical ideal, the latter a consequence of an internal need of 
the human being to search for and find systematicity in the world to which it 
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belongs. Thus, as Varela & Weber (2002, p. 98) say, Kant reduces teleology 
as a classically dogmatic metaphysical position to a sort of ‘methodological 
fiction’—a ‘teleonomy’, that is, an apparent but impossibly provable 
purposiveness.  
It is significant to outline Kant’s position here for the reason that Bloch 
completely does away with the premises of its heritage. That is, Bloch does 
away with Kant’s agnostic “as if-ness,” insofar as he decisively re-posits 
goal-directedness as objectively belonging to process-matter—as Weber & 
Varela write, here teleology is envisioned as a ‘real mode of being.’ (ibid, p. 
111) The question of how Bloch provides satisfactory arguments to 
overcome the limits of experience which Kant had set-up as an 
insurmountable hurdle to knowing whether nature is truly purposive does not 
concern me here. As I stated in the Introduction, my aim in this study is not 
to argue for the plausibility of Bloch’s arguments but merely to extend his 
concepts into the realm of philosophy of language, and in so doing breaking 
new ground in Bloch-studies itself. For now then it is important to highlight 
that Bloch is working not with a subjective but an objective notion of 
teleology. Having established this important difference I can now turn to the 
precise nature of purposive process as conceived by Bloch. 
I have stated above that, to Bloch’s mind, the material-process harbours an 
intention of fulfilment. Here is where hope is said to emerge from its process, 
for it is claimed to be directed towards a possible fulfilment. Insofar as for 
Bloch process-matter is a process of possibility, so then process must be for 
some type of goal or end or, properly speaking, process must be for some 
actuality; and this, Bloch insists, is matter’s ‘most important truth’ (PHE, p. 
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1374). Within this general theoretical framework Bloch will then suggest that 
process-matter possesses within itself a cohering ‘intention-for-meaning 
[Bedeutungs-Intention]’ or ‘intention-for-realisation’ [Verwirklichungs-
Intention]’ (ibid., p. 121), but that such meaning or such realisation is not pre-
determined from the outset but must itself undergo a process of 
determination. Bloch will at times speak of this indeterminate outfall of the 
intending as “home [Heimat]” but also more familiar philosophically as 
essence (“What-ness,” or quidditas). More interestingly, Bloch relates the 
realisation of what is intended/intending by/in process-matter with a category 
of perennial philosophical standing, namely—that of the highest good:  
In the goal which is being striven for it is the one necessity of, to use an 
outmoded expression, the highest good, which pacifies the unrest of the need 
and striving, that for which it would not be necessary to struggle if it were 
already available. This kind of totality, the non-existing all, not the existing 
whole, is the goal of the dialectical movement that holds it together, exactly as 
need is its impulse and motor. (1983, p. 303; my emphasis)  
It is important to note here that I am not concerned with a Blochian concept 
of the highest good per se; rather, to reiterate a point I made earlier, it is my 
aim to grasp as best I can the precise nature of the purposiveness of 
process which Bloch considers leads to the possibility of fulfilment in the 
highest good, the latter of which, to paraphrase Guyer (2005, p. 326), is that 
which purposive process is subsumed under as a ‘single ultimate principle.’ 
That said, it is of course the case that the one cannot be dissociated from 
the other, such that in truth path and goal are necessarily interlaced in 
Bloch’s philosophical thought: the nature of totality as not yet surely effects 
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the nature of process, whilst, with this in mind, process organises totality 
through itself. Despite this nuance I think I am justified in drawing an 
analytical distinction of focus, at least provisionally here. For now, it is 
correct to say that Bloch equates the something process is for with the “non-
existing all” employed in the above passage. And if the highest good must in 
Bloch’s mind relate to totality, then Bloch’s notion of the highest good turns 
on the position which states that it is not yet there. For it is the absence of 
totality’s availability which announces the need for process in the first place. 
The question of what sort of purposive process is at play here has to 
recognise its answer as hinging on how totality’s being not-yet effects an 
understanding of teleological process. To muster a response to this question 
and to begin to see the difficulties involved requires rehearsing a customarily 
understood notion of teleological process.  
[2] For a classically conceived notion of teleology one can turn to 
Aristotle. Aristotle’s approach to the question of teleology is customary in the 
sense that it is underpinned by the view that the idea of a whole towards 
which particular things strive is antecedent to such movement towards it—
note here that this echoes Aristotle’s prioritisation of actuality. To hold 
otherwise, namely, to say that the end towards which process tends is not 
yet, is a manifest antinomy—for what is a purpose if it is not determined (and 
thus in some sense actualised) prior to a striving towards it (see Guyer, 
2005, p. 329)? This problematic which emerges from Bloch’s notion of a 
totality not-yet in being can be brought into clearer view by turning to 
Aristotle’s medieval interpreters, who usually translate the idea of teleology 
as ‘final cause [causa finalis]’ (Tuominen et al., 2014, p. 5). Feser (2014, p. 
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160; my emphasis) notes that much of Scholastic metaphysics, heavily 
indebted to Aristotelianism, perceived a potency as ‘always a potency for 
some actuality’, and thus a potency always ‘points beyond itself to an end or 
a range of ends’ and, as such, understanding potencies entails 
understanding ends, fulfilments, or what I term outfalls. Now, as I have 
hoped to indicate in passing above, it is unquestionably the case that Bloch 
wants to grasp matter qua a process of possibility in terms of ends, but Bloch 
seems to rely too heavily on a notion of pure potentiality, which in itself has 
no pre-determined actuality to direct its movement. One of Aristotle’s most 
famous readers, Aquinas, captures the real nub of the philosophical stakes 
at play here when he asserts that ‘an end or a goal, […] this is the starting 
point of causal action, the cause of causality itself’ (ST, 5.2; my emphasis). 
As Aquinas lucidly conveys the point: a final cause is located precisely at the 
beginning of a process insofar as it will be the cause of any beginnings of 
process as such—it is that end which lends to a beginning its reason for 
being a beginning and thus is rightfully coined by Aquinas the cause of 
causes (causa causarum).65 This is why the final cause is ‘first in the order of 
intention and last in the order of execution or activity.’ (Wallace, 1977, p. 
105) As Aristotle writes: 
                                                          
65 This makes teleological arguments notoriously circular, as Fugate makes clear by drawing on the 
circle shape itself: 
 
[For] consider that a circle be formed by the joining of the two ends of a line. Such 
joining evidently does not consist in the placing of the two ends next to one another, 
because then the beginning and the end would remain two different points, and thus 
there would have to be at least one point between them, and thus no circle. If we are to 
transform a line into a true circle, then this can only be by taking the two most distant 
points and identifying them as the very same point. (2014, pp. 104-5) 
 
Bloch, however, proposes a dotted ‘circle-symbol [Kreissymbol]’ as alternative to what he designates 
as the closed ‘circle of circles’ of Hegelian becoming, wherein the teleological process is so conceived 
as to foreclose the radically new from occurring (SO, pp. 445-9). Bloch’s dotted circle-symbol 
illustrates that ‘matter does not have its Totum in the horizon of the past’ but ‘the future.’ (SO, p. 410) 
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That for the sake of which is an end such that it is not for the sake of 
something else, but that for whose sake everything else is; so that if there is to 
be some such final term, it will not be unlimited, but if there is no such term, 
then there will be no for the sake of which. But those who endorse an unlimited 
series, forgetting this, destroy the nature of the good. Yet no one would try to 
do anything if they were not going to come to a limit. Nor would there be any 
reason [i.e. rational order] in reality. For whatever has reason always acts for 
the sake of something, and this is a limit. For the end is a limit. (Quoted in 
Johnson, 2005, p. 82) 
Like Bloch, Aristotle in the Metaphysics extends this teleological principle to 
the whole of nature insofar as, for Aristotle, the highest good is that limit 
which constitutes ‘the end of all generation and change’ (938a1, 30); that is, 
“end” both in the sense of the limit which terminates generation and change 
and that for which generation and change are what they are. One can thus 
infer that the highest good is the ultimate limit of all possibility for Aristotle 
and therefore is the highest mode of actuality. To a large extent this is 
precisely the case with Bloch. But there are two stark differences spanning 
the two thinkers’ approaches on the score of teleology. Firstly, for Bloch, the 
end of process does not come at the beginning, as with Aristotle’s customary 
approach to teleology, but the beginning at the end. In other words, 
teleological explanation is employed in such a way that the totality for which 
particular things tend and strive cannot precede such tending and striving—
the final cause really does come at the end. This first point places the 
purported teleological dimension of Bloch’s materialism in a bind insofar as, 
despite this radical refunction of teleology, Bloch still wants to maintain the 
idea that process has a teleological bearing from the outset, and as such, in 
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keeping with tradition, Bloch still affirms an end’s status as the cause of 
causes: 
To find it, to find the right thing, for which it is worthy to live, to be organised, 
and to have time: that is why we go, why we cut new, metaphysically 
constitutive paths, summon what is not, build into the blue, and build ourselves 
into the blue, and there seek the true, the real, where the merely factual 
disappears—incipit vita nova. (SU, p. 3; my emphasis) 
But it was already said that the goal of process is what sets off the process 
in the first place; even if this goal is an idea, it remains actualised in that 
state. The trouble is that Bloch insists the goal is not only not known, but not 
yet ontologically determined. Does Bloch not therefore propagate a goalless 
teleology or at least one that is utterly blind? Secondly, and contrary to 
Aristotle, Bloch dichotomises the actuality towards which the process of 
possibility can tend towards. On the one hand Bloch speaks of The All as a 
possible outfall of process, whilst on the other he speaks of The Nothing 
(admittedly not an actuality but the very termination and impossibility of any 
actuality whatsoever). This second difference between the two thinkers of 
teleology is problematic for Bloch insofar as he locates the end of process 
on the site of a possibility. But it is precisely this move which is contrary to 
the very logic of teleology for the reason that if a proper possibility of the 
process of matter is that a nothingness befall it, then nothingness cannot be 
said to constitute a state of actuality. This problem relates to Bloch’s very 
concept of the positive possibility mentioned above, The All, which Bloch has 
also termed the non-existing goal. I have established so far that whilst need, 
hunger, and longing are those states which constitute the driving force of the 
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flow of process-matter, what holds this process together and directs it is a 
“non-existing” goal—the “non-existing all,” i.e. it is a type of totality not yet in 
its very being. But here resides the ambivalence of the teleological moment 
in Bloch’s materialism. If as Lord (2011, p. 82) puts it, teleological 
explanation presupposes that ‘the idea of the whole causes the parts’, i.e. 
the final cause is the cause of all particulars, then Bloch has apparently 
jeopardised the grounds upon which teleological explanation stands by 
asserting that totality is not yet. And yet Bloch does not relinquish the 
conviction of an end-limit to process-matter and thus, it can be argued, at 
least in principle, he does not do away with the idea of a highest good: ‘The 
genuine utopian will is definitely not endless striving’, he writes (PHE, p. 16; 
my emphasis).66 If as Brentano (1975, p. 29; my emphasis) writes, 
‘[p]otential being cannot be defined except with the aid of the concept of 
actuality’, then Bloch is here working with a utopic notion of actuality. Bloch’s 
materialism creates categories with which to think about the world as an 
immanently developing whole, but this whole does not pre-exist its 
development, and insofar as this is the case so then teleology is dis-related 
                                                          
66 Bloch equates endless striving with an utter lack of direction:  
 
Homogenous flow as becoming without terminations shows itself everywhere as 
ideological residue, as a mere restless changing of itself for the sake of change, each 
change thereby losing its value. (EM, p. 152) 
 
[Der homogene Fluß als Werden ohne Anhalten zeigt selber überall ideologischen 
Rückstand eines ruhelosen Sichveränderns bloß um des Veränderns willen, in dem 
jede Veränderung ihren Wert verliert.] 
 
Bloch therefore battles against not only static, but processual ontologies devoid of direction (Richtung), 
i.e. processuality without arrival, realisation, or outfall. Bloch’s protestations against process 
philosopher Henri Bergson serve to highlight this point. Bergson posits process without the prospect of 
finality (see PHE, pp. 140 & 201; Hudson, 1982, p. 72) and thus ‘opposes the process-idea directed 
towards a goal’, eliminating ‘any and every trace of the onward, the Where To and openly pursuable 
goal’ (PHE, pp. 140-1). Conceptions of homogenous process as one witnesses them in Bergson are, 
for Bloch then, myopic to the really new (the Novum) insofar as they posit sheer repetitiveness of 
change without any true break or rupture. In a pure processuality there can be no true transgressing of 
limits into what is new (into finality). This is why Bloch speaks of the ‘future-character’ of matter (M, p. 
254). 
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from what has been perceived to be its necessary rootedness in an 
antecedent actuality—in an ‘entelechy of fate’ as Bloch terms it (LM, p. 290).  
Turning to the category Bloch employs in order to think this peculiar 
teleological moment—this purposive process of possibility towards a utopic 
actuality—can help in my task of grasping this teleological process. “Latency 
[Latenz]” Bloch broadly defines as ‘the existence in tendency of the not-yet 
being goal-contents [das Dasein des noch nicht seienden Zielinhalts in der 
Tendenz].’ (LM, p. 352) Tendency denotes a striving towards something; 
latency, which ‘comes from latere,’ meaning ‘“being hidden [versteckt sein],” 
“being concealed [verborgen sein],” “having not yet emerged [noch nicht 
herausgetreten sein]”’ (LM, p. 352), concerns the nature of that for which 
tendency strives. If tendency’s latent goal is no more than a totality which 
has nowhere (ou-topia) yet entered into being, then that which process 
strives and hungers for is what has nowhere yet appeared in process; and 
thus process strives for ‘the reality of tomorrow’—process strives for the new 
(LM, p. 352). Indeed, Bloch thinks the Ultimum not merely with the Novum 
but as the Novum, and it is perhaps his mistake to have held onto the 
category of “latency” to convey this point, for what is latent tends to be 
already there, however dimly. Nevertheless, the point is that the process that 
tends towards totality would thus be, to Bloch’s mind, a process which leaps 
out and over into something new. This will be an important notion when I 
come to my reading of anacoluthon, which means a break in syntactical flow, 
or, more literally, a “not following” on the plane of syntax. Process does not 
follow (a pre-conceived route, as it were), but leads towards what has not yet 
been. And here is the sticking point, for if process-matter is structured or so 
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held together by a final cause the finality of which precisely is open in itself—
the cause of causality consists of an openness to novelty, thereby it cannot 
be limited in any simple sense, for the goal possesses a ‘frontier 
characteristic’ (LE, p. 131)—then it would appear that this utopian form of 
teleology abrogates certain basic features of customary teleological 
explanation. Insofar as Bloch’s materialism locates matter’s final actuality 
(final cause) within the modality of possibility—in accordance with Aristotle’s 
definition of possibility cited earlier, this utopian conception of teleology 
would amount to saying that process-matter’s limit, i.e. its stopping-point, is 
no more than a possibility—so then there is little basis, it seems, for Bloch to 
be convinced that there is any sign of teleology within the flow of process-
matter. The upshot is that the latency of tendency fundamentally concerns a 
final cause which has, as it were, fallen ‘out of changelessness into 
movement’, ‘out of the sphere of identity’ ‘into the river of the world fire.’ 
(Bloch, 1983, p. 300) It is for this reason of indeterminacy of the final cause 
that the highest good, as a possible ultimate outfall of process, thus 
becomes ‘an objectively-real real problem.’ (PHE, p. 1324) As Bloch writes: 
[T]hat which is meant by the highest good, formerly called God, then the 
kingdom of God, and which is finally the realm of freedom, constitutes not only 
the purpose-ideal of human history but also the metaphysical latency problem 
of nature. (PHE, p. 1324) 
Insofar as the totality for which process-matter searches is constitutively not-
yet; to paraphrase Guyer (2005, p. 12), insofar as this totality ‘is not 
antecedently given’ to the need, antecedent to the longing for it, so then 
there is a reflective freedom in the composition of processual realisation as 
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conceived by Bloch. It could even be said that, in the world of Bloch’s 
philosophy, teleology is inherently inductive as opposed to deductive (this if 
one considers this statement not merely epistemologically, but bears in mind 
that the final cause is realised through its effects: it is not that the human 
mind goes from effect to cause, but that the real itself goes from its effect to 
cause, this in the peculiar manner that this cause is not-yet in existence). 
Indeed, the new cannot appear in a world conceived of as a cycle recurring 
to itself, to paraphrase Przywara (2014, p. 136) in his expression of 
Aristotle’s teleological notion of entelechy. Bloch remains Aristotelian insofar 
as he designates his materialism ‘immanent teleology’ (M, p. 447); the 
teleological moment of Bloch’s materialism is underlined by a rejection of 
any and every transcendent preordination of process-matter’s outfall, as 
seen to an extent with Aristotle. But Bloch argues that a materialisation of 
this immanent form of teleology would, in the first instance, consist of 
process’s desideratum being itself not yet constituted. Instead, what is 
desired is really reflectively sought. It is for this reason that the teleological 
moment of Bloch’s materialism opens up for view the notion of a utopic final 
cause: teleology which is open purposiveness.  
Even so, as Przywara highlights, however open this type of process might 
be, it must harbour within itself an a priori of the end: ‘Every “it is assumed 
that” already implies an antecedent theory, which affects the order of the 
experiment and thus constitutes at least a negative a priori.’ (Przywara, 
2014, p. 137) Siebers foregrounds this dimension in Bloch’s work. The 
Ultimum of the process is that which always is ultimately aimed at and as 
such stands as a limit category whose function is to act ‘as a (negative) 
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measure for the critique of existence’ (Siebers, 2012f, pp. 583-4). Its nature 
of a limit is what leads Siebers to speak of the Ultimum as the 
‘extraterritorial’, ‘eschatological dimension’ of all human and extra-human 
realisation. It is in this sense that the category Ultimum both does and does 
not align with Aristotle’s notion of an ultimate limit as the end towards which 
all generation and change tend towards. To deal with Bloch’s severance 
from Aristotelianism: what makes the Ultimum an “extraterritorial, 
eschatological dimension” is that it is the as of yet ‘unavailable fundamental 
goal’ of process (PHE, p. 1375). One is thus in a strange position with 
Bloch’s thought, for here one has the idea that that which guides the process 
of actualisation is not-yet. If classical teleology’s “thither towards form” is 
from the first only really a “hither from the idea” (Przywara, 2014, p. 139), so 
Bloch’s really is “thither towards a form which is not-yet,” even if what is 
“hither from” in the classical conceptualisation remains that which is always 
intended from the start. I return to these points in Chapter II when I properly 
turn to the metaphysics underpinning Bloch’s materialism. 
For now, the main point of contention with Bloch’s notion of an open 
teleological process, namely a goal-directed process in which the goal is not 
yet decided upon or even in existence, is precisely the objection of how such 
a process can even be considered teleological in the first place, that is, a 
directed process amidst an infinite ocean of possibilities. The objection’s 
point of departure would not be, then, whether Bloch conceives of teleology 
in a subjective Kantian register, as ‘an artifact of our own judgment’ (Guyer, 
2005, p. 300), or indeed an objective, real register—clearly Bloch’s corpus 
commends the latter, and in so doing Bloch echoes a growing line of 
[97] 
 
research in the philosophy of biology which deems teleology a ‘primordial 
tendency of matter manifest in the form of organisms’ (Web & Varela, 2002, 
p. 114). Rather, the nub of the issue lies in whether processuality, as a 
radical openness, can, in its openness, be directed in one way as opposed 
to another. But to my mind this point of contention is problematic only if one 
sticks to those customary conceptions of teleology—those which precisely 
Bloch attempts to step beyond and leave behind. Bloch’s suggestion of a 
radically open material process in which there exists such a creative self-
production of the still fermenting core of matter need not be considered a 
process of mere groping in the abyss of indefinite possibilities. Why if Bloch 
relinquishes the position of a pre-determined end does he face the charge of 
being unable to adequately attend to the notion of directedness as such? 
One of the principal objections that can be levelled at Bloch concerns the 
feasibility of an open teleological process. I have shown that Bloch both 
wants to avoid a closed-ness of the goal insofar as he rejects pre-
determination, and yet simultaneously Bloch maintains the importance of 
directionality, an idea which in itself presupposes a determination of 
destination, however slight. Indeed the problem is thus: how can direction be 
preserved in a radically open process? My response to this potential 
objection is that process for Bloch is directed to the new, to novelty. Thus, 
direction and openness need not be thought as incompatible. Process is 
directed towards a goal that is not yet in itself. This is what makes the 
process open. What makes the process directional is therefore also what 
makes the process open, for process is directed to the really new, which is 
its goal: the nowhere yet existent totality of being. As Bloch writes: 
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At the very beginning Thomas More designated utopia as a place, an island in 
the distant South Seas. This designation underwent changes so that it left 
space and entered time. Indeed, the utopians, especially those of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, transposed the wishland more into the 
future. In other words, there is a transformation of the topos from space into 
time. With Thomas More the wishland was still ready, on a distant island, but I 
am not there. On the other hand, when it is transposed into the future, not only 
am I not there, but utopia itself is also not with itself. This island does not even 
exist. But it is not something like nonsense or absolute fancy; rather it is 
something not yet in the sense of a possibility; that it could be there if only we 
could do something for it. Not only if we travel there, but in that we travel there 
does the island of utopia arise out of the sea of the possible—utopia, but with 
new contents. (Bloch, 1988, p. 3) 
One way to concretise this form of utopian teleology, a counter model to 
tradition, in which the goal is determined through a movement towards it, is 
to turn to a musical example. In fact, this would be apt given Bloch’s intense 
fascination for this form of artistic production, which for him is the utopian art 
form kat’exochen: Bloch would like ‘to allot to music primacy in what is 
otherwise unsayable’ (SU, p. 163). The spontaneous and open teleological 
composition of totality at work in Bloch’s materialism can be demonstrated 
more specifically with the example of musical improvisation. When, for 
instance, jazz musicians, as parts of the live musical composition, come 
together to “jam” they aim to produce a sonic expression of life and 
existence that nowhere yet has entered into being. This is shown by the fact 
that whilst musicians in an improvised setting collectively seek a common 
goal by specifying their production of sound toward a certain wholeness, 
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they cannot describe, either with words or prior musical notation, this goal of 
wholeness, but can only achieve its realisation in their very playing. The 
process of jamming is open then, and yet remains determined in its process 
by a sort of purposiveness: no musician really knows where they will go and 
what they will hear, but they do seek something and this is what makes their 
process of playing a directed process. It is directed process towards the 
new. Hegel touches on this Blochian idea of a spontaneous development of 
totality, insofar as totality’s being not yet renders its developmental process 
an open developmental process of realisation, even if one adds the caveat 
that Bloch, like many other major theorists of the previous century, considers 
Hegel still abides by a sort of Aristotelian prioritisation of actuality or 
sameness, or ossified repetition: 
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said 
that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that 
precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous 
becoming of itself. (Hegel, 1977b, p. 11) 
Moder (2017, pp. 286 & 288) touches on the notion which Hegel dimly offers 
as a post-critical account of teleology but which, I claim, only Bloch sees to 
the end, namely: that ‘the substance itself is transformed by the accident’; as 
such substance can ‘radically transform itself.’ In other words, for Bloch, the 
substance of totality (that is, matter’s potential completion, its outfall) only 
arrives inasmuch as through experimental probing, through its accidental 
turnings and thus through its openness to being imprinted by those 
accidents. Only through this spontaneous becoming does process-matter 
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achieve its goal of completion. If every act limits the virtual infinity of 
potentiality, and if in the beginning substance just is potentiality and nothing 
but pure potentiality ecstatically constituted, so then it can be said that 
substance’s actuality is arrived at both contingently and necessarily. Matter’s 
substance is a dotted circle: in its directedness towards realisation process-
matter is open to the new and not then, as traditionally the circle has 
symbolised, a process enclosed in a self-sufficient completeness (see 
Przywara, 2014, p. 145). And this is precisely the reason why I turned to the 
example of improvisation. Jazz improvisation is a musical form of a dotted 
circle, i.e. an open teleological process. It can be said that, as experimentally 
probing a jamming session is a “dotted reflective flow”—that is, a flow which, 
whilst lacking a actual constitutive end (Kant was half-right, for no such end 
presently exists), does not for that lack a real reflective tendency towards an 
end. Following Muyumba’s (2009, p. 135) work in jazz improvisation, it can 
be said that in being a process of improvisation matter ‘leads to new 
realities’; improvisation touches on the Novum. Matter’s process is thus 
ontological improvisation towards totality, it is a process of ontological 
creative directedness. Its process is one of creating totality without foresight: 
improvised. Bloch’s utopian form of teleology thus allows a sensitivity to be 
developed which sees openness and directedness not as mutually exclusive 
and incompatible, but as one and the same. 
 [3] I have shown a ‘driving tendency’ and an ‘entelechial latency’ as 
central categories of Bloch’s materialism (M, p. 474). How the two categories 
relate specifically, however, has not yet been broached. This requires a 
response. What, then, is the nature of their relation? Whilst devoting 
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sustained attention to this question oversteps the limits available to me here, 
I have nonetheless already intimated that the relation of tendency and 
latency must be understood dialectically. A brief consideration of the 
dialectic in Bloch’s materialism is thus called-for. In that Hegel is key for 
Bloch in this regard, turning to Hegel’s conception of dialectic will be helpful 
in grasping the singularity of the tendency-latency relation so crucial to 
Bloch’s materialism. 
The first point to note here is that Hegel conceives of dialectic as the true 
method of reality itself; dialectic is held as the precise manner in which 
reality tends towards completeness, or absolution. This is another way of 
saying that, in Hegel’s (1991, p. 1; my emphasis) mind, dialectic is ‘the only 
method that is identical with the content.’ Hegel regards dialectical method 
as real as the content it treats of (ibid., p. 2) and is therefore immanent 
method. Dialectical method is such that it allows ‘the matter itself to hold 
sway over us’ (ibid., p. 55); it ‘tie[s] thought down, lead[s] it to the matter, and 
maintain[s] it there.’ (ibid., p. 5) So attuned is the dialectical method to that 
which it treats that it can be considered only as ‘real-dialectic’, as Bloch says 
(SO, p. 64). Nor can the dialectical method be considered a tertium quid, a 
third term, interjecting itself between tendency and latency. Rather, the 
dialectical method, according to both Hegel and Bloch, constitutes the living 
rhythm of each pole’s becoming. According to Bloch, and following Hegel, 
tendency and latency relate dialectically, such that their relation is a real 
relation. This real relation is underpinned by three causal conceptions, 
conceptions inextricably dialectical in kind: (1) interaction (Wechselwirkung); 
(2) contradiction; and (3) a utopian Agens (LM, pp. 345-49). In what follows, 
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I shall deal with the first two, as to an extent the latter has already been dealt 
with in the section on tendency and latency: the utopian Agens is the 
realising element in matter.  
[a] In the first instance, the dialectical nature of tendency and latency’s 
relation means that each of the categories possesses mutual causal 
efficaciousness, such that neither stands as hierarchically dominant in 
relation to its opposite; moreover, each contains a potency for imparting 
change upon its opposite, and vice versa. This flows from the Hegelian 
dialectic, which is above all else a radical theory of movement defined 
precisely by the interaction (and contradiction) of subject and object (SO, pp. 
36 & 65; Adorno, 2000, p. 81). What this essentially means, in the first 
instance, is neither subject nor object are pure unto themselves but instead 
gain their inner constitutions through the play of their outward, living 
interaction. And so it is with tendency and latency: no tendency without 
latency, no latency without tendency; process directing the nature of outfall, 
outfall the nature of process, such that each pole influences, imparts, 
changes and transforms its related opposite in the becoming of totality. As 
Adorno (2001, p. 163) writes of subject and object: ‘these two elements do 
not oppose each other in a static, inflexible manner,’ but mutually influence 
and in turn are mutually influenced, each pole imbuing its opposite with itself, 
interpenetrating, and thereby giving voice to a unity—and difference—of 
subject and object (see Ollman, 1976, p. 55). Of course, as I have shown in 
the case of Bloch’s conception of totality, the unity of tendency and latency is 
not-yet, but always ever again intended: ‘the totality of the non-existing All’ is 
the dialectic’s ‘cohering goal’, Bloch writes (SO, p. 512)  
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[b] In the second instance, as a dialectical relation, tendency and 
latency’s interaction consists of events of negation, interruption, and thus 
discontinuity (important for my reading of anacoluthon in Chapter III); in sum, 
their interactive relation is constituted in large measure by contradiction. Like 
Hegel, Bloch holds this as, to some extent, dialectic’s key contribution to 
philosophical thought.67 As the following passage makes clear, contradiction 
and the negation it entails is a facet of dialectic woven into the idea of an 
incomplete subject-object identity: 
[D]ialectic as the logic of process reflects in the whole history of its concept this 
provocative and history-making claim: there is still no identity. Because no 
object is complete within itself and without otherness, conflict is the father of 
things. (1983, p. 293)  
When Bloch (ibid., p. 295) is discussing the contradiction dialectic involves, 
so then he has in mind ‘real contradiction, contradiction as constitution of the 
object’. A good sense of the place of negation in dialectical becoming is 
visible in the following Hegel-passage, in which negation is aligned with 
discontent and inadequacy: 
[T]he Idea displays itself in each sphere so far as it can within the finitude of 
that sphere, just as each drop of water provides an image of the sun, and 
secondly, that the Notion, through its dialectic, breaks through the limitation of 
                                                          
67 As Hegel writes: 
It is […] one of the basic prejudices of previous logic and of ordinary thought that 
contradiction is not as essential and immanent a determination as identity. But in fact, if 
order of precedence were an issue, and the two determinations were to be held 
separate, it would be the principle of contradiction that should be taken as the more 
profound and the more essential. For in contrast to it, identity is only the determination 
of simple immediacy, of inert being, whereas contradiction is the root of all movement 
and life; it is only in so far as something has contradiction within it that it moves, is 
possessed of instinct and activity. (2010, pp. 381-2) 
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this sphere, since it cannot rest content with an inadequate element, and 
necessarily passes over into a higher stage. (1970, §252 Zusatz; my 
emphasis) 
This passage is almost echoed by Bloch, but the emphasis is laid on the 
incompleteness of the goal of dialectical becoming: 
Dialectic itself, in the world made by humans, is subject-object relation, nothing 
other; dialectic is working subjectivity, time and again overhauling, and striving 
to blast open already become objectivisation and objectivity. Ultimately, finding 
itself and its work inadequately objectified, the needy subject is always the 
driver of historically occurring contradictions. The needy subject is the intensive 
motor, is the consequence of the inadequacy of the attained form of existence 
at any one time, whose revolutionary gait, conflicting the contradiction of the 
matter itself, activates, from the inadequacy, the Totum of its content. For if 
unfulfilled need is the impetus and motor of dialectical-material movement, so 
then is—on the ground of the same absent content—the totality of the non-
existing All its cohering goal. (SO, p. 512) 
[Dialektik selber, in der von Menschen gemachten Welt, ist Subjekt-Objekt-
Beziehung, nichts anderes; ist erarbeitende Subjektivität, die die ihr gewordene 
Objektivierung und Objektivität immer wieder überholt und zu sprengen strebt. 
Letzhin ist stets das bedürtige Subjekt, indem es sich und seine Arbeit 
unangemessen objektiviert findet, der Treiber der geschichtlich auftretenden 
Widersprüche. Ist der intensive Motor, der infolge der Unangemessenheit der 
jeweils erreichten Daseinsform an ihr zum Gang kommt und widersprechend 
den Widerspruch in der Sache selbst, den von der Unangemessenheit zum 
Totum des Subjekt-Inhalts herstammenden, revolutionär aktiviert. […]. […] 
wenn das unerfüllte Bedürfnis der Antrieb und Motor der dialektisch-materiellen 
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Bewegung, so ist—auf Grund des gleichen noch unpräsenten Inhalts—die 
Totalität des unvorhandenen Alles ihr zusammenhaltendes Ziel.] 
Interruption is born of inadequacy, of limitation, of negativity at the heart of 
identity, the latter of which is always intended as the goal of dialectical 
process.68 Negation, an intertexture to the interactive causality of tendency 
and latency, involves explosive leaps. As Bloch writes: 
Each half-fulfilled or inadequate already become movement-form, each 
historical society, contains in its womb the bearer of further, greater need, 
developing capacity, that wants to be fulfilled. Need, as the active capacity, 
contradicts the old forms of existence, becoming explosive, containing the call 
to the future, to the next approaching contradiction, a relatively sublated stage. 
That is the source of rupturing tendency in the dialectic, a source out of need 
(SO, p. 138). 
[Jede Halberfüllung oder unzureichend gewordene Bewegungsgestalt, 
Geschichtsgesellschaft zieht in ihrem Schoß die Träger weitergehenden 
Bedüfnisses groß, entwickelteren Vermögens, es zu erfüllen. Das Bedürfnis 
wie das aktive Vermögen widersprechen der alten Daseinsform, so werden sie 
explosiv, so enthalten sie den Beruf zur Zukunft, das ist zur nächsten, den 
Widerspruch relativ aufhebenden Stufe. Das ist der Ursprung von sprengender 
Tendenz in der Dialektik, ein Ursprung aus Bedürfnis] 
As Harris notes (1986, p. xvi), a key feature of Hegelian dialectic is the 
process by which categories are brought before their own nullity (or 
                                                          
68 Socrates’ dia-logical approach to wisdom and definition is perhaps the inception of dialectical 
thought. Dialectical is the Socratic beginning of wisdom: “I know that I do not know,” that is, I know that 
I have a not-having. The felt inadequacy of this contradiction drives forth for a solution (SO, pp. 126-8). 
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inadequacy) in the face of the absolute. A similar process is seen in Bloch’s 
materialist dialectic. What makes of this materialist dialectic a utopian 
dialectic, however, is that inadequacy can only be measured against an 
absolute that is not-yet in existence (an existing non-existent). And so the 
inadequacy of each material-form dawns only in the face of a complete 
subject-object identity that itself is—not-yet. This point brings me to what can 
perhaps be considered as the foremost objection that Bloch aims at 
Hegelian dialectic. Bloch’s recurrent complaint turns on what he perceives 
as the utter disregard Hegelian dialectic pays to truly new, i.e. the Novum, 
the logic of which I will now briefly consider.  
If the absolute is that end to which all moments of dialectical becoming move 
towards, then its conception as consisting of “an already being there” 
precludes genuine novelty from this process. For Bloch, however, process-
matter’s dialectic is contradictory, discontinuous, really real anticipative, 
spontaneous becoming, in that reality is the becoming to an as yet 
incomplete totality, an outfall, which, as such, cannot pre-exist its process of 
arrival. Given this is the case for Bloch, given that the outfall of process does 
not pre-exist process but is found forming in and through process, so then 
the outfall would be a novelty in process, would be something that has not 
yet occurred in the history of becoming. Thus the Nouvm and totality are 
tightly bound up together to Bloch’s mind. As Siebers writes: 
Genuine novelties in history—revolution, new behavioural patterns, 
experiences of transgressing limits, thought itself as transgression—are all 
actualisations of the intention to totality (2012a, p. 414; my emphasis).  
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CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 I have expounded the basic architectonic structure of Bloch’s concept of 
matter. To further elucidate this materialism I have drawn on the 
philosophical genealogies of the categories that structure it. I have 
contended that the starting point of Bloch’s materialism may be viewed as an 
ontologisation of Kant’s Copernican turn, by which I mean, for Bloch, the 
incomprehensibility of matter’s essence or core does not reside on the 
epistemological side alone—as it does with Kant—but is the ontological 
basis of matter’s really real incompleteness. My next step was to consider 
the two categories that make up Bloch’s ontologisation of Kant, namely 
tendency and latency. These terms denote, respectively, both the 
processuality of matter and its purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit). I have 
argued that, taken together, Bloch conceives of matter as an anticipatory, 
contradictory process; which is another way of saying that matter is a 
discontinuous process with direction. The categories of tendency and 
latency essentially grasp these two related moments of matter, in which 
incompleteness, process, development, direction, and anticipation all 
constitutes the decisive features of Bloch’s materialism from which one can 
then build one’s speculation on language. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ANALOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I, I provided an analysis of the compositional structure of 
Bloch’s utopian materialism—essential for any attempt to think the 
materiality of language within its horizon. My claim in the above was that 
Bloch’s materialism views matter as a discontinuous, teleologically open 
process. What this analysis does not take into account, however, is an 
appreciation of the movement of transcending (note, not transcendence) that 
is vital to Bloch’s way of thinking about matter. Thus, my reading of Bloch’s 
materialism in Chapter I operates on an all too immanent plane, or, better 
put, does not give heed to the transcending (Überschreiten) which is key to 
understanding Bloch’s materialism.  
To get a handle on the place of a transcending process in Bloch’s 
materialism requires inquiring into this materialism’s guiding metaphysics. 
Indeed, it is not controversial to say that Bloch’s matter-categories tend 
towards a meta-physical outlook insofar as together they coalesce into a 
fundamental reflection on the question of being (Holz, 1975, p. 126).69 My 
aim in this chapter then is to provide a response to the question of what kind 
of metaphysics underpins Blochian materialism? What is this materialism’s 
                                                          
69 Indeed, Hermann-Sinai and Tegtmeyer (2012, p. 9) speak quite freely of Bloch’s ‘metaphysical 
materialism’, and Susman (1992, p. 22) famously described Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia as marking a ‘new 
German metaphysics’. 
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metaphysical sens?70 This question is significant to pose because it brings 
one face to face with what Puntel (2011, p. 159) terms ‘the ontological 
domain’ proper, that is, ‘the ultimate subject matter’ of (Bloch’s) philosophy.  
Under review here then is the nature of the relation between process 
and that for which process strives, and this relation is marked by a 
movement of transcending for Bloch (not transcendence). Against this 
qualification of my inquiry, then, below I will argue that here the nature of 
relation between process and its goal consists of an analogic relation. This 
thesis opens me up to the metaphysical doctrine of the analogy of being, 
otherwise known as analogia entis. My claim will be that Bloch’s materialism 
is an original retrieval of the analogy of being doctrine; it is a utopian 
experimentation in the fundamental logic of that doctrine. Bloch’s open, 
teleologically directed materialism sets out a new direction for the analogy of 
being doctrine precisely by developing an eschatological analogy of being, in 
which what is traditionally viewed as a static permanence of the relation 
between process and outfall is now deemed “sublatable” over into a dynamic 
relation that itself can be overcome (it is a capacity, a possibility, of the 
material process for this permanent relation to be transcended).71 
                                                          
70 The French sens denotes both “sense” and “meaning,” but also “direction.” Here, I am concerned 
with what this direction consists of at the most fundamental level. 
 
71 This claim of the analogical nature of Bloch’s materialism is not entirely given by Bloch’s corpus; my 
reading draws on an implicature. For this reason my reading certainly can claim originality: analogy’s 
significance remains un-thought in extant Bloch-scholarship and, to some degree, by Bloch himself, 
despite, as I will show below, his evident intimations towards the doctrine. Equally, for the same 
reason, my thesis is difficult to substantiate. It fails to constitute an entirely surefooted interpretative 
step. Nonetheless, the benefit of reading Bloch’s materialism through the prism of the analogy of being 
problematic is that doing so allows me to cast light on what all things—including language as an object 
of speculative inquiry—communicate with in the horizon of Bloch’s philosophical thought, i.e. a 
transcending movement to what is not-yet. 
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To make my case I will have to sketch a number of key conjunctures in 
analogy’s history, beyond what I take as Bloch’s own eschatological-
materialist rendition of it, so as to bring to the fore the doctrine’s principal 
features. This means considering the following: (i) analogy’s ancient Greek 
beginnings, (ii) its medieval Christian expression, and (iii) its modern forms 
of appearance. Once again, by briefly reviewing these moments of analogy’s 
history (not analogy’s history) one comes to a makeshift measure by which 
to gauge the specificity of what for me is Bloch’s original retrieval of analogic 
metaphysics.72  
But insofar as analogia entis itself is but one response to the question of 
being (to the problematic of metaphysics), so then it is necessary to preface 
my review of analogia entis by tracing three other related lines of inquiry: (1) 
the nature of metaphysics as a science; (2) Bloch’s critique of metaphysics; 
and, (3) Bloch’s (re-)construction of metaphysics over into an ontology of 
not-yet being. By treading these three steps an entrance into analogia entis 
will be all the more smoother. 
§1. METAPHYSICS  
 In the Introduction of this study I claimed that philosophy has re-awoken to 
its speculative mandate. Philosophy has arisen from its anti-metaphysical 
slumber, from what Puntel (2011, p. 8) terms ‘a dogma postmodernisticum 
antimetaphysicum’, to re-establish itself with ‘the inescapable metaphysical 
foundation of human reality’ (Coates, 2002, p. 4). Partly my aim in the 
                                                          
72 Bloch gave his Leipzig philosophy students a piece of advice prior to their commencing a course on 
the history of philosophy: ‘We are not historians’, Bloch says, ‘What interests us is the history of 
philosophy.’ (1985d, p. 31) 
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Introduction was to show that the renewal of metaphysics which is marking 
contemporary philosophical debate provides an opening through which 
alternative approaches to philosophising language can be charted. In turn, I 
contended that Ernst Bloch is a thinker who offers just one such alternative 
way to proceed in speculating on the materiality of language.  
This is certainly all to the good, but the question of what precisely 
metaphysics is raises its head. It is certainly beyond the scope of my study 
to delve into the rich and varied history of metaphysical speculation, the 
tapestry of debates, conflicts, and headways to be found there, and to 
provide a resounding response to this question. That said, I am able briefly 
to shed light on the vocation of metaphysics, very broadly construed, and by 
laying this vocation out in clear sight I will then be able to consider Bloch’s 
critique of metaphysical thought as such, and, thereby, the specificity of the 
analogy of being as a particular response to the guiding concern of 
metaphysics. 
[1] The guiding concern of metaphysics is traditionally the question of 
being, namely: what is being or what is it to be?, the locus classicus of its 
philospohical formulation belonging to Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The nature of 
this question is given by the very title of Aristotle’s work. Indeed, the Greek 
“meta-physics” originates from a bibliographical designation, inasmuch as 
these Aristotelian writings were assigned this name due to their 
chronologically follow on from Aristotle’s physical investigations (they are the 
writings whose concern is “above” or “beyond” that which is physical). 
However, in terms of their subject-matter, Aristotle’s metaphysical writings 
are first in investigative rank insofar as the task of metaphysical speculation 
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is to discern the grounds and causes of the physical world as such (that 
which is beyond the physical is thus seen as that which gives birth to and 
sustains the physical). To borrow from a thinker of the previous century who 
was most concerned to reignite the embers of the question of being, 
Heidegger writes of this question that it is thus ‘the most originary’ (2000, p. 
2) and, as such, ‘the darkest of all.’ (1990, p. 23) Bloch concurs: the germ 
and kernel of all questioning is the ‘dark Am and Is’; the question of being is 
therefore ‘the question of questions’ (EM, p. 245). In a significant passage of 
the Spirit of Utopia Bloch conveys not only the centrality of this question for 
his philosophical thought, but its fundamental enigmatic quality: 
It is questioning in itself, an inmost, deepest amazement, which often moves 
toward nothing, and yet quiets the flux of what was just lived; lets one reflect 
oneself into oneself such that what is most deeply meant for us appears there, 
regards itself strangely. A drop falls and there it is; a hut, the child cries, an old 
woman in the hut, outside wind, heath, an evening in autumn, and there it is 
again, exactly, the same; or we read how the dreaming Dmitri Karamazov is 
astonished that the peasant always says “a wee one,” and we suspect that it 
could be found here; “Little rat, rustle as long as you like; / Oh, if there were 
only a crumb!” and upon hearing this small, harsh, strange line from Goethe’s 
Wedding Song we sense that in this direction lies the unsayable, what the boy 
left lying there as he came out of the mountain, “Don’t forget the best thing of 
all!” the old man told him, but no one could ever have come across something 
so inconspicuous, deeply hidden, uncanny within the concept. (SU, p. 193) 
What I would like to highlight at this point is the link Bloch establishes in this 
passage between the question of being and the unsayable, and his 
embedding the emergence of this question and its concomitant relation to 
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the unsayable within the occurrences of everyday human life and 
experience, i.e. the rain falling, a human inhabitancy, the sound of a child, an 
autumnal setting of the Sun, etc. It is during these moments in which the 
daily occurrences of human life and the natural environments in which they 
take place are gripped by their own surplus of meaning that first pricks 
metaphysical questioning: an inkling emerges from this wonder that there is 
something more to the empirical. But the unsayability not only of a response 
to the question of being, but, for Bloch, of the question of being itself, leads 
to a paradoxical style of communicating these sudden confrontations with 
the question of being, these sudden moments of rupture in which the familiar 
turns over into the unfamiliar: ‘The simplest word is already much too much 
for it, the most sublime word much too little again’; so much so that ‘[i]f one 
nonetheless would like to designate here somewhat, one should consider 
that what has just been said must be crossed out each time, so that nothing 
can solidify.’ (SU, pp. 193 & 194). As I will show shortly, this move on 
Bloch’s part, in which metaphysical questioning relates to an un-congealing 
of speech (and one can imagine, that which one speaks of), sets out to 
establish a symbiosis of ideology critique and the question of being.  
For now, I can render clearer the point Bloch is making and better bring into 
view the vocation of metaphysics by turning to the recognised philosopher of 
being Étienne Gilson (1950, p. 17), who has remarked that often a human 
life is lived by that which has been chosen to be forgotten. Against this 
remark, the metaphysician seeks to counter this tendency of forgetfulness by 
rekindling a recognition of the uncanny fact of being as such—‘the 
overpowering enigma of existence!’ (SU, p. 172), as Bloch says—which 
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often times becomes all too veiled by hasty concerns with the empiricities of 
life. ‘We are all merely empirical in three quarters of what we do’, as Leibniz 
(1998, p. 271) said, and without a recognition of this surplus of the empirical 
and of what we are, a surplus which nonetheless sustains the empirical and 
what we are, ‘humans collapse into themselves, without a path or a goal 
beyond the quotidian.’ (SU, 167) This being-tied to ‘the stockpile of […] the 
merely become of existence [Vorhandenseins]’ (PA, p. 149) thus to Bloch’s 
mind and perhaps to the minds of metaphysicians with him, quashes the 
ability for a movement of transcending (incurvatio in se ipsum)—the 
movement of transcending being long related to metaphysics. This surplus 
of the physical-empirical as that which unites all physical-empirical 
individualities in a commonness of being is, as Heidegger (1990, p. 21) says, 
that ‘disturbing’, ‘obscure and hidden’ feature of existence that metaphysical 
speculation aims to recuperate a remembrance of and investigate it as best 
it can: ‘Being is common to all the sciences. But it is for metaphysics to treat 
of it in its commonness.’ (Blanchette, 2003, p. 117) Bloch’s manner of 
treating this commonness of being is just peculiar to say the least. 
§1.1. BLOCH’S CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS  
[B]eing minus horizons. (M, p. 468) 
As I will hope to show below, there is much of the vocation of 
metaphysics that speaks to Bloch’s agenda, particularly the movement of 
transcending already mentioned and to which I will come to shortly. 
However, to Bloch’s lights metaphysics’ mandate as remembering the 
commonness of being betrays an error that is present in the historical 
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manifestations of its programme, an error consisting of a deep-seated and 
persistent forgetfulness of its own in which, contrary to the path of 
metaphysical criticism charted by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, it not so much 
forgets being (Heidegger, 1990, p. 21) as the real openness of being to-
come. As Bloch writes in the opening pages of The Principle of Hope: ‘In his 
first attempt at a Latin grammar, M. Terentius Varro is said to have forgotten 
the future tense; philosophically, it has not been adequately considered to 
this day.’ (PHE, p. 6) Bloch’s principal criticism is thus that a notion of being 
as closed because already fulfilled pervades all hitherto metaphysical 
directions of thought, even Heidegger’s to some extent, although a 
comparative study on this topic between Bloch and Heidegger would be 
interesting.73 In any case, Bloch’s materialism is an attempt to put the 
question of being on a new basis, precisely one upon which being can be 
thought as what is new. Thus the forgetfulness of metaphysics equates to a 
forgetfulness of, and thus a hermetic isolation from, the real openness of 
being as such. Recall at this point that for Bloch possibility (not actuality) 
constitutes the larger part of what is. In holding this position he ostensibly 
throws out of speculation the sustaining hypostatisation of most if not of all 
classical metaphysics, namely: a present completeness of (the) being (of 
beings), upon which classical metaphysics is firmly established. Bloch’s 
critique of this illusion of metaphysics, the illusion of an already fulfilled being 
as there in constant reserve, as it were, is, on my reading, certainly 
influenced by Bloch’s allegiance to Marxism, even if in no wise can Bloch be 
                                                          
73 Fredric Jameson notes that while somewhat reminiscent of Heidegger’s question of being (“Why is 
there something rather than nothing”), Bloch’s approach rejects Heidegger’s formulation:  
[F]or [Bloch] being is precisely incomplete, in process, not yet altogether there: what 
astounds is therefore not so much being itself, but rather the latency of being-to-come 
at work, the signs and foreshadowings of future being. (1974, p. 123) 
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said to have shown a simplified form of fidelity to the Marxism of his time. 
Bloch’s rootedness in the radical philosophy of Marx is of significance, 
however, because as a tradition of thought Marxism generally rejects 
metaphysics as mere ideology and thus as a perpetuation of false 
consciousness. So much so that the very idea of a Marxian metaphysics 
induces somewhat of a paroxysm for thought.74 The truth is that Bloch’s 
thought incorporates metaphysics and ideology critique to such an extent 
that they become almost synonymous, but this of course has repercussions 
for his conception of being. To take a closer look at this problematic one can 
turn to Siebers’ work, which articulates these two motives in Bloch’s 
materialism to the effect that they are rendered compatible, but only in a 
form of tensioning. As Siebers writes: 
Two contrasting motives are at work in […] Bloch. One is the intention to dispel 
illusions and ideologies that chain and oppress humanity—[…], the other is the 
intention to show the anticipatory, transcending dimension in consciousness 
and reality, which gives depth, meaning and direction but which is not open to 
the clear, rational analysis that is at our disposal in the critique of ideology. For 
Bloch, these two motivations require and reinforce each other and form two 
aspects of the same thing: philosophical truth. (2012g, p. 27) 
                                                          
74 Schmidt is the one to have described Bloch as the last metaphysician of Marxism (1978, p. 62), and 
with some grounds for doing so. Schmidt’s curious claim, however, strikes one as paradoxical when 
read in the context of Marxism’s general critique of metaphysics, as provided by Engels’ (1934, p. 45; 
see also Adorno, 2004, p. 361) juxtaposition of ‘the old Procrustean bed of metaphysics’ against 
‘dialectical thought’ (metaphysics here is viewed as static thinking). Bloch’s friend Lukács, however, 
spoke of his surprise and admiration when learning of Bloch’s ability to speak the ‘mother tongue’ of 
the ‘old philosophers.’ (TL, p. 374; see Gluck, 1985, p. 160) ‘Lukács would emphasise the human’, 
‘while my business’ Bloch says, ‘was the edifice, the landscape, the system of nature, in another 
sense the renaissance of Aristotle, Thomas and Hegel.’ (TL, p. 373) For a discussion of this new 
ontological path in Marxist thought, see Preve (1988). 
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This appeal to the compatibility-in-tension of materialist ideology-critique and 
metaphysical speculation (this transcending dimension in consciousness 
and reality which, importantly, does not rely on mere inference) produces a 
novel perspective on the question of being. For it opens human beings up 
not only to their own ontological incompletion, but also to the metaphysical 
incompletion of the commonness of being they necessarily share with all 
else that is in existence and which, via ideology, is glossed over with veils of 
posited actuality (ibid., p. 39). It is this incompletion or general lack of being 
that lends a pervading impetus to overcome any and all pretensions of 
completion—all contrived offerings of arrival—as well as that which, 
simultaneously, provides the space to enter into what is new. This is the 
transcending moment of Bloch’s metaphysics, and it is not by chance that 
Siebers describes metaphysical speculation as consisting of a transcending 
movement—Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308) had deemed metaphysics ‘the 
transcending science, because it is concerned with the transcendentals.’ 
(1987, p. 2)75 
[1] Bloch’s contention is as follows: to presuppose the being of beings 
as already established upon an ‘all too prematurely fulfilled objectivism’ (SU, 
p. 65), inevitably sets metaphysical knowledge on a path of return to what 
has been; for if the being of beings already is then what is most fundamental 
to beings—namely their underlying beingness—cannot be otherwise, and 
                                                          
75 In the Introduction I outlined how Kant sought to limit any pretensions to access the 
transcendentals, turning philosophical thought over in so doing into a transcendentalism. But if the 
coincidence of speculation and critique is possible in a fruitful way, then the possibility of a 
metaphysics which in its very disposition critiques the transcendentals of being (and thus being itself) 
without, however, disregarding the importance of the transcendentals as such, is opened up. The 
transcendentals of being remain the ultimate intention of critique, and thus themselves turn over into 
anticipatory structures.  
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thus such beings are as they always will be. It is no coincidence, then, that 
Bloch consistently criticises Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis, which holds that 
truth is located in the past and that what is required to come to truth is a re-
membering.76 But this metaphysical tradition sanctions an erasure of 
possibility and thus an expunction of process and futurity from any 
understanding of the being of beings. Thus metaphysics has been grounded 
upon a radical forgetfulness of the utopian horizon of being,77 a ‘discarded 
cornerstone within […] metaphysical perspective.’ (SU, p. 193) It has 
consisted of a fundamental orientation to the past and as such its knowledge 
is thoroughly epistrophic (epistrophe) insofar as it constitutes a “(re)turning” 
or “reversal.” Unable to fathom any real notion of ontological futurity, 
metaphysical speculation does away with real ontological process (Bloch’s 
“tendency”) and genuine ontological arrival and novelty (Bloch’s “Ultimum” 
and “Novum”). ‘Beingness’, as Bloch summarises this metaphysical 
dispensation, ‘simply coincides with Been-ness’ (PHE, p. 8). Against this 
backdrop it can be said that Bloch’s metaphysical materialism is based on 
an utter reversal of this logic of been-ness: 
The Not-Yet-Become, although it fulfils the meaning of all men and the horizon 
of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a concept. 
                                                          
76 As Jay (1984, p. 183) notes: ‘Rather than basing his ontology and epistemology on a variant of 
Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis, or recollection, Bloch chose the religious concept of eschatology 
instead.’  
 
77 A prime example of this backward logic is Aristotle’s definition of essence: essence, the essence of 
being as the what-ness of beings (their beingness), is “what-it-was-to-be-that-thing” (see Lawson-
Tancred, 2004, p. lvii). In other words, the what-ness of being (what is being? what is it to be?) is given 
a regressive inflection as what it was to be. 
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This blossoming field of questions lies almost speechless in previous 
philosophy. (PHE, p. 6; my emphasis)78 
The Not-Yet-Become is not some one thing among others, but the being of 
beings. Does this mean that beings in truth are not or rather that an 
indeterminacy is found at the heart of the real itself (the non-identity of the 
real itself)? Bloch’s ‘We do not even really know what absolutely just “is” or 
even who we “are”’ (SU, p. 199) is, contra Kant then, a radical not-having 
insofar as it is a really not-having being. ‘[T]rue being, as ontōs on,’ of which 
the metaphysicians of old spoke and upon which they heavily relied, ‘is not 
yet.’ (TE, p. 223)79  
It is important to state at this stage that the “not-yet” of Bloch’s ontology of 
not-yet being signifies an expectation, or better, an anticipation. Thus, Bloch 
does not completely rid his ontology of the fulfilledness of being that was the 
premature basis of all hitherto metaphysical speculation. Indeed, in a 
passage I will make use of to verify my analogic reading of Bloch’s 
materialism, he writes: 
World-history is itself an experiment, a real tendency in the world toward a 
possible Justice. Such history therefore understands itself as an operative 
probing, as real-probing to a still outstanding exemplum. To an omega of 
exemplum, just as it was intended every time in the philosophical anticipations 
                                                          
78 Bloch’s talk here of such dynamics as “breaking through as a word” and such states as “lying 
speechless” is not coincidental. As I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter III, if, as Holz (1978, p. 
112) claims, ‘philosophy is the discovery of the Un-thought [Ungedachten] and the Un-said 
[Ungesagten]’, then Bloch’s philosophy produces a strange reflexivity here. For it thinks and speaks 
something new, namely, that the new is integral to the being of beings.  
 
79 Not-yet-being is the ontological real problem of the world itself, and is ‘consequently a real problem 
of the highest objective manner.’ (TE, p. 226).  
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of true being (ontōs on, substance, complete identity of appearance and 
essence). (TE, p. 117) 
[die Weltgeschichte ist […] selber ein Experiment, ein reales in der Welt auf 
eine mögliche Recht zu. Solche Geschichte versteht sich mithin als selber 
operative Probe, als Realprobe, […] auf ein noch ausstehendes Exempel. Auf 
ein Omega von Exempel, wie es im philosophischen Vorgriff als wahren Sein 
(ontōs on, Substanz, volle Identität von Erscheinung und Wesen) allemal—
intendiert war.] 
What this passage makes evident is that Bloch’s strategy is other than an 
outright rejection of metaphysics, even if he himself recognises the category 
of not-yet being is nothing short of an ‘indecent’ gesture to tradition (TE, p. 
222). Instead, Bloch takes ontology’s intention very seriously, but only as an 
intention of the real itself; indeed Bloch doubts the overriding sincerity of 
ontology as it stands, if, that is, ontology is simply that science which deals 
with the fullness of being as already upon its thinker. As a new thinker of the 
question of being responding to a new conjuncture, however, Bloch retrieves 
the tradition (amidst its abjuration) and teaches it the identification of its 
object of inquiry (the being of beings) with utopia, i.e. with what is not-yet in 
being but which is nonetheless what is always really intended. Thus, while 
an ontological incompleteness of matter is at the very heart of Bloch’s 
materialist metaphysics, ontological fulfilment does not assume a total 
redundancy, for the fullness of being retains its esteem as an ultimate 
ontological desire (otherwise known as the Ultimum). Thus Bloch’s truly ‘is a 
philosophy of desire’ (Siebers, 2013a, p. 65), and the metaphysical 
structuration of this desire is one of ‘activity and hope’ (M, p. 545), for it 
[121] 
 
reconceives the already achieved and fulfilled being of classical metaphysics 
as not-yet there but as a real intention in the real itself (see Christen, 1979, 
pp. 145-7). ‘[S]o the Archē is not itself archaic, to the contrary’, Bloch writes 
(TE, p. 215)  
§1.2. NOT-YET BEING 
What then? I am. But I do not yet have myself. (EM, p. 11) 
[Wie also? Ich bin. Aber ich habe mich noch nicht.] 
There are a number of further observations that can be made on the 
basis of Bloch’s significant alteration of ontological thought. It is important to 
spend some more time on this because all of the matter-categories 
discussed in Chapter I find their common touching point in Bloch’s 
overarching category of ‘not-yet being’ (TE, p. 212), the latter constituting the 
red thread tying together the complex assemblage of questions that Bloch’s 
philosophy concerns itself with (Siebers, 2012b, pp. 403 & 406), and thus is 
that category which supports the step of the present chapter, which takes as 
key a metaphysical reading of Bloch’s materialism. It is also important to 
clarify this category if not because it has no philosophical forerunner prior to 
Bloch and announces an irreversible departure from classical metaphysics 
(ibid., p. 404). Thus it is worthy of thought in its own right. 
It is good to begin by posing the question of whether Bloch’s ontology of 
‘not-yet being’ (TE, p. 212) permits a treatment as ontology, in the Greek 
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sense of ontōs on or “full being.”80 For in posing this question of whether 
there can be a science of what is not-yet one is led to inquire into what an 
ontology of not-yet being even means. One can certainly imagine that the 
whole ontological pursuit is being revised here. As Gilson writes: ‘The 
slightest alteration in [the comprehension of abstract ideas] never fails to 
bring about a corresponding alteration in the whole series of their 
consequences.’ (2014, p. 6) What sort consequences, then, follow from 
Bloch’s pen for ontology?  
[1] One can begin to respond to this question by noting that, to 
Aristotle’s mind, the essence of a thing is “what-it-was-to-be-that-thing.” Here 
the definition of thing (which always allies to ontology) proceeds according to 
a backward logic, the very same trajectory of thought that occupies the more 
recent articulation of being by Puntel’s (2011, p. 91) structural-systematic 
approach, which, in aiming for maximal or ‘ultimate intelligibility’ of being is 
committed to the same presupposition as Aristotle, namely: that being as 
such as a fullness of being already exists. In the case of the what-ness of 
being, Bloch’s thesis that essence is not yet clearly then inserts a 
fundamental undecidedness into the definition (and thus the intelligibility) of 
what a thing is. For now one cannot rely on the what-has-gone-before-of-a-
thing to define that thing. Bloch’s dramatic move is of course to extend this 
undecidedness into the very ontological constitution of beings, such that 
what a particular thing actually is is thus indeterminate (note that this 
indeterminacy is not simply on the side of subjectivity, but constitutes a really 
                                                          
80 Here Bloch ‘envisions a specific ontology without being, before being itself can be found’ (Boldyrev, 
2014, p. 10). ‘Bloch’s arguments depend absolutely on a […] logic whose potential is as yet unrealised 
in any presently-existing system of thought’, as Norris (1989, p. 313) writes. 
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real indeterminateness of the thing itself). The kind of consequences that 
follow from this radical refunctioning can be found in a very rich passage: 
Things become intelligible only when thought of as moving, when determined 
as passage, not as solid facts. Determination is ambiguous. It can include 
determination from something and determination to something. The copula in 
judgement intends both, but as determination from something (definitio) it is 
only formal and not yet material. It describes the thoughts, the concept of the 
matter with its attributes and its circumference, but not yet the object itself with 
its properties and its essence. Determination to something (destinatio) moves 
with the passage of matter, conforming to its objective directedness. Hence, in 
accordance with material directedness a concrete definition is each time also 
destinatory. (LM, pp. 361-2) 
[Die Dinge werden nur verständlich, wenn sie als bewegte gedacht sind. Wenn 
sie als Gang […] bestimmt sind, nicht als feste Tatsachen. Bestimmung ist 
doppelsinnig, sie kann enthalten Bestimmung von etwas und Bestimmung zu 
etwas. Die Kopula Ist im Urteil meint beides, aber al Bestimmung von etwas 
(definitio) ist sie nur formell, noch nicht materiell. Sie bezeichnet den 
Gedanken, den Begriff der Sache mit seinen Merkmalen und seinem Umfang, 
noch nicht das Objekt selber, mit seinen Eigenschaften und seinem Wesen. 
Erst die Bestimmung zu etwas (destinatio) geht mit dem Gang der Sache, mit 
ihrem objekthaften Gerichtetsein konform. Eine konkrete Definition ist daher 
allemal auch destinatorisch, dem materiellen Gerichtetsein gemäß.] 
To refer back to my discussion of Bloch’s utopian form of teleology, it can be 
said in light of this passage above that, like musical improvisation, process-
matter is a concrete definition of itself; that is, it is destinatory. Indeed, if 
there were doubt, Bloch perceives this undecidedness as not merely 
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imbuing any given individual thing, but rather more so as being the (hitherto 
discarded) cornerstone of being as such: ‘There are utopian borders not only 
for respective individual beings, but also for the whole of present being and 
of essence’, he writes (TE, p. 102). Bloch’s utopian ontology, a ‘forward 
directed [nach vorn], incomplete metaphysics’ (M, p. 448) thus equates to a 
destinatory concept of the being of beings.81 And it is this determination of 
Bloch’s materialism that first opens the door to conceiving of it as an 
eschatological form of analogia entis. 
[2] Bloch’s ontological position can be made more concrete, however, by 
turning to his speculations on anthropology. Whilst Bloch’s anthropological 
speculations remain incomprehensible without the underpinning conception 
of being sketched above, nonetheless, they allow for a concrete perspective 
out onto the ontology of not-yet being, and for that reason I briefly turn to 
them. With this in mind, Bloch writes of human culture: 
The present multiverse of human cultures is itself an expression that the 
Humanum still stands in the process of becoming conscious of its freedom and 
selfhood, that the Humanum is therefore not yet found but has doubtlessly 
been searched for and experimented with everywhere (TE, p. 129). 
[Das geschehende und vorliegende Multiversum der Kulturen ist ja selber ein 
Ausdruck dafür, daß das Humanum noch im Prozeß des Bewußtseins seiner 
Freiheit und Selbstheit steht, also noch nicht gefunden, wohl aber überall 
gesucht und experimentiert worden ist] 
                                                          
81 Bloch also expresses this idea with a simple yet rich and heretical propositional form: ‘S is not yet P’ 
(SO, p. 37). As Bloch writes, the ‘Subject […] has not yet attained its adequate contents-predicate, is 
not yet fully testified [ausgesagt], objectivised,’ not yet ‘manifest.’ (ibid.) At play here is kind of real 
predicative searching, a predicative-process, of which, significantly, Bloch’s philosophy itself cannot be 
exempted from (see Zimmermann, 2001, pp. 91-2).  
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Bloch’s point here is that all past and present human culture (languages, 
customs, etc.) stand together as experimental attempts (predicates, as it 
were) at defining the ultimate what-ness of the human being, which ultimate 
what-ness itself remains undetermined. This ultimate Humanum, as Bloch 
terms it, remains in the process of its own becoming (recall Bloch’s open 
teleology), and is improvisation, is open, to paraphrase Betz, ‘to the 
metaphysical possibility of failure.’ (2014, p. 109) There is a concept of 
individuation at play here, in which the variety of contemporary and non-
contemporary human culture represents a band of thus far inadequate 
experimental expressions of what is ultimately searched for, namely: the not-
yet Humanum for which cultures are born and for which they strive. That 
which individuates in Bloch’s system of thought is thus a “not-yet”: multi-
versum = a “turning into many” from the not. In this context Thompson 
(2012, p. 131) makes the important point that the traditional anthropological 
question of “What is the human being?” turns out to be posed incorrectly in 
the light of Bloch’s philosophy, for really the question ought to be “What is 
the human being becoming?” This shift translates over precisely into 
ontology: all beings individuate from that which is not-yet as their ultimate 
end goal. This process of searching at the level of human culture is just itself 
(albeit with its own uniqueness to be sure) a mode of the broader process of 
being itself: ‘The basic form of the proposition “S is not yet P” expresses both 
the process of knowledge as well as the process of being’, as Siebers writes 
(2013a, p. 64). Bloch thus both distinguishes and in turn relates the 
destinatory searching of being and of human culture: 
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This inceptive Not and what it searches for grows exacting in us humans, like 
nowhere else. We are transcending ourselves but so too is everything in our 
compass. (EM, p. 172)  
[Diese anfangende Nicht und was es sucht, kommt in uns Menschen hoch, wie 
nirgends sonst. Wir sind uns selber übersteigend, aber auch alles in unserem 
Umkreis.] 
The “Not” and what it searches for does not begin with human beings, but, 
that said, the ‘tempo of a becoming-other’ (ibid.) grows to such an intense 
degree with the coming of human beings that they may be considered that 
mode of not-yet being that stands on the Front of this searching process: the 
human, ‘surely a leap [Sprung] like no other’ (ibid., p. 173). And so the 
process of matter cannot be reduced to the process of human searching for 
essence, for the latter searching is an expression of the process of matter:  
History is […] a polyrhythmic construction, and not only the social production of 
a still obscure social human being, it is also the artistic, religious, metaphysical 
production of the transcendental mystery of human beings, a new depth-
relation to being. (PA, p. 618; my emphasis)82 
                                                          
82 Emmanual Levinas (2000, p. 98) thus, to my mind, incorrectly interprets Bloch as enacting an 
absolute ethical structuration of ontology. For Levinas, Bloch’s ontological speculations harbour 
‘meaning only as subordinated to man’s liberation’, inasmuch as only a ‘concern for the human 
dimension’ ‘commands all intelligibility’ (ibid.). In sum, Bloch is interpreted here as employing ‘the 
language of being and ontology’ only for purposes of the liberation of human suffering (ibid., p. 103)—
the emphasis here comes down solely on the dimension of ideology critique which certainly is present 
in Bloch’s thought, as I have shown. The Levinasian thesis that the ontology of not-yet being consists 
of a complete reduction of being to the ethical order is, I think, much too one-sided, and in fact 
commits the error of mistaking a product (or a mode) of process for the process itself. What is missing 
here is the clear question-answer dialectic that Bloch claims obtains between the human being and 
nature, between subject-object, between existence and essence. While it is somewhat true, as 
Kolakowski (2005, p. 1144) writes, that Bloch ‘sought to erect a metaphysical foundation for practical 
life in the world and not merely for contemplation’, the question that imposes itself and which 
complicates Levinas’ thesis is: what philosophical substance would this practical-ethical orientation 
have were Bloch to at root disbelieve its true metaphysical underpinning? Bloch is not a relativist, but a 
speculative philosopher concerned, to paraphrase Coates (2002, p. 4) once more, with ‘the 
inescapable metaphysical foundation of human reality’. If Bloch’s ontology has a radical ethical 
impetus, which certainly it does, the ethical conception at play in it cannot be confined to the human 
[127] 
 
 
[Die Geschichte ist […] ein polyrhymisches Gebilde, und nicht nur die soziale 
Gewinnung des noch verdeckten gesellschaftlichen Menschen, sondern auch 
die künstlerische, religiöse, metaphysiche Gewinnung des geheimen 
transzendentalen Menschen ist ein Denken des Seins, einer neuen 
Tiefenbeziehung des Seins.] 
 
[4] Let me turn more focus towards the “not” of “not-yet being.” The 
terminus a quo of Bloch’s philosophy (its initial impulse) is a not-having 
oneself. It is Bloch’s distinctive point of departure, and most if not all of the 
opening lines of his texts play to the motif of what can be called this, his 
utopian-centric starting point. Indeed Bloch often times is found articulating 
an interiority that does not know itself, is placed too near to itself to see or 
speak itself, such that a no-place occupies it: 
I am by myself. 
That I move, that I speak: is not there. (SU, p. 7) 
The short opening paragraph to the first section of The Spirit of Utopia (titled 
“The Self-Encounter”) is the foremost intuition of Bloch’s philosophy.83 An 
incognito lies at the very heart of the subject but it wants to become cogito to 
itself: ‘I want to occupy myself’ (ibid.). The telic moment of this not-having is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sphere alone. ‘This open ontology’, Bloch says, calls for [fordert]’—that is, leads to—an open 
anthropology’ just as much as it ‘calls for an open cosmology’ (TE, p. 299; my emphasis). Bloch thus 
produces an ‘ethico-cosmic perspective’ (LM, p. 364) in that neither does he humanise the cosmos (he 
does not stand for an ethicisation of nature) nor does he mechanistically set the cosmos over against 
the affairs of human life. 
 
83 Christen (1979, p. 12) notes that the relation of being to having is crucial to understanding Bloch’s 
metaphysical materialism and that it is derived from the mystic’s experience ‘of the disunity of being.’ 
This mystical experience is metaphysically charged, alienating, and is found expressed by Bloch 
aphoristically whereby while the I to some extent is, it does not have itself. An alienation pervades 
Bloch’s speculation. 
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again visible here: ‘We almost begin with nothing. That drives us to want to 
feel more.’ (M, p. 21; my emphasis) ‘Only as searching, intending, do we 
begin to be.’ (ibid., p. 24; my emphasis) The beginning of any being for 
Bloch thus seems to be a searching, precisely a searching to overcome what 
is fundamentally missing. But once more this incognito or lack of being is not 
confined merely to the human being, but derives, to Bloch’s way of thinking, 
from the incognito of reality itself: ‘the Not-Yet-Conscious in man belongs 
completely to the Not-Yet-Become […] in the world.’ (PHE, p. 13; my 
emphasis) It can therefore be said that incognito is the first impression of 
being itself.84 What befalls our nearest nearness befalls the whole of being 
as such; or better, what befalls being befalls our nearest nearness: 
The self’s intuition of itself […] is only a problem at all because until the hour of 
the process, the “world-process,” the rotational and objectivational process kat 
exochen, no placing-oneself-before-oneself, no revolving-oneself-beyond 
oneself, encountering-oneself, no more total reflecting of any lived moment had 
succeeded; no concentration of mere partial consciousness into being-
identical-to-oneself, achieved being as such. (SU, p. 200) 
The inability to see oneself devoid of any contrived mirroring has its 
substrate in an incomplete process. One could thus say that being cannot 
                                                          
84 Would this not mean that Bloch’s materialism assumes the character of an idealism—if, that is, 
idealism is that thought-mode which posits the identity of thought and being: ‘An idealistic equating of 
thought with being’, as Bloch defines idealism (LM, p. 95); or, following Przywara’s (2014, p. 471) 
definition, idealism being a style of philosophy which lacks the resistancy of the real because ‘human 
beings and the world are brought into accord with one another, indeed into a coherence of each in the 
other’? Bloch’s idealism could then be said to lie in his conjoining being and thought in an incognito: 
thought and being interpenetrate precisely on the site of this not-knowing, not-seeing oneself, not-
speaking oneself. Is this not, then, a Parmenidean “thinking is the same as what is thought” at the 
heart of Blochianism? But this potential charge is complicated when one takes account of the fact that 
the being-thought univocity seemingly posited by Bloch here lies precisely in an incognito (in non-
identity). While the idea of incognito does not necessarily lead to the idea of non-identity, Bloch 
overcomes this logical problem by asserting a really real incognito: an ontologically inflected incognito.  
 
[129] 
 
cut loose from itself to see itself, and this condition generates process and 
novelty, for there is a desire to do precisely this: to see and speak and have 
oneself in that way.  
[5] A fundamental question ought to arise at this point. Namely: if being 
is not-yet then how can “it” even be spoken of? But not-yet being is not the 
same as nothing: ‘Utopia is not nothing’ (TL, p. 335).85 It is just as misguided 
to maintain that Bloch’s philosophy is based on an unqualified sense of “not,” 
that is, on absolute nothingness, as it is to claim his ontology is a simple 
ethicisation. There is an unequivocalness on this issue, and, pertinently, in 
the context of language: ‘But one cannot speak of nothing, of beings that are 
not [Über Nichts, über Nichtseiendes kann man doch nicht reden].’ (Bloch, 
1985d, p. 160) A strict dissociation is clear enough:  
Nothingness is not identical with the Not. The Not exists in the darkness of the 
lived moment: that something “is not” means something is not yet there, not yet 
brought out, not yet materialised. The Nothing, however, is the frustration of all 
emergence; the condition in which all human activity, everything which 
happens in the world, is frustrated, comes to a standstill, like that of entropy in 
astronomy (Bloch, quoted in Thompson, 2013b, p. 87). 
On the basis of the above important distinction between “not” and “nothing,” 
the category not-yet appears to echo the notion of “relative nonbeing,” a 
notion closely associated with Thomism. Its meaning: nonbeing in a qualified 
sense (for the Thomists, nonbeing is relative to an effect’s degree of 
                                                          
85 This form of negative proposition, a litotes (“nicht nichts,” “not nothing”) Przywara terms a “negative 
reductive formality,” and is, he says, the basic expression of the principle of non-contradiction, a 
principle which ought not to be equated with identity. To know of a contradiction one has to have some 
idea of that which is not contradictory, even if this contradictory-free thing or position be ghostlike in its 
existence. 
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remoteness from divine perfection; this remoteness for Thomism is the 
principle of the plurality of beings and thus in a sense represents an 
ontologically productive principle [Wippel, 2000, pp. 72-3, & 181-3]). The 
claim that with not-yet and relative non-being one encounters the same idea 
gains traction by way of Bloch’s suggestion that not-ness is itself a 
determinate form of having: the having of a remoteness from completion, or 
better, the having of an incompleteness. Bloch articulates this point 
dialectically, such that the relation between having and not-having is porous: 
Had the searcher totally nothing, then he would not be able to search. That, 
what is missing, the Not-had, is in him equally present as the Had, otherwise 
he would not be capable of being sublated into Not-having. (TL, p. 406) 
[Hätte der Suchende gar nichts, dann könnte er nicht danach suchen. Das, 
was fehlt, das Nichtgehabte, ist in ihm zugleich anwesend als Gehabtes, sonst 
könnte es gar nicht als Nicht-Haben aufgehoben werden.] 
In the following section I focus on this relation in more detail. 
§ 1.3. THAT-WHAT 
appearance—essence […] clearly shows a utopian pole. (PHE, p. 15) 
The dynamic relation between not-having and having Bloch also 
construes as the relation between That and What, traditionally 
philosophically conceptualised as the relation between existence and 
essence.86 In fact, the relation between That and What is utopian ontology’s 
                                                          
86 Bloch’s ontology is therefore in a sense traditional or open to comparison with tradition. As 
Lakebrink (1955, p. 29) writes, ‘Essence and existence are, according to the teaching of old 
metaphysics, constitutive parts by which being [das Seiende] is articulated [gliedert]’; or, in Przywara’s 
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most fundamental category. As such, this relation ought to have a strong 
bearing on any Blochian philosophy of language. Recall that for 
Avanessian’s (2016, p. 199; my emphasis) speculative-materialist approach, 
language is said to ‘always already’ contain ‘an ontological thesis’: ‘the world 
that language mediates is made up of relations, not of objects.’ But in light of 
the passage to follow it seems that, for Bloch, what language mediates and 
what is mediated in language is ultimately a world made of a relation 
(singular). Bloch writes: 
But that between That [existence] and What [essence] there can obtain a 
relation at all: this relation itself is the most fundamental category and all other 
categories merely perform it, all others are only the continued opening that out 
of the That emanate Something-multiplicity through a road network. (EM, p. 71; 
my emphasis)  
[Daß aber zwischen Daß und Was überhaupt bezogen werden kann: diese 
Beziehung ist selber die Grundkategorie, und alle anderen führen sie nur aus, 
alle anderen sind nur die fortgeführte Lichtung der aus dem Daß 
entspringenden Etwas-Vielheit durch ein Wegnetz.] 
[1] Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being, and so the very problem of utopia, 
relies for its articulation on the composition of essence and existence and, 
importantly, on how it exactly conceives of this composition. In my view, 
Bloch’s ontology hinges on a real distinction between existence and essence 
and the dynamic, generative tension that is born of this real distinction (in my 
reading in Chapter III, anacoluthon is a linguistic expression of this 
distinction in tension). As Bloch writes: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2014, p. 475) terms, which expand the relation’s significance, ‘the distinction between “essentia” and 
“existentia” […] stands at the centre of ancient, medieval, and modern philosophy.’   
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The Hunger of the That drives ever after a clearer and more distinct revelation 
of itself, but in this innermost being of immanence clarity and before all else 
distinctness still find no coverage and fulfilment. Herein lies the process-
tension from the quodditas [i.e. existence] to the quidditas [i.e. essence] (EM, 
p. 240).  
[Der Hunger des Daß treibt wohl nach klarer und deutlicher Aufdeckung seiner, 
das Clare wie erst recht Distincte finden aber in diesem Innersten der 
Immanenz noch keine Deckung und Erfüllung. Darin ist die Prozeßspannung 
angelegt von der quodditas zur quidditas] 
Now, if the purest expression of Bloch’s utopian ontology, as I think he 
claims, is just this real distinction between existence (That) and essence 
(What), and indeed if it is crucial to Bloch’s very conception of the real that 
the concomitant dynamic tension between existence and essence, that is, 
this ontological relation as dis-relation, marks what is most fundamental to 
matter, then it is precisely on the point of this relation as dis-relation that 
utopian ontology bears an affinity with analogic metaphysics. I say this 
because a real distinction between existence and essence is equally vital for 
analogia entis (at least for the Thomist kind [see Maritain, 1987, p. 67 and 
also §2.1 of the present chapter]). A first step is thus furnished toward a 
discussion of analogy and utopia, and perhaps even analogy as utopia.  
The point to focus on for now, however, is that Bloch does not abandon this 
traditional composition, but his formulation certainly differs so sharply from 
all previous formulations that one can really speak here of a radical 
innovation, as does Siebers (2012e, pp. 165-6). What offsets Bloch from 
tradition is, I contend, the productiveness or creativity he posits of the That-
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What relation; that is, of That’s searching for its What-ness. And it is on this 
difference, I claim, that Bloch’s analogic metaphysics is radically innovative, 
and, moreover, as I show in Chapter III, what differentiates Bloch’s construal 
of the figure of anacoluthon from such other thinkers as Adorno. 
[2] To get a handle on this one has to be mindful that for Bloch the 
question of that there is a relation between that something is and what it is, 
is an inconstructable question; in other words, it is a question that cannot be 
formulated but nonetheless constitutes the central question (not merely for 
philosophy but ontologically, that is, for the world itself). From what has so 
far been said, it ought to be at least vaguely clear, I think, why this 
fundamental philosophical question is inconstructable. This is because what 
the question would seek to “construct” (the What of the That) is not yet. That 
said, in my view, it is the inconstructability of this question of that there is a 
relation between existence and essence that inculcates ontological 
productivity and ontological creativity. For Bloch, that there is a relation 
between existence and essence is incommunicable. Importantly, however, 
Bloch’s utopian ontology is based on the notion that incommunicability is 
communicable, but only precisely as incommunicability. The question of how 
to communicate an incommunicability is also at the heart of analogic 
metaphysics, which I will come to later on, particularly when I discuss the 
analogy of being as conceived by Erich Przywara.  
To clarify this relation between incommunicability and communicability, one 
can turn to an intriguing passage in which Bloch writes the following: ‘The 
incommunicability [Das Verschlossene] of That-ness is as it were the original 
generation [Urzeugung] of false consciousness’ (LM, p. 220). I think this 
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passage can be read in two ways. First, it might suggest the idea that if and 
when incommunicability goes uncommunicated what transpires is a 
condition of the inertness and frozenness that Bloch claims characterises the 
mechanistic conception of matter; that is, what arises is a sort of false 
consciousness whereby the product is mistaken for the process. If and when 
incommunicability is not communicated (when the inconstructible relation is 
not undergoing attempts at being constructed) one sees the dynamic 
between That and What solidify.87 This will have important implications for 
language, discussed in Chapter III. But the passage can also suggest that 
the incommunicability of the relation in question itself has a fundamentum in 
re; that is, an objective foundation in existence. In other words, 
incommunicability is ontologically productive or generative. Productive or 
generative of what? Precisely what-ness, however inadequate. Bloch writes: 
‘In Indian philosophy one finds the prodigious sentence: Not-knowing is the 
ground for the appearance of this world [Das Nichtwissen ist der Grund für 
die Erscheinung dieser Welt].’ While Bloch notes that the original intention of 
this thought is ‘flight from the world [Weltflucht]’, it is, he says, nonetheless 
‘the formula for inadequate appearance (concreteness) and its ground.’ (LM, 
p. 220) In other words, incommunicability, inconstructibility, incognito, 
incompleteness, a not-having, all cognates: this, according to Bloch, is the 
source of communications, of appearances, of phenomenality. The non-
identity of the That-ness of existence is thus the productive source of 
ontological expression, or creation. So the process of existence—existence 
qua process—is a productive expressionism of ontological inadequateness: 
                                                          
87 It is little wonder why Bloch style of written expression is so vital to his philosophy. Bloch’s 
philosophy itself can be interpreted as a performance of the essence-existence relation, and as such 
has a fundamentum in re; that is, an objective foundation in existence. Bloch’s philosophy is a 
performance of the “that there is a relation at all.” 
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‘All being is still constructed around the Not, which suffers of hunger’ (SO, p. 
511); ‘all being is still built around the Not, which admittedly it cannot bear’ 
(ibid., p. 514); ‘the centre in itself is still night, incognito, ferment, around 
which everyone, everything, and every work is still built.’ (SU, p. 173) 
“Not having” is Bloch’s categorisation of existence, or what he calls 
elsewhere as a cognate, the ‘That [Daß]’ (LM, p. 255). That-ness stands as 
a categorial determination of what is a pre-categorial state of being (LM, p. 
256). This is because existence is poverty and hollowness of being (of what-
ness, essence), existence is non-possession and non-determination of 
being, and thus it is incommunicable: the ‘completely empty Daß’ (LM, p. 
255). But this poverty of not-having oneself instils dynamism 
(communicability) into Bloch’s concept of matter; it is what makes of 
existence an open questioning and searching (existence is an exitus, indeed 
an exodus): 
the That is intending, tensioning, driving, addiction; gives itself as intensive, 
namely as drive, hunger, need, longing, but also as a question which not only 
intends what it asks for, but also in the end intends itself. (LM, p. 256; my 
emphasis) 
[So ist das Daß meinend, spannend, stachelnd, treibend, Sucht; so gibt es sich 
als intensive, nämlich als Trieb, Hunger, Bedürfnis, Sehnsucht, auch als Frage, 
die nicht nur das meint, wonach sie fragt, sondern letzthin sich selber meint.]88  
                                                          
88 Reinicke (1974, p. iv) and Siebers (2012e, p. 165) consider Bloch’s position as notably following an 
Eckhartian, Böhmean, and Schellingian tradition of metaphysical speculation, which construes the 
ontological ground of beings as a dynamic non-ground, a ground devoid of its own grounding, an 
“Ungrund.”  
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[3] Bloch thinks the essence of existence as a Novum: ‘the What itself—
in the still pending expression of its contents—is ultimately the Novum.’ (LM, 
p. 256) The That’s What will be a Novum: ‘the essence of the world lies on 
the Front.’ (TE, p. 275) Thus, if the That ultimately intends a having of itself, 
this having would amount to something new. In a reading of the utopian 
dimension in German Idealism, Chepurin (2015, p. 339) describes a similar 
thought when he speaks of the ‘the revolutionary production of newness 
from the in-itself.’ The That produces from within itself its What, which would 
be a Novum. Indeed, in Chapter III I argue that anacoluthic language 
expresses the incompleteness of matter’s process—process-matter’s 
unfinishedness.  
Bloch’s conception of the composition of existence and essence relies on an 
apophatic element. Essence is known and ontologically occurs by way of 
what that essence is not—ex negativa, by negation. As Siebers notes, 
Bloch’s conception of essence here is plainly rooted in the tradition of 
negative theology (Siebers names Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite in 
this regard), that is, a doctrine for which ‘God cannot be described directly, 
but only indirectly’ (2012b, p. 405). The suggestion here being that the 
ontology of not-yet being proceeds or is structured along similar lines as the 
apophatic description of God.89 This brings my discussion to analogy. 
Indeed, I think it is possible to subsume, or better to illuminate Bloch’s 
matter-categories through recourse to analogic metaphysics. 
 
                                                          
89 While intimating the close relation of this facet of Bloch’s ontology to analogy Siebers does not 
however explicitly state the case. The apophasis of divine naming is invariably built from theo-logically 
inclined analogic speculations. 
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§2. THE ANALOGY OF BEING 
Reading Bloch’s ontology as analogic metaphysics faces significant 
difficulty from the outset. Notwithstanding analogy’s polysemy,90 the difficulty 
in question lies in not one of analogy’s historico-theoretical variations (as I 
outline these variations below) compliments Bloch’s ontology or adheres to 
the latter’s basic tenets. The saving grace here will be drawn from analogy’s 
history itself: it is the openness of analogia which allows for the innovative 
experimentations that one finds clearly marking its philosophical-historical 
movement.91 As Whistler has drawn attention to, the experimental 
permeates analogic metaphysics: ‘Each theory of analogy is singular.’ 
(2013b, p. 241) So much is this the case that it would be erroneous to 
explain how Bloch’s analogic ontology could depart from “traditional” 
analogic metaphysics. That said, Bloch’s metaphysics is singular, and to get 
a sense of what is singular in Bloch’s innovation in analogic metaphysics 
requires that I turn to consider versions of analogy’s appearance prior to 
Bloch’s own. It is sufficient to restrict my survey to three cornerstones:92 
(1) Aristotle, commonly viewed as the progenitor of analogy as a metaphysical 
concept, inherited from ancient mathematical thought-forms;  
                                                          
90 “Analogy” has undergone transformations as it passed through the history of philosophy and is 
indeed a concept that cannot even be confined to philosophy. Both White (2010, p. 6) and Hochschild 
(2010, p. xvii) have drawn attention to this variation in the interpretation of analogia, as has 
Pannenberg (2007, p. 5), who describes analogy as ‘an old conflictual question’.  
91 Such openness is demonstrated by analogy’s transcendence of disciplinary boundaries. Areas as 
diverse as semantics and linguistics (Anttila & Brewer, 1977), music, architecture, astronomy, and the 
physical sciences all draw on the concept of analogy to one degree or another (Hochschild, 2010, p. 9; 
Blanchette, 2003, p. 117). 
 
92 The intention here cannot be ‘to venture into the boundless territory of […] the analogia entis’, as 
Umberto Eco (2014, p. 160) has formulated the travails of researching this topic; analogy can lead 
toward a Sisyphusarbeit. Rather the aim is to lend sufficient background to the concept so the 
implications of Bloch’s refunctioning can be better discerned. 
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(2) Thomas Aquinas, who is said to place the concept of analogy into the curial 
worldview of a decidedly Catholic metaphysics (philosophia christiana);  
(3) Erich Przywara, who reformulates Aquinas in light of and in opposition to the 
trajectory of modern philosophy, from Descartes to Hegel to Heidegger.  
 
The Protestant theologian Karl Barth’s objection to analogy will also be 
briefly attended to. 
§2.1. ARISTOTLE-AQUINAS-PRZYWARA  
[1] Analogy’s inception is with Pythagorean mathematics. “Analogia” 
is key to Pythagoreanism’s metaphysical principle “all is number,” something 
Bloch does not draw attention to in a lecture he gave on Pythagoreanism 
(1985d, pp. 49-61). However, Bloch is well aware of Pythagoreanism’s 
passion for mathematics and of how their love for theorising musical 
harmony blends with mathematicity to produce an ordered metaphysical 
outlook which can be said to permeate any standard understanding of what 
analogic metaphysics entails (ibid., p. 52-54; see White, 2010, pp. 11-12; 
Lyttkens, 1952, pp. 15-6). Music is perceived by Pythagoras and his 
followers as expressive of the cosmically expansive and mathematically 
ordered reality in which the human being finds herself (see Horovitz, 1979, 
pp. 7-8).93 This interpenetration of music, speculative-systematic-ordered 
metaphysics, and analogy is significant precisely because it contradicts my 
                                                          
93 As an aside, while Bloch writes elsewhere that ‘the mathematically oriented natural science of the 
modern era is born from Pythagoreanism’ he also suggests that this birth only arises from ‘out of half 
of Pythagoreanism.’ (1985d, pp. 59 & 61) Bloch then states that ‘the Pythaogreans are not yet simply 
at an end‘ but might in fact yet harbour the possibility of a mathesis of quality, as opposed quantity 
(ibid., p. 61). My hunch is that a mathesis of quality might well entail a reappraisal of analogy along the 
lines I set-out below. As far I know, only Schneider (2016) has attempted to develop Bloch’s idea of a 
new mathesis. 
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thesis that Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being is a form of analogic 
metaphysics.94 If Bloch’s ontology is a new and experimental form of 
analogic metaphysics then analogy’s antique alliance with order/harmony 
will have to be incidental to analogy, for top-to-bottom order ill-fits the nature 
of process at the heart of Bloch’s materialism (see M, pp. 27-8).95  
Pythagoreanism’s notion of analogia designates a quantifiable proportion 
between four terms (A:B::C:D), otherwise known as an analogy of 
proportionality. An example of this would be: 6 is to 3 as 4 is to 2 (6:3::4:2). 
What one has here are two sets of terms between which there exists a 
quantified and thus calculable proportion of magnitudes. Importantly, if the 
values of A, B, and C are already given, the value of the final term is more or 
less inferable.96 In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant draws attention to 
precisely this tenet of the analogy of proportionality, except he terms it 
“constitutive analogy.” In so doing Kant relates analogy to teleology, for he 
had already distinguished constitutive from reflective modes of teleological 
causality. In the light of my discussion in Chapter I and indeed against the 
backdrop of the previous section of this chapter, clearly the case is that the 
constitutive form of analogy is incompatible with Bloch’s materialism: ‘There 
                                                          
94 The Pythagorean and the Blochian stances admit of the indelible interpenetration of music and the 
question of being. While Pythagoreanism’s formalist aesthetics rests on the idea of music’s supposed 
articulation of being’s enduring mathematical order and unity, concordance and univocity—‘the 
“singing harmony” of Pythagoras’s mathematical world’ (Przywara, 2014, p. 471), Blochian aesthetics 
rests on the idea that music is the utopian art-form par excellence, in that great music is said to 
express best being’s not-yetness (TL, pp. 183-4): ‘and so we want to allot to music primacy in what is 
otherwise unsayable’ (SU, p. 163) (for a discussion of the differences between Pythagoreanism and 
Bloch on the issue of music, see Norris [1989, pp. 329-41]). 
95 Leibniz’s employment of analogy signals its enduring connection with metaphysical doctrines of 
inherent cosmic harmony and universal order. As Rescher (1991, p. 38) writes, Leibniz is ‘par 
excellence the philosopher of cosmic harmony’.  
 
96 Euclid summarises this as: ‘“Ratio is a mutual relation of two magnitudes of the same kind to one 
another in respect of quantity’” (quoted White, 2010, p. 58). 
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is no number that may calculate the future’s circumference’, Bloch writes 
(PA, p. 131). The “final term” of process, the end-goal, cannot be inferred 
from any preceding series, for the Ultimum will be the Novum, and the 
Novum cannot be measured by what has gone before. To go back to Kant: it 
is of crucial significance for my reading of Bloch’s utopian ontology that Kant 
contrasts this form of constitutive analogy with a regulative form. Regulative 
analogy, says Kant, presents a very different analogical form in which the 
final term is missing, thus providing a “mark” which not only illuminates an a 
priori knowledge of a lack, but a space for experimentation within that lack: 
A:B::C:X. Contrasting the two forms of analogy, Kant writes that 
In philosophy analogies signify something very different from what they 
represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulas which express the 
equality of two quantitative relations, and are always constitutive; so that if 
three terms of the proportion are given, the fourth is likewise given, that is, can 
be constructed. But in philosophy the analogy is not the equality of two 
quantitative but of two qualitative relationships; and from three given members 
we can obtain a priori knowledge only of the relation to a fourth, not of the 
fourth member itself. The relation yields, however, a rule for seeking the fourth 
member in experience, and a mark whereby it can be detected. An analogy of 
experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of experience 
may arise from perception. It does not tell us how mere perception or empirical 
intuition in general itself comes about. It is not a principle constitutive of the 
objects, that is, of the appearances, but only regulative. (B222-B223) 
I will not enter into detail on Kant’s rather complex views concerning analogy 
here; Kant is not a thinker who features in my narrative of analogia’s 
[141] 
 
odyssey through philosophy.97 However, Callanan’s formulation of the 
intention behind Kant’s employment of analogy is useful in the sense that it 
highlights just how much the analogic problematic coincides with a sort of 
openness which only a decidedly apophatic element can gives rise to. In the 
context of the distinction Kant makes above, Callanan writes that 
For Kant, […] an analogy is a principle which functions to combine 
appearances in a specific manner, relating non-given appearances to given 
ones, and warranting an inference regarding the existence, if not the 
characteristic features, of that former non-given appearance. (2008, p. 764). 
The regulative operation in Kant is, with Bloch’s ontology, inscribed into the 
real itself. It is the non-given appearance of true being as such that is the 
combining force of appearances and thus of phenomenality.98 In truth, it is 
precisely this process of movement into a really real openness that the 
combining force of the appearances of the different form of analogy under 
review. Indeed, this gesture is already found in the constitutive form of 
                                                          
97 For focused work on analogy in Kant’s philosophy, see Whistler (2013b) and Callanan (2008). 
 
98 One can see an analogy at play between, on the one hand, constitutive analogy and the fugue, and, 
on the other, regulative analogy and the sonata. ‘Mathematics’, Bloch claims, 
is the model for every uniform system and hence also the model for the fugue, as 
being a uniform system in miniature. In every case, the inferences are seemingly 
contained in the initial principle. They can be elicited, predicted, calculated from it, in 
accordance with a totally rational idea of relationships [i.e., Kant’s notion of a 
constitutive analogy!] which shows the theme of the fugue to be purely contrapuntal in 
nature and oriented towards its complete contrapuntal expansion. The epoch of 
mathematical construction and the great rational systems was also the heyday of the 
fugue (1985a, p. 186). 
In contrast, 
whereas the fugue seemed at least to go on obeying its initial law, like “calculation”, 
Beethoven’s sonata themes are purely signs of a dynamic condition, seeds of a 
process which grows primarily out of antithesis. And he himself commands the main 
theme’s triumph in the reprise only as the supreme element within the qualifying 
process. Therefore mathematics has at any rate no relation to the sonata, that 
impulsive, dramatic, discontinuous excess of tension, that pure art of time and direction 
with its productive leaps in the development or travelling. (ibid.) 
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Pythagorean analogy, which was shook to its foundations by the decisive 
discovery of incommensurable magnitudes (White, 2010, pp. 12-13)—an 
early sign of the inconstructable X. It was exactly this discovery of an 
immeasurable surplus that allowed the concept of analogy to undergo an 
exploration in its philosophical valence (ibid, p. 14). Plato and Aristotle were 
the first to take up the mantle and explore this new territory: in Aristotle’s 
metaphysical refunctioning of analogy, analogy is ‘employed creatively […] 
in order to express ontological similitudes between diverse beings or states 
of being.’ (White, 2011a, p. 4) This metaphysical extrapolation is what 
enabled Aristotle to group together ‘as falling under a single concept, 
completely heterogeneous entities.’ (White, 2010, pp. 59-60) It allowed for 
that searching for a missing term.  
At the heart of why Aristotle would want to do this is his desire to overcome 
the ‘pre-Socratic dialectic’ of being and becoming, bequeathed to philosophy 
by Parmenides and Heraclitus, whose diametrically opposed positions of “all 
is rest” and “all is flux” commonly present unsatisfactory explanations of 
reality’s essence (Betz, 2014, pp. 31-4). For if, on the one hand, all is rest, 
so then process is to be considered illusion, albeit that, to the contrary, it 
seems to be the case that process is indeed a proper feature of reality. To 
suppose, however, that all is flux is equally mistaken, for this position 
discounts the reality of stability. But to reject such a possibility amounts to 
rejecting the very grounds for being able even to recognise flux: for to 
register a coming to be and a passing away as having taken place requires a 
perduring something (X?) upon or through which one can recognise change 
at all. Insofar as each of these positions cannot be credible unto themselves, 
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so then their combined purchase enabled Aristotle to pursue a middle 
course. The result was analogic metaphysics (see Wippel, 2000, p. 77).99 
Thinking matter’s becoming in relation to being, or to an arrival or outfall 
(being), is of course vital to Bloch’s whole philosophy (see Chapter I).  
What then is for Aristotle this perduring something underpinning flux? 
Aristotle names it substance: the substratum of all coming to be and passing 
away. Already Aristotle’s difference with Bloch on this score becomes 
evident. Recall that for Bloch substance must be grasped as process. 
Nevertheless, contra the abovementioned constitutive form of analogy, 
otherwise known as the analogy of proportionality, this Aristotelian form of 
analogy, entwined with his substance metaphysics, has been coined the 
analogy of attribution (analogia attributionis). As Jüngel writes: 
If, in the analogy of proportionality, A relates to B as C to D, then in the analogy 
of attribution, B, C, and D all relate in varying ways to A, on the basis of which 
they are commonly named. (1983, p. 270) 
This shift can be concretised by drawing on the famous example of “to be 
healthy” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. While only truly spoken of with reference 
to an organism (e.g. only a man can be healthy in the first instance), one can 
speak nonetheless of food and the coloration of urine as “being healthy;” that 
is, as signs of health, but it is only the man that is or is not healthy, and so 
the being of the health as found in food and urine respectively can find 
meaning or sense only by relating back to the primary health of the 
organism. Food is not healthy in itself but for the one who eats it. The 
                                                          
99 Significant for the possibility of a leftist (that is, materialist) form of analogy is Alain de Libera’s claim 
that the founding text of analogy is not Aristotle, in fact Avicenna’s Metaphysics (see Aertsen, 2012, p. 
97). 
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meaning of health in the organism is thus, as Heidegger (1995, p. 33) writes, 
‘“that upon which the other meanings are hinged and secured and that 
through which the other meanings can be (understood and) said.”’ 
Heidegger describes this analogy of attribution thus as a ‘mode of unity’ 
(ibid., p. 34) insofar as it enables the manifoldness of beings or states of 
being to have one common centre, one guiding and sustaining meaning or, 
better, one sustaining sens (direction/sense), since substance is ultimately 
unthinkable and unsayable without that which relies on it (again, the 
apophatic element of analogy rises to the fore). For Aristotle, then, the being 
of beings (or states of being) is known only by analogy (Rocca, 2004, pp. 80-
4; Hütter, 2011, p. 220; Wippel, 2000, pp. 80-1).  
[2] Analogy is a perennial concept of Western culture and its 
theological metamorphosis appears once Western thought shifts from pagan 
to Judeo-Christian socio-cultural sensibilities; from a rootedness in Athens to 
a rootedness in Jerusalem.100 The first theological articulation of analogy is 
with the Neoplatonist Proclus Diadochus and the Christian Platonist 
(pseudo-) Dionysius the Areopagite i.e., the corpus dionysiacum (see 
Mondin, 1963, p. 3; Schäfer, 2006, pp. 8-9; Aertsen, 2012, pp. 101-107). 
Shifting from a rootedness in Aristotelian substance these new analogical 
formulations conceive a divine being as the primum analogatum, and insofar 
that they do what now becomes central is the immanent (or creation) and the 
transcendent (God as Creator) (Lyttkens, 1952, pp. 61-2). But retained in 
this theological shift is the notion of a continuity of the likeness of cause to 
                                                          
100 It is more accurate to describe analogy as a perennial concept of human culture per se. See 
Zilberman’s Analogy in Indian and Western Philosophical Thought (2006): ‘the entire canon of 
philosophical literature is based almost exclusively on analogies, examples, “paradigms” and 
incomplete induction (which resembles analogies very much).’ (ibid. p. 45) 
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effect (ibid., p. 79). This Neoplatonic tendency is formative for later 
developments in medieval Christian theology (Lyttkens, 1952, p. 188), 
notably Thomas Aquinas.101 
Thomas is a thinker of particular interest because under his aegis 
analogy undergoes the colouration of ‘an emphatically “Christian” concept’ 
(Przywara, 2014, p. 260; Maritain, 1959, p. 420; Caputo, 1982, p. 142).102 Of 
what does this consist? Thomas produces a systematic doctrine of analogy 
in view of such questions as the problem of the precise metaphysical relation 
obtaining between Creator and creation and the possibility and nature of 
divine naming; both related enterprises in that predication is based upon the 
true nature of being. For Thomas, analogy ultimately ensures three 
metaphysical-theological positions, all of which carry over into his 
meditations on divine naming: (1) God’s utter transcendence—dissimilarity—
from creation; (2) God’s utter immanence to creation (He is creation’s cause 
and support); and (3) creation’s ontological integrity, i.e. creatures have free 
will (Mondin, 1963, p. 53). Hütter describes the crucial shift involved: 
[…] the central metaphysical challenge is not anymore the reduction to unity of 
multiple meanings of being by way of substance but the reduction of diverse 
beings to unity in relation to God. (2011, p. 224) 
                                                          
101 Like Aristotle Thomas did not write a separate treatise on analogy (Hütter, 2011, p. 213; 
Hochschild, 2010, p. xiv) 
 
102 Despite the centrality this concept to Thomas’s theological system, Bloch does not mention analogy 
in his Leipzig lecture on Thomas; although covered in the lecture are a certain number of categories 
central to Thomas’s analogical conception of being, i.e. his theory of knowledge, his conception of sin, 
his graded theory of reality. In fact, mention of analogy only arises in Bloch’s lecture when in an 
attempt to convey the key motive of Thomas’s thought, Bloch constructs an analogy between the 
“summa-intention” of Thomas’s theology and the value-ordered compositions of Giotto di Bondone 
(1266-1337) (1985e, p. 42). 
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[3] Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being is incompatible with Thomas’ 
theologic analogy.103 To see why this does not militate against my reading I 
want at this stage to turn to a 20th century theologian: the Jesuit, Erich 
Przywara. Przywara’s analogic metaphysics shares numerous points of 
accord with Bloch’s own ontology of not-yet being;104 the most important 
being, I think, Przywara’s (2014, p. 124) dynamic construal of the essence-
existence couplet, so crucial to his formulation of a ‘creaturely 
metaphysics.’105 The importance to Bloch’s materialism of this metaphysical 
distinction between existence and essence has already been sketched 
above.  
In the Preface to Analogia Entis, Przywara (ibid, p. xx) asserts that the 
impetus of the work is ‘the question of the distinction between essence and 
existence—Sosein und Dasein’. His reflections lead him to garb analogy in 
the notion of ‘essence in-and-beyond existence’, indicating ‘the direction of a 
dynamic solution’ (ibid.). This axiom, which is the very archon of Przywara’s 
                                                          
103 While Anna Lesznai, a member of Bloch’s intellectual circle around Lukács, wrote that Bloch ‘“is a 
young man […] who is so Talmudic that he verges on Catholicism”’ (Quoted in Gluck, 1985, p. 160), 
Bloch claims that he parted ways with his intellectual friend Alfred Döblin (a German poet) due to the 
latter’s ‘neo-Catholicism.’ (Quoted in Landmann, 1975, p. 166) 
 
104 The lack of real dialogue between Bloch (1885-1977) and Przywara (1889-1972) is an intriguing 
20th century non-occurrence. That each thinker was remotely aware of the other’s existence is proven 
by Przywara’s (1963) brief review of Das Prinzip Hoffnung, and by Bloch’s cursory remarks of his 
counterpart in the Heritage of Our Times. But that Przywara’s (2014, p. xxi)  ‘vibrant connections’ with 
Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger (cf. Betz, 2014, pp. 1, 14, 17, 24) 
failed to lead to a more substantial engagement with Bloch’s philosophy is somewhat surprising. 
Equally curious is Bloch’s sustained readings of religious thought-forms failed to meet with a man 
esteemed to have been the greatest German Catholic theologian of the 20th century (Betz, 2014, pp. 4 
& 9); and this even more so given Bloch’s ample enough commentary on Karl Barth, Przywara’s 
Protestant interlocutor. 
105 Przywara was of course certainly no materialist, and in fact was heavily critical of Hegelian inspired 
materialisms. Przywara could well have seen Bloch’s materialism as a turn within ‘the fundamentally 
noetic phenomenology of Hegel, in which all content (those of nature, man, history, and religion) 
appear as reduced to an inner dialectic of the one noesis of “Spirit”’; except that  ‘Spirit proves to be 
nothing but the Ur-dialectic of matter and the material (which is to say that it leads to a 
“phenomenology of matter,” in contrast to Hegel’s noetic “phenomenology of Spirit”’ (2014, pp. 467 & 
465).  
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metaphysics, connotes an existence pointing within itself beyond itself (ibid., 
pp. 432-3). The formula both dervies from and seeks to further draw-out the 
full implications of the real distinction of essence and existence found in 
Thomism: 
The essence of the creature is precisely not identical to its existence. Rather, 
essence and existence are related in the creature in such a way that the 
essence of the creature is never fully given, i.e., never identical or reducible to 
its existence, but is always on the horizon of its existence as something to be 
attained. (Betz, 2014, p. 63). 
This is the point of intersection with Bloch’s ontology, albeit the nature of 
transcendence within this structure of essence in-and-beyond existence is 
radically different for each thinker.106 That said, Bloch too garbs his 
theorisation of the human being in similar transitive terms: ‘We live and 
glance ourselves in transcendental movement [über uns hinaus]. That 
makes us human’ (PA, p. 116). In the case of Przywara, the point is that 
what any created thing is, is always beyond that it is, and this entails a 
transcendental movement. Once again, Bloch shares a very similar 
sentiment: ‘Only that can be in existence if it relates toward something more 
than it already is, if it is searching [Nur das kann da sein, das auf mehr, als 
es schon ist, sich versuchend bezieht].’ (EM, p. 70) For Przywara, it does not 
belong to the essence of the creature to exist and thus its essence will 
always be ‘that to which it is underway’ (Betz, 2014, p. 63). But if this “being 
ever underway,” if this ‘dynamic, never fixed relation of difference between 
                                                          
106 Hart’s (2011, p. 396) contention that Przywara’s is an ‘antimetaphysical ontology’ is an interesting 
assessment in that it discloses in general terms the precise ground upon which Bloch’s ontology of 
not-yet and Przywarian metaphysics meet: precisely on the score of a radically open ontology. Just 
what each thinker’s open ontology is open to is, however, the site of their real difference.  
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essence and existence’ (ibid., p. 66) is not to be subsumed in its own infinite 
becoming, it must necessarily—Przywara asserts—come up against ‘the 
One of whom it is an image’ (ibid., p. 63, fn. 168)—namely, the perfectly 
complete “Is” of God. As Przywara writes: 
To posit a “self-enclosed creatureliness” […] is arbitrarily to freeze a “transition” 
into a fixed “state.” “Essence in-and-beyond existence” is an “ultimate 
quality”—one that, in itself, is “a transcending relation because it is 
transcended.” In arriving at creatureliness as a quality, one also arrives at 
createdness as a relation. All that remains is an either-or: either the 
absolutisations of the immanent poles of the creaturely […] or the absolute 
beyond-and-in them. (2014, p. 159) 
Creaturely flux as emerging from the rupture of essence and existence is 
taken to necessarily relate it to a transcendent Other. The immanent 
transcending form of creaturely being is said to point beyond itself toward a 
profounder analogy: the theological analogy between God and creation. 
What Przywara makes clear here is that analogia entis is at root a 
metaphysics of relation (recall, as an aside, that relation is for Bloch the Ur-
category). What type of relationality is proposed? For Przywara the relation 
in question is ‘a relation of mutual alterity’ (2014, p. 231). No positive speech 
exists that could adequately speak of this relation. As Nikulin writes: 
‘Analogical knowledge stresses the relational, not the substantial aspect, so 
that an entity […] is known not as such, but only in its relation to something 
else.’ (2002, p. 8; my emphasis) The ‘“ultimate” relation between God and 
creature’ (Przywara, 2014, pp. xxi-ii) is such that it is of a radically apophatic 
kind: an ever greater dissimilarity always intercedes between God and his 
[149] 
 
creation over and above any similarity that might arise, such that the 
creature cannot know of God as He is in Himself, rather, the creature can 
only—to paraphrase Bloch here—be content with ‘deep and brief glimpses 
into otherness.’ (PHE, p. 22) What reflection on the relation between God 
and creation discloses, argues Przywara, is precisely the emphaticness of a 
dis-relation at the core of creaturely being. The creature is related to such an 
alterity that relation is a word and a category and indeed an ontological 
constitution that is stretched to its very limit: it turns over on itself into dis-
relation. For Bloch, a having is present in not-having, so then for Przywara: 
‘At its peak, the positivum of “relation” reveals itself as the negativum of 
“alterity.”’ (2014, pp. 231). Przywara often expresses this analogical relation 
as a rhythmic oscillation between, on the one hand, that of an “in-(theologia 
positiva),” and a “beyond-(theologia negativa),” ever more eminent, on the 
other. And this is just what is meant by: essence-in-and-beyond-existence. It 
is an articulation of the Fourth Lateran Council’s 1215 AD proclamation: 
‘“One cannot note any similarity between Creator and creature, however 
great, without being compelled to note an ever greater dissimilarity between 
them.”’ (Quoted in Przywara, 2014, p. 234) In sum, what is at play here in 
Przywara’s concept of analogy is a rhythmic oscillation between positive 
(kataphatic) and negative (apophatic) theology. The apophatic dimension, 
with unbending necessity, bears the preponderant ascription: ‘With a wise 
silence’, Pseudo Dionysius writes, ‘we do honour to the inexpressible.’ 
(1987, 589B)107 Indeed, religious life for Przywara is the life lived-out of and 
brought home to the primacy of the apophatic:  
                                                          
107 ‘The two most significant terms of negative theology are aphairesis (Latin: remotion/abstractio) and 
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For conscious and voluntarily lived-out religion is […] a “consciousness of 
being,” the conscious and voluntarily lived-out “being” of religion as the being 
of the “interval between Creator and creature,” which is none other than the 
“analogy of ever greater dissimilarity within every similarity, however great.” In 
this sense, “analogy”—as the essence of objective religion—is the formal law 
of “religious experience” between the living God and the living human being. 
That is to say, with absolute rigor: there is no “revelation” (understood as a 
“religious experience coming from God”) and no “mysticism” (understood as a 
“religious experience arising in man”) in which the experience of the “ever 
greater dissimilarity” within “every similarity, however great” (in “likeness and 
“image” and “word,” etc.), would not be what is ultimate and highest. 
(Przywara, 2014, p. 424) 
It is always the interceding of a silence—for silence best represents and is 
the finest representative of the unsayable—into language that brings the 
creature closest to (saying) God. But, as I show in the next section, this 
silence is only reached through an outpouring of language.  
[4] The most notable theological objection to analogia entis is the 
Protestant theologian Karl Barth (Rocca, 2004, pp. 93-102; Johnson, 1982, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
apophasis (Latin: negatio).’ (Rocca, 2004, p. 3) And yet an element of affirmation is always necessarily 
embedded in negative theology: ‘the analogia entis is a form of negative theology which expresses a 
dynamic rhythm between affirmation and negation’ (Betz, 2006, p. 13; my emphasis). Nonetheless, the 
preponderance of affirmations always recedes in relation to that of negations, which stress the utter 
dissimilarity between and remotion of the creature’s predications to that which is aimed at: God (the 
“thing” sought to be grasped and signified) (Mondin, 1963, pp. 29-30). This rhythm between affirmation 
and negation offers a framework in which to understand Bloch’s utopian ontology, and does so in the 
following sense: it can be said whatever has already become to the possibility of being is an 
affirmation, whilst negations are those eruptions stressing the inadequacy of these affirmations in the 
face of the ultimate “”What-has-not-yet become to being” qua being itself. Affirmations and negations, 
ontologised, are the utopian cause qualifying itself through the material process. 
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p. 686; White, 2011, p. 23). Heidegger and Deleuze adopt critical attitudes to 
analogy, but these do not concern me here.108 
At the root of Barth’s objections are doubts as to whether analogy is truly 
compatible with the utterly new of Christian revelation. Thus his stance 
toward analogy is borne up by questions surrounding the place of the 
Novum. Can analogy really be open to the new? Barth does not think so, 
and he charges analogy with rationalising the rupturing new of revelation 
under the order of a human concept, and, ultimately, under the order of a 
metaphysics that at root must posit a form of univocity between God and 
creation in order to gain traction. Analogy reduces ‘the sheer novum of 
revelation’ (Hart, 2011, p. 395) to a theory or a concept, and thus belittles 
the real rupturing excess of revelation’s otherness in relation to reason’s 
continuity. Analogy is thus said to be an ‘invention of the Antichrist’ (Barth, 
                                                          
108 Giles Deleuze, whose philosophical vocation according to Patton (2010, pp. 185-210) is an overtly 
utopian one, rejects analogia entis and does so on the basis of an attempt to overcome a blindness to 
real difference: 
 
In effect, difference […] recovers an effectively real concept only to the extent that it 
designates catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in the series of resemblances or 
impassable fissures between the analogical structures. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 44)  
 
Thus, the implication is that analogy represents a philosophical model unable to appreciate a real 
metaphysics of difference. Deleuze juxtaposes discontinuity, impassable fissures and “catastrophes” 
on the one hand, against “resemblances” propagated by “the analogical structures.” In sum, for 
Deleuze, analogy crucifies difference (ibid., p. 174). But then Deleuze says something curious: 
 
That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a 
principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a 
Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own 
concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general 
already understood as identical. (ibid., p. 50) 
 
Here is described in nuce the utopian analogy of being, or at least what could be intended by it, in 
which the One or the univocity relating differences (or the Many) to itself is One that is precisely noch 
nicht. In being a univocity that is not-yet, it is demanded, precisely, that identity be understood as 
becoming. I cannot explore this connection between Bloch and Deleuze any further, but Bloch’s notion 
of ‘a fraternitas even without a father’ (SU, p. 212) hints at where the dialogue could lay. 
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1936, p. x).109 In truth, Barth’s rejection of analogy is based on his ‘suspicion 
of natural theology’, on his distrust ‘of any openness whatsoever of the 
creature to God’ (Betz, 2006, p. 4 & 7). As Barth (1936, p. 41-4) writes, an 
innate ‘anthropological prius to faith’ does not exist because God is ‘the 
fundamental transcendence of all human possibilities’; analogy’s enclosing 
God in a ‘continuously present and objective relation’ with creation must 
therefore be humbled by the reality of ‘no synthesis’ whatsoever, ‘no 
mediation’, as Ward (1995, p. 23) writes (incidentally, this is the site upon 
which I think Adorno’s deployment of the Bilderverbot echoes Barthian 
dogmatics, a point also made by Brittain [2010, p. 9]). As Bloch writes of 
Barthian dogmatics, in its deepest intention it advances ‘the reality of God’ 
as placed ‘outside of each correspondence with human possibility.’ (SO, p. 
330; cf. PHE, p. 1194) However, Bloch equally discerns in Barth a utopian 
surplus: 
however untenable the alienation with which it operated, Barth’s system did 
manage to achieve distance, heteronomy, transcendence. It did rediscover 
with its Deus absconditus the problem of the incognito […]. And, with that, 
Deus absconditus becomes a recognisable pointer to homo absconditus. 
(ACE, p. 39) 
Another feature of Barth’s rejection of analogy is an apparent incompatibility 
with dialectic. Indeed Pannenberg, a student of Barth’s, likewise rejects 
                                                          
109 This charge echoes Luther’s first construal of papal universal authority as the devil’s doing in 
Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (MacCulloch, 2003, p. 128). It is by no means 
accidental that Luther objected to what he saw as the corrupting presence of Aristotelianism in such 
supposed rationalisations of faith.  
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analogy on the grounds that, in his eyes, analogy necessarily posits a 
univocity of God and creation.110 As Johnson writes of this: 
analogy inevitably functions within a world characterised mainly by order and 
continuity, even homogeneity, or its power of inference would not be grounded. 
(1982, pp. 687) 
This is evidently incompatible with Bloch’s notion of materialist interruption, 
for, in light of ‘the Barthian theology of discontinuity’ (O’Donaghue, 1986, p. 
3) analogy presupposes continuity between what should be held as radical 
alterities. For Pannenberg (2007, pp. 14 & 24) analogy just is the supposition 
that without even the smallest degree of identity between creation and God, 
no analogy can occur. If it is true that a radical inhospitality for the truly new 
(or truly other) is inherent to the doctrine of analogy, as Pannenberg 
believes, then it becomes difficult to frame Bloch’s concept of matter within 
analogia entis without sacrificing a vital tenet of his materialism: A 
‘transcendere into the Novum’ is crucial to Bloch’s utopian materialism (PHE, 
p. 298). But Pannenberg’s criticisms of analogia entis become markedly 
softer in tone: 
It cannot be a matter of contention whether or not reasoning may or may not 
have a share in the knowledge of God, but only whether in a historically open 
reality knowledge of God can be brought to a conclusion by reasoning. 
(Quoted in Johnson, 1982, p. 689; my emphasis) 
As Johnson formulates Pannenberg’s line of questioning here:  
                                                          
110 Another of Barth’s students, Jüngel, on the other hand, rejecting analogia all the same, does so for 
the opposite reason: Analogy propagates God’s utter inscrutability (the fallacy of equivocation), such 
that the stronger swing of apophasis leads inevitably toward an equivocal agnosticism (see Hütter, 
2011, pp. 209-11). 
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Analogy is related to the consciousness of the ontological givenness of the 
past and/or present; but can it survive and contribute to a world view whose 
originating insight is the ontological priority of future and the critical 
transformation of all existing reality in light of that future? (ibid., pp. 699-90; my 
emphasis) 
The answer to this question could be affirmative if and only if one’s 
conception of analogia entis enters into Bloch’s materialist metaphysics of 
not-yet being.111 Only then is analogia entis based on an ontology in which 
futurity is the greatest region of being.112 It is curious that Johnson reiterates 
                                                          
111 It is interesting to note Pannenberg has himself stressed Bloch’s general importance, but only that 
he may help channel Bloch’s findings toward a theological renewal: 
 
Christian theology at some time will perhaps be indebted to Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of 
hope if it again finds the courage to deal with its central category: the general concept 
of eschatology. Of crucial importance in this matter is the prospect toward a future 
which is to be understood as temporal. Bloch has taught us to understand anew the 
overwhelming significance of a future which is still open, and of the hope which 
anticipates this future, for the life and thought of mankind and moreover for the 
ontological peculiarity of all reality. (1968, p. 268)  
 
112 It is of significance that in a discussion of Aquinas’ response to whether creatures can be 
considered like God, Betz (2014, pp. 41) writes: ‘Thomas argues that indeed they [creatures] can [be 
considered like God]’, and does so with  
 
a fascinating conjunction of the protological and the eschatological, both the familiar 
verse from Genesis 1:26, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” and the verse 
from 1 John 3:2, “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him.” [1 John 3:2, this 
eschatological, and not theological uncovering of the face, is quoted by Bloch in SU, p. 
216.] 
 
In the footnote Betz (ibid., pp. 41-2 fn. 116) remarks:  
 
What makes Thomas’s conjunction fascinating is that, given the différance between a 
protological and an eschatological “likeness,” the “likeness” of Genesis 1:26 could be 
understood as a proleptic likeness, that is, as a promise, which is to be effected 
historically through Christ and his Spirit […], and which awaits the eschatological 
realisation of 1 John 3:2 […]. Unfortunately, Thomas does not discuss the relation 
between the protological and the eschatological here, even though the whole question 
of the analogy of being would seem to turn on it. For the question is not whether there 
is an analogy of being—Scripture clearly commends it. The question is one of whether 
the analogy is to be affirmed already as a matter of protology (in spite of the 
subsequent reality of sin) as a terminus a quo (which not even the reality of sin can 
destroy), or whether the analogy is only to be affirmed eschatologically, as a terminus 
ad quem […]. (my emphasis)  
 
So even the Catholic form harbours within itself questions akin to those which concern Bloch. But 
again, while this meditation opens the door to a futurally-directed analogy, a “theo-backward-logic” is 
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the distinction between harmony and discontinuity by juxtaposing analogy 
and dialectics: 
For those of an analogical imagination, the central clue to the whole of reality is 
found pre-eminently in the symbol of Incarnation: the gracious gift of God to the 
world in that event that makes possible the perennial discovery of some order, 
some harmony, in reality. Those of a dialectical imagination find the central 
symbol to be focused in the resurrection of the Crucified: the reversal of norms 
through the power of God in that event that opens up the possibility of 
overturning present disorder and of expecting the genuinely new. (1982, p. 
691) 
The question arises as to whether analogy’s “imagination of order” and 
dialectic’s “imagination of the rupturing-new” (the Novum) are resolvable. 
That thought over the two imaginations might strike out on a new path is 
perfectly possible, for they are found together at work in Bloch’s materialist 
metaphysics.  
§2.2. Excursus. ANALOGY & LANGUAGE 
Following the treatment of analogy’s conceptual becoming a word is 
needed on how Przywara’s analogic metaphysics informs a theory of or an 
approach to language. Turning to the broad sweep of a Przywarian 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in play nonetheless, for the image the creature is promised is already there, fully worked-out. Despite 
the real future orientations of religion (SO, p. 344), not only is God the figure of an utter 
transcendence, but such transcendence is always thoroughly recoiled back into a past (religion—
meaning a “binding back” to the origin. ‘When all things began, the Word already was.’ (John, 1:1) As 
Przywara himself writes: 
Whether the word “religio” is derived, as by Cicero, from “re-legere” (understood as a 
“reading one’s way back”) or, as Lactantius and Augustine, from “re-ligare” (understood 
as a “binding back”), in either interpretation it is a “return ever again” to an origin (2014, 
p. 413).  
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“theolinguistics” (a theory of language theologically conditioned) provides a 
bridge between reading Bloch’s materialism as a form of analogic ontology 
and—what is the whole intent of this study—extending Bloch’s materialism 
over into a speculative appraisal of language. Showing how analogic 
metaphysics translates into a theory of language will enable me in Chapter 
III to better chart how Bloch’s materialism as a materialism of an urge to 
creative forms, mediated by a utopian analogy as the objective phantasy, 
itself translates into a theory of language. 
[1] Przywara’s theolinguistics is born of his analogic doctrine sketched 
above. In translating Przywara’s original German prose Betz and Hart have 
drawn attention to Przywara’s language partaking in the same “essence in-
and-beyond existence” that is said to mark the very nature of creaturely 
reality and that reality’s relation to its transcendent source: ‘for Przywara, the 
rhythm of analogy that defines creaturely being eo ipso defines the nature of 
language itself’ (2014, pp. xv-xvi, fn. 10). The consequence of this is that 
language necessarily harbours the rhythmic-oscillation between similarity 
and dissimilarity that Przywara has expressed as an axiomatic of analogic 
metaphysics; as such, it is God who is the motor of this generativity. In short, 
analogic speech (ultimately of God) is rendered incompatible with a stable 
economy of representation, for that which is spoken of, in that the path to its 
dark mystery is analogically poised, cannot be subjected to stability of 
speech that would, as it were, “have” that which is spoken of (Betz, 2014, p. 
82). Such stability would necessarily presuppose a univocity between 
signifier and signified (ibid.), it would annul what Pickstock (1998, p. 7) 
elsewhere has termed ‘doxological distance.’ This analogy precludes. In 
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Przywara’s theolinguistics doxological distance is preserved because his 
language of God keeps in step with the rhythmic tension of similitude and 
ever greater, unsurpassable dissimilitude (via negationis) that is crucial to his 
analogic conception. In a rare statement of the place of language in his 
philosophical theology, Przywara writes: 
If being in itself is analogical […], this necessarily applies to thought and 
language as well. But this means that both thought and language are an “ever-
transcending” movement [ein “je über hinaus”]. There is no such thing as 
possessive saturation in a concept or a formula. Rather, one can only make 
every thought and word transparent “beyond itself,” which is to say that I think 
and speak in a “transcendental dynamic” way: always beyond every concept 
and every word in ever renewed movement (Quoted in Betz & Bentley Hart, 
2014, p. xvi, fn. 10; my emphasis). 
For my purposes, the important point here is that by speaking in such a way 
Przywara opens up for view language’s almost inexperiential generativity 
and creativity. From its basis in analogic metaphysics, the essence of 
Przywarian theolinguistics is of a transgressing transcendental dynamic, in 
which words are made transparent only by their entering into renewed 
movement. This “transcendental dynamic” style113 is necessary to Przywara 
because it is attuned to the purpose of analogical predication: 
                                                          
113 Following Bloch’s ontologic-aesthetic assessment of Gothic architecture, one could claim that 
Przywarian theolinguistics maintains a ‘style of transcendence [Transzendenzstil]’ (TE, p. 327). 
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What is transcendental goes beyond the categorial order of the genera and 
ipso facto transcends the domain of univocal predication. “Analogical” unity [is] 
the mark of transcendentality. (Aertsen, 2012, p. 393)114 
Ventis encapsulates well the motive behind the apophasis of the 
transcendental, in which, as Przywara has said, transparency is only 
achieved in the word moving beyond itself in ever renewed movement: 
the true value of maintaining an apophatic asymmetry […] lies in the difference 
it makes on our perception of ourselves and the world, of the inside and as well 
the outside universes; for, in distinguishing an entity’s being from its being 
known […] we shield it from reason’s reductive advances. […] we allow beings 
to unconditionally manifest themselves in ways other than those expected of 
them. (Ventis, 2015, pp. 141-2)115 
What is key here is that the “ever greater [transcendental] dissimilarity” of 
God from creaturely being, thought, and language does not nourish a 
despairing acceptance of incapability, but encourages creative linguistic 
usage, rule breaking even. This circumstance schools a speaking that would 
move off into wider horizons—as long as human language does not mislead 
itself on its ultimate incapability of being able to speak God in Himself:  
                                                          
114 If utopia is a transcendens, then to speak of it requires the same linguistic movement as that 
propagated by the Jesuit Przywara: a “je über hinaus.” Przywara’s speaking “beyond in ever renewed 
movement”—this theolinguistics couched in a “transcendental dynamic”—is put on a new basis: a 
linguistics of utopia.  
 
115 Note that Ventis is making a distinction between “being” and “being known”, such that “being” is 
already fully constituted and it is only the human being’s thought and speech of this “being” which is 
“asymmetrical” with that which is spoken of (the “being”). Again, for Bloch this is an unwarranted 
hypostatisation. It is much more radical—that is, the human can expect much more radical revelations 
of novelty on the part of objects—if the ontological constitution of such objects is noch nicht, that is, 
not entirely constituted, manifested, or brought out.  
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In the case of everyday reality (whether physical, mental, real, or imaginary), 
one can locate the thing and speak about it as a composite of matter and form, 
accidents and substance, potency and act, genus and species, or form and 
esse. God transcends this sort of description. If God is the sort of reality 
Christians believe God to be, that is to say, if God is the beginning and end of 
all things, then logically and grammatically God does not fit into any of these 
categories. But since such categories are the only tools available in our 
language and grammar for thinking about anything at all, God included, 
asserting God’s reality requires purposively breaking the rule in a way that 
indirectly displays what cannot be directly described. (Masson, 2015, p. 532) 
As Ventis writes: ‘Christian apophaticism does not condemn Christians to 
absolute silence, as if the limitations of language mandated the resignation 
from any and all theological endeavour.’ (2015, p. 143) To bring the point 
back to Przywara. What all this means is that, in accordance with Thomas 
Aquinas’ position contra the univocity of being, in attempting to speak of God 
one is attempting to express that which ‘transcend[s] the Porphyrian order of 
the predicables.’ (Aertsen, 2012, p. 398) There is a radical disproportionality 
between what one can speak and that which is to be spoken of. Be that as it 
may, the choice is not between silence or nonsense, and here my comments 
in the Introduction regarding Wittgenstein can be recalled. If God transcends 
beyond every being, then speech of Him must in some sense enact the 
same transgressing movement, it must be language transcending, going 
beyond itself in ever renewed movement. What language tries to express 
totally exceeds the capacity for expression given grammatical and 
syntactical norms. Przywara’s solution to this paradox is to establish a 
constantly renewed movement of linguistic transcendence. But this is just 
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analogy; it is just “essence in-and-beyond existence” within language itself. 
The movement of language is this “in-and-beyond” rhythm. Ward articulates 
the theological stakes of this theorisation of language: there must be 
construed, he writes, an ‘immanent presence in language of transcendent 
meaning’, ‘a transcendental Logos, a Word beyond and yet discerned within 
words.’ (1995, pp. 32 & 77) This transcendent meaning is that which always 
and ever exceeds creaturely representation and yet is the abundant source, 
the “for-the-sake-of-which” of human’s speech at all. As Dante writes in the 
Paradiso: 
He who turned his compass  
at the limit of the world, and within it 
distinguished so much that is hidden and manifest, 
could not impress his worth on the whole  
universe in any way that did not leave  
his Word in infinite excess (Quoted in Franke, 2012, p. 101). 
 
[2] This notion of divine un-representability being productive of novel 
use of language in order, precisely, to touch upon this ultimate un-
representability, brings me back to Karl Barth for a brief note. Much of 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics constitutes a sustained reflection on language 
(1936, p. 5)—this not surprising given the importance placed on the 
preached word in Protestant denominations. Barth employs an image to 
convey the purport of his reflections on the difference between the Word of 
God and the word of man, that is, the Word that is un-representable for man, 
and the word that ever seeks to try to speak that divine Word, respectively. 
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Echoing what I have already said above, Barth claims that human language 
contains within itself the ‘prodigious index finger’ of John the Baptist, best 
depicted, according to Barth’s judgement, by Matthias Grünewald’s 
Crucifixion, the Isenheim Altarpiece circa. 1514. Grünewald’s construal of 
the event in fine paints captures the theological significance of John’s 
presence for the problem of divine naming. Pointing beyond himself to 
Christ, John is said to symbolise the very purpose of Christian attestation 
(and thus Christian proclamation): ‘can anyone point away from himself more 
impressively and completely?’ (ibid., pp. 126-7) Barth’s point here is that 
John negates himself by pointing beyond himself, that he ceases to be in the 
very act of indicating. John’s pointing beyond himself to the folly of the cross 
embodies the very principle of analogy as it is construed in its theological 
form.116 Each attempt to  express God’s Word—a necessary endeavour it 
seems—can only ever, Barth claims, point beyond itself to that Word, ‘it only 
points to that’ (ibid., p. 160). Williams rehearses the same claim: 
Obscurity of the words of revelation is one of the things that anchors us in our 
temporal condition […]. A language which indefinitely postpones fulfilment […] 
is appropriate to the Christian discipline of spiritual homelessness, to the 
character of the believing life as pilgrimage. (1989, pp. 142-3; my emphasis) 
This ‘final non-representable end of desire’ (ibid., p. 143) of language is what 
structures Przywara’s analogic style: ‘The unbridgeable distance between 
the eternal res and all earthly representation opens up through this “anti-
representation” in the cross’ (ibid., p. 144).  
                                                          
116 ‘What Christ and the apostolic tradition teach […] is not so much a clear and direct understanding 
of all signs, as much as the fact that “signs are signs” and, as such, they point to something else.’ 
(Lombardi, 2007, p. 31) 
 
[162] 
 
Bloch clearly rejected the direction of these types of claims when he writes of 
Barth: ‘The divine can only ever be present now as the impenetrable frontier 
of man’s being, thought and speech’ (ACE, p. 32). There is too much 
limitation operating at the core of these claims for Bloch, too much restriction 
on a radical openness. And, to be sure, this point stands as the foremost 
difference between what I consider to be Bloch’s utopian analogia entis, and 
the analogia entis as it exists in its Christian dispensation. But, as I have 
already shown through a discussion of the That-What relation, it is clear that 
Bloch maintains certain key features of Christian analogic thought: ‘No-thing 
means [meint] itself as it is, how it already has been set forth [gesetzt] and 
expressed [geäussert].’ (LM, p. 373) Everything means itself, for Bloch, in 
relation to what it is not-yet, and more still, in relation to its ultimate 
beingness. In what follows, I will sketch the lineaments of what can be 
termed a utopian analogia entis.117  
 §3. A UTOPIAN ANALOGON 
Here I would like to provide a positive account of the kind of analogia 
entis that must underpin Bloch’s metaphysical materialism if, as I claim, this 
materialism can indeed be read as a form of the theory of the analogy of 
being. To ease my line of thought toward this direction, I will briefly consider 
features of an eschatological analogia entis, that is, this form’s compatibility 
and incompatibility with the tenets of Bloch’s ontology, thereby gauging what 
                                                          
117 Taking into account that the German meinen can mean both “to mean” and “to intend,” and 
therefore is close to the Latin intentio, the crux of what Przywara means (intends) when he says he 
speaks in a transcendental dynamic way becomes clear. The idea there is transcendental dynamic in 
things (in being itself) is expressed in this passage by Bloch. For Bloch, what this transcendental 
dynamic reaches out towards is the Ungesagten, the ‘unsaid’ (LM, p. 374). What is always meant 
(intended) is the unspoken. 
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a Blochian version of analogia entis might look like. In sum: while I claim that 
an analogy of being that is informed by the futural power of an eschaton fails 
to adequately express a Blochian version of analogia entis, it does, however, 
open us up to a more future-inclined form of analogia entis. It thus helps to 
foreground the singularity of the Blochian form of analogia entis. 
[1] An eschatological form of the analogy of being is, then, one in which 
the relation between process and outfall (Mündung) (or, in theistic terms, 
creation and God’s fullness of being) is revealed only at the point of a future 
arrival. Thus in this form of the analogy of being, the relation between 
creation and God is not yet present, but is promised. The passage of John 
3:2 is usually turned to as an expression in support of this form of analogia 
entis. In speaking of Thomas Aquinas’ response to the question whether 
creatures can be considered to be like God, Betz (2014, p. 41), for instance, 
writes that ‘Thomas argues that indeed they can [be considered like God]’, 
and does so via  
a fascinating conjunction of the protological and the eschatological, both the 
familiar verse from Genesis 1:26, “Let us make man to our image and 
likeness,” and the verse from 1 John 3:2, “When He shall appear we shall be 
like to Him.” 
Betz then remarks that:  
What makes Thomas’s conjunction fascinating is that, given the différance 
between a protological and an eschatological “likeness,” the “likeness” of 
Genesis 1:26 could be understood as a proleptic likeness, that is, as a 
promise, which is to be effected historically through Christ and his Spirit […], 
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and which awaits the eschatological realisation of 1 John 3:2 […] (ibid, pp. 41-
2, fn. 116). 
In light of this eschatological shift in key, Betz then writes that: 
Unfortunately, Thomas does not discuss the relation between the protological 
and the eschatological here, even though the whole question of the analogy of 
being would seem to turn on it. For the question is not whether there is an 
analogy of being—Scripture clearly commends it. The question is one of 
whether the analogy is to be affirmed already as a matter of protology (in spite 
of the subsequent reality of sin) as a terminus a quo (which not even the reality 
of sin can destroy), or whether the analogy is only to be affirmed 
eschatologically, as a terminus ad quem […]. (ibid., pp. 42 fn. 116)  
There is thus some scope to warrant the suggestion that Bloch’s 
metaphysical materialism touches on the general tenor of this eschatological 
form of analogia entis. The analogia entis of Bloch’s materialism could take 
the shape of an eschatological relational ontology, somewhat mirroring the 
relation of likeness said to obtain between God and creation as promise 
(terminus ad quem). This would seem to be so for two principal reasons. In 
the first case, it is clear that the eschatological form’s prolepsis resonates 
with the guiding Novum of Bloch’s materialism; in both thought-figures, what 
arrives is something radically new, this ontological novelty constituting an 
ontological invariant of direction of process/creation’s constant becoming. In 
the second case, the promise of a relation of likeness between God and 
creation is said to be “effected historically,” that is, the relation comes into 
being; it is clear that this feature somewhat coincides with the spontaneous 
becoming that is front and centre of the Blochian approach to teleology, as 
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outlined in Chapter I. But to shore up the basis of these two cases it is not 
without importance to mention that a red thread which runs through works 
such as the early The Spirit of Utopia and the late Atheism in Christianity, is 
the distinction Bloch tends to make between theological and eschatological 
strands of Christianity, the latter of which is influential to Bloch’s 
philosophical thought through and through (SU, p. 217). Indeed to Bloch’s 
mind, the problem with theology has been that its house always stands as 
already made in its completeness; it is thus ‘as if it lay only in man’s 
blindness not to see it, only in the weakness of his flesh not to enter.’ (PHE, 
p. 302) But I have shown above that Bloch ontologises whatever, say, in 
Kantianism, was merely an epistemic lack. Contrary to this present 
fulfilledness of theology, then, an eschatological form of analogia entis at 
least possesses the merit—from a Blochian perspective—of living in a kind 
of “not-yetness,” and so it somewhat tempers the premature objectivism 
anathema to Bloch’s materialism.  
Nevertheless, Bloch’s philosophy constitutes a kind of Promethean 
emancipation of the mystery of being, whereby precisely the mystery of 
being is wrought from its previous encompassment in theism—mystery is 
thus made immanent with Bloch. And so, as I will briefly show below, a 
reliance on an eschatological as opposed to a theological tendency in 
Christianity ought only to act as a kind of springboard that propels Bloch 
over into his own utopian mode of thought, much as I have been using this 
form of analogia entis myself in order to gauge the specificity of Bloch’s own 
form. This is because eschatology itself is still premised on theism and 
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theology. In sum, utopian analogy is not reducible to theologico-
eschatological analogy.  
Despite his obvious atheism several notable theologians have found Bloch’s 
work helpful for renewing their own projects in theological speculation, 
sometimes missing in the process the whole purport of Bloch’s employment 
of theologically-inclined concepts, such as analogy (Bloch was no 
theologian).118 As Siebers (2013a, p. 66) writes, Bloch uses theological 
concepts ‘stripped of [their] theistic nature,’ such that a-theistic theological 
speculation acts as a ‘mediator that connects [philosophy] to the layers of 
the real it tries to understand and articulate.’119 As Bloch himself writes, what 
drives this process of theological stripping as a principle is a sublation of the 
place of God, an act which of course theologians would find totally 
unacceptable: 
[G]enuine materialism, dialectical materialism, cancels out precisely the 
transcendence and reality of every god-hypostasis, but without removing that 
which is intended by ens perfectissimum (PHE, p. 1200; my emphasis). 
                                                          
118 ‘Ernst Bloch as theologian—that is a provocative theme for us, for him himself, for his friends and 
enemies.’ (Moltmann, 1978, p. 71) 
 
119 Bloch’s materialism is ‘a critique of religion and, at the same time, a salvaging of religion’s core.’ 
(Siebers, 2013b, p. 202) It could be said: utopian dialectical materialism does not destroy theological 
analogy, but presupposes and perfects it (cf. Thompson, 2009, p. x). On Habermas’ assessment, 
however, Bloch is so much theological baggage: 
Without initially having any theological intention, the reason that becomes aware of its 
limitations thus transcends itself in the direction of something else. This can take the 
form of a mystical fusion with a consciousness that embraces the universe; it may be 
the despairing hope that a redeeming message will occur in history; or it may take the 
shape of a solidarity with those who are oppressed and insulted, which presses 
forward in order to hasten on the coming of the messianic salvation. These anonymous 
gods of the post-Hegelian metaphysics—the encompassing consciousness, the event 
from time immemorial, the nonalienated society—are an easy prey for theology. There 
is no difficulty in deciphering them as pseudonyms of the Trinity of the personal God 
who communicates his own self. (Ratzinger & Habermas, 2006, pp. 40-1) 
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Thus, even an analogy of being based on eschatology is insufficient in 
capturing what is unique about analogia entis in the context of Bloch’s 
materialism. For Bloch, ‘a new mysterium’ (PHE, p. 1198) must pervade the 
space of what has tradtionally been the ens perfectissimum, that is, now a 
‘real mystery’ (LM, p. 363) that is mysterious to itself must come to be the 
beginning and the guiding light of all that which is. The grip of a ‘Caesar-like 
concept of God’ (ACE, p. 107) must be loosened, the ‘church Aristotelianism’ 
(M, pp. 502-7) of analogia entis must be sublated over into a utopian image 
of the analogy of being, a “left Aristotelian” analogia entis, perhaps, in which 
the ever-greater beyond-ness of the ens perfectissimum is grasped 
immanently and so precisely as not-yet. In sum, while the eschaton merely 
postpones the (be-)coming of an inevitable theistic dissimilarity between the 
constant becoming of creaturehood and the outfall of God’s fullness of 
being, and thus is found still operating within an horizon of thought that 
cannot get past an insurmountable relation of likeness, Bloch begins to 
create a sensitivity to a relation to something not-yet which, in arriving, 
sublates all relation whatsoever. Thus, whilst eschatology remains reliant on 
relation, utopia relies on consummation; whilst eschatology speaks of a 
coming event, utopia speaks of an event of overcoming. Ultimately the 
eschaton fails to provide the proper parameters in terms of which Bloch’s 
ontology must be understood, for eschatology remains tied to theism.  
What this brief consideration of the eschatological form’s compatibility 
and incapability brings sharply into focus is the singularity of the form of 
analogy that would underpin Bloch’s materialism. As it turns out, if one refers 
to certain commentators on the doctrine of analogy of being, then singularity 
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is a proper expression of analogy’s essence. As Whistler (2013b, pp. 241-3; 
my emphasis) points out: analogy ‘has been a concept with which to 
experiment and to innovate’ (experimentation marks the history of this 
concept, as I have hoped to show above); as such, one’s concept of analogy 
cannot be confined to tradition: ‘there is not one stable form […], but a 
plurality of irreducible experiments in analogic ontology.’ Montagnes, an 
authority on the concept, also highlights this point: ‘Each doctrine of analogy 
is a manifestation of a certain conception of being, of causality, of 
participation, of the unity of beings in being.’ (2004, p. 10; my emphasis) 
That Bloch’s utopian analogia entis cannot be found overlapping with 
previous analogy doctrines need not jeopardise my thesis, then. The point is 
to best articulate what is going on with analogy in the context of Blochian 
utopianism. 
[2] This becomes clear by turning to the only explicit place in Bloch’s 
corpus where the analogy of being is explicitly mentioned. It is interesting 
that the only indication that Bloch’s materialism might constitute a new form 
of analogic metaphysics is to be found at a moment at which Bloch is 
discussing features of the dialectic. This speaks to the originality of analogy 
in Bloch’s thought precisely because in its fundamental characteristics 
dialectics has long been thought contrary to the theoretical imagination of 
analogia entis (see Lakebrink, 1955). Whilst analogy bespeaks order and 
harmony, the dialectical imagination is premised on discontinuity and 
rupture. Thus once again Bloch is found breaking with tradition, weaving 
dialectic with analogia entis, rupture with order, but an order that is not yet 
present, not yet in being. Specifically, he does this by enlisting analogy so as 
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to ensure that a directedness imbues the dialectical interpenetration and 
contradictory becoming of subject-object. An order that is not-yet guides 
dialectical becoming. As Bloch writes: 
[subject-object] reveal themselves as dialectically woven moments of an 
analogia entis, that is, of a not-yet completely manifested, first symbolic (but 
real-symbolic) appearing of being (SO, p. 296).120 
[Von dieser Durchdringung, als einer, die gerade nicht den Stoff über die Form, 
das Objekt über das Subjekt in der Sache überwiegen läßt, sondern beide als 
dialektisch verwobene Momente einer analogia entis zeigt, das ist, eines noch 
nicht ganz manifestierten, erst symbolisch (aber real-symbolisch) 
erscheinenden Seins] 
Recall that this passage echoes another one I employed earlier so as to 
support the feasibility of a utopian teleology: ‘This kind of totality [i.e. the not-
yet fullness of being] […] is the goal of the dialectical movement that holds it 
together’ (Bloch, 1983, p. 303; my emphasis). Strangely, then, what orders 
the dialectical process of matter is a fullness of being of this process which 
itself is not-yet. But this ordering principle is precisely a lack of order, for it 
speaks of a fundamental gap or lack at the very heart of being, and so could 
be said to be an-archic. But this with the proviso that matter’s an-archic 
process longs for a ‘“coming-in-order”’, as Bloch (1988, p. 11) writes.  
                                                          
120 There are other moments in the corpus which indicate analogy’s importance, but these instances 
require more interpretative work than I undertake here. Bloch’s theorisation of allegory and symbol, for 
example, counts among these instances: ‘Every “As [Wie]”’, writes Bloch, ‘bends the Unfamiliar 
together, making it close.’ (LM, p. 383) A reading of Bloch’s theorisation of allegory-symbol would have 
to draw on the importance of German Romanticism’s employment of analogy, which Bloch himself 
traces back to mystical thinkers, principally Jakob Böhme (LM, p. 385). One also thinks of the forefront 
role analogy plays in the minds of such thinkers as Novalis (his ‘magic wand of analogy’ [LM, p. 385]) 
and also Goethe, whose reliance on analogy for Naturphilosophie is well documented: ‘Both, language 
as well as material content of such production, contain the constant interaction between sealedness 
and Aurora rising.’ (PHE, p. 992) 
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On this basis we can say: the dialectic needs analogy to hold its movement 
together (to direct it), while analogy needs dialectic if it is not to succumb to 
the temptation of theism and thus to the eternalisation of a gap between 
being and becoming. By employing dialectical language together with a 
reference to the analogia entis, Bloch completely overturns the notion that a 
fullness of being be presently existing.121  
[3] There is another, less explicit indication of the presence of analogy 
in Bloch’s philosophy than the one given above, but this implicit appeal to 
analogy actually serves to concretise the utopian form of its expression 
outlined above.  
In The Spirit of Utopia Bloch writes that philosophy must now ‘let Kant burn 
through Hegel’ (SU, p. 187). The imperative laid-out here implicitly stages 
Bloch’s discovery of an ontology of not-yet being through the terms of two 
philosophers over whom much ink has been spilt. More specifically, the 
imperative indicates a tension of opposition that Bloch sees between the two 
German philosophers, a tension turning on the Sein und Sollen problematic 
(what is and what ought to be). It is a tension over which, as Bloch says, two 
                                                          
121 My reading differs from Thompson’s (2015, p. 53; 2013b), for whom Bloch’s is chiefly a “materialist 
metaphysics of contingency.” Thompson employs, however, a number of analogies to express his 
reading of Bloch’s ontology. Whether this is coincidental to an articulation of this ontology is not 
something that concerns me here, but it is an interesting facet of Thompson’s explication. For Holz 
(1978, p. 120), comparisons, metaphors and analogies are integral to Bloch’s explication of his 
ontology. Unlike my reading, Holz does not, however, think to draw the conclusion that Bloch’s 
ontology relies on an analogic conception of reality. In any case, in my view Thompson overstates the 
centrality of contingency in Bloch’s metaphysics. In doing so Thompson neglects (nota bene, does not 
utterly disregard) “the one thing necessary” (the unum necessarium,) that, for Bloch, is said to guide 
process-matter (Bloch is against ‘the ideology of unlimited [unbegrenzter] possibilities’ [1985e, p. 79]). 
If there is a “one thing necessary” at the heart of the ontology of not-yet being, then such a necessary 
thing would be difficult to square with Thompson’s interpretation of this ontology as one of utter 
contingency. On the other hand, this “necessary element” also appears equally difficult to square with 
an ontology of radical openness, as Bloch claims his ontology to be based on. But it does not logically 
follow from there being a “one thing necessary” that the content of this “one thing” be necessarily 
determined one way or another; what is necessary is that this one thing ultimately, at some point, be 
determined. 
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philosophical schools of thought ‘conflict’ but ‘between which one may not 
simply choose.’ (SU, p. 185) Here Bloch asks for the power of “both” (Kant 
must burn through Hegel), but through such “burning” there is produced the 
surplus power of an “and…”— something new is fashioned for thought here, 
a mode of thought that obviously is ‘neither strictly Hegelian nor recognisably 
Kantian’, as Blechman (2008, p. 182) writes. The first moment (namely Kant) 
must come back into the second moment (Hegel) without, however, a simple 
return to the first. Once again, something new must enter into thought and 
being.122  
In order to fully grasp what Bloch means by this imperative I need to outline 
what Bloch likes and dislikes in the respective philosophies of Kant and 
Hegel on the problematic of Sein und Sollen. Firstly, to begin on the side of 
Kant, Bloch’s imperative signals a rejection of mere Kantian regulative 
approximation to the fullness of being, and thus in a sense opens up the 
possibility of breaking through analogy’s logic of ever greater dissimilarity, as 
conceived of by Przywara (PHE, p. 168). At the same time, Bloch’s 
imperative signals a surplus in Kant in that Kant’s transcendental ego knows 
‘how to postulate morally beyond a bad existent’, because in this 
approximation (although infinite) there flashes hope for a future in which the 
gap is closed, and in this hope there springs a rejection of what is, of what is 
presently given (ibid., p. 147), namely: the givenness of merely a relation to 
the fullness of being that can only ever be approximated asymptotically. In 
sum, while Kant is seen to eternalise the gap between what is and what 
                                                          
122 This echoes Aristotle’s construal of the Heraclitean (equivocal) and Parmenidean (univocal) 
schools of thought, and the middle course he seeks to strike out between them, which, as was shown, 
is the very invention of philosophical analogy. Indeed, one can say per analogiam: As Aristotle’s 
philosophy is to Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’, so Bloch’s is to Kant’s and Hegel’s. 
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ought to be the case, he is at least attuned to the fact that there is a gap. But 
the will to transgress this state of affairs springs up and, whilst intensely felt 
by Kant, whilst intensely spoken, it nevertheless amounts to a “desire 
without hope,” as Dante translated the theologians’ “poena damni” 
(Lombardi, 2007, p. 11). It is a desire without hope because Kantian 
ontology is based on an endless progress towards what ought to be the 
case: not a likeness, but an identity, an ultimate arrival, which for Kant 
remains forever beyond reach at an abyssal distance, forever receding into 
the horizon of being. The striving ‘only always approximates the infinitely 
remote goal’, as Bloch writes (PA, p. 375). Kant’s virtue thus turns over into 
his weakness. He practises ‘the art of talking about what we have not yet 
experienced’ (PHE, p. 24) even if he talks about it to end all talk about it. 
Bloch seeks to hold onto Kant’s recognition of the gap and of what the gap 
promises, and indeed to hold fast to that striving to realise the gap’s closure, 
to fulfil the promise. But one must rid herself of the notion that this gap, in 
truth, can never be overhauled.  
Hegel, on the other hand, is, like Bloch, averse to the goal’s ‘remotion 
[Entfernte]’ (SO, p. 446). Hegel too, like Bloch, philosophically struggles 
against the Kantian conception of a dualism between existence (Dasein) and 
being-for-itself (Fürsichsein), between what is and what ought to be so. To 
Hegel’s mind the Kantian subject is left ‘starving [Hungerleiderei]’, for what 
would be its ‘good and proper meal [einer tüchtigen Mahlzeit]’—the Ought 
for which it craves—is situated in the unreachable domain of the ‘eternally 
non-present [ewig ungegenwärtig]’ (SO, pp. 446-7). Not without a hint of 
interest for the earlier discussion of Karl Barth’s opposition to the analogia 
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entis, Bloch designates this bad infinite hunger a strictly Protestant form of 
desire (‘the bad infinite of Protestantism’ [SO, p. 448]), which in the very act 
of recognising a surplus to what is ‘eliminates the surplus’ (SO, p. 447) as 
utterly unattainable.123  
In light of all of this, it would seem that if the choice be between Kant and 
Hegel that Hegel is the better option. And yet, while Kant eliminates the 
surplus of what has not yet come to be by rendering its attainability—its 
realisation—a strict impossibility, by rendering the tension between the “is” 
and “ought” irrevocable (PA, p. 28), Hegel, Bloch argues, eliminates the 
“ought” in another, equally unacceptable way. Despite Hegel’s antipathy 
toward a ‘melancholic’ Kantianism honouring its own incapacity to attain the 
ultimate “What” (object) of its desire (‘a desire to believe but an inability to’ 
[SU, p. 173]), his proposed resolution is equally suspect (SO, p. 446). The 
remotion of being, of existence, from the “ought,” the “What,” as ontologised 
in Kant (rendered a priori and thereby fixed), in Hegel no longer takes on the 
colouring of pure absence but is rather levelled to pure presence: to ‘the 
perfect Now.’ (SU, p. 179) ‘Hegel,’ writes Bloch, ‘with great correctness, 
goes against the perennial Ought, but with the effect that there is generally 
no more unrealised [Unverwirklichtes] left and therefore no future.’ (SO, p. 
446) Hegel discards the bad infinite of Kantian striving, and this in effect 
discards the impossibility of a real future arrival. But Hegel’s impatience 
                                                          
123 ‘Insofar as it is the ideological reflex of the early capitalist economy, Protestantism premiers only an 
infinite striving’ (PA, p. 370); ‘above all Protestantism harbours a distrust of human striving and an 
aversion to the end, to the arrival of striving, authorising only an infinite approximation to the ideal.’ 
(PA, p. 28). For a more subtle discussion of the ‘confessional-political background’ to Kant’s 
philosophy, see Hildebrandt (2007, pp. 477-8): ‘The description of Kant as the philosopher of 
Protestantism has a long tradition.’ See also Adorno (2001, pp. 71-3), who makes a similar argument 
as does Bloch concerning the tight relation between Protestant theology and infinite striving as a type 
of anti-utopian tendency of thought; the danger that the not-yetness of the reality of reason is 
suspended into an infinite task. 
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pushes too far, so that no longer is there a need nor demand for striving, no 
longer is there any incompletion to transgress. For Hegel the good and 
proper meal has been cooked, is served up, and simply awaits its 
recognition: 
Hegel’s theory that everything rational is already real concludes a premature 
and total truce with the world, but Kant’s only approximative infinity of reason, 
practical reason in particular, makes of the world an ocean without a shore 
(SU, p. 178). 
In sum, Kant recognises the gap but posits its overcoming as an 
impossibility—there is too much beyond; Hegel recognises the possibility of 
overcoming the gap, but only in its having already been achieved—thus 
there is too little beyond. The conflict between Kant’s equivocity (eternalised 
incompletion) and Hegel’s univocity (premature completion) must lead out 
toward something new. It is precisely in this context that the metaphysical 
significance of the need for Kant to burn through Hegel takes its cue: to think 
a recognition of the gap whilst holding open the possibility of its overcoming. 
This task, to my mind, is what Bloch’s appeal to an ontology interwoven with 
dialectics and analogy is meant to respond to. Bloch does not absolutise the 
gap between process and outfall, i.e., he does not insist solely on a Kantian 
equivocity, on an empty regulative approximation toward the final term (“X”). 
Nor does he posit a complete identification between process and outfall, i.e. 
he does not stand upon a Hegelian univocity, but he does nevertheless 
maintain the Hegelian possibility of arrival. ‘So it seems necessary at this 
point to let Kant’—the yearning will of a striving amidst the not-yet—burn 
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through Hegel’ (SU, p. 187)—the objective possibility of arrival: ‘Die 
Fähigkeit zur Ankunft’ (SO, p. 448). 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I have sought to provide an original reading of the 
fundamental structure of Bloch’s materialism. If, as I have argued in Chapter 
I, this open structure, born of the tendency-latency dialectic, can be seen as 
“Incompleteness - Process - (the possibility of an) Outfall,” then immediately 
above I have considered the relation of incompleteness/process to outfall as 
an analogic relation to a fullness of being which, following the core insight of 
Bloch’s ontology, is not-yet. To discern what this meant, I analysed some 
key moments in the history of analogy’s appearance so as to gauge the 
singularity of a Blochian form of analogia entis. I found that, despite the 
incompatibility of Bloch’s materialism with features of traditional forms of 
analogy, whether it be mathematicity or a sustaining theism, Bloch’s 
materialism can profitably be read as a new, experimental form of analogic 
metaphysics, in which the unity of process of matter is given, not by what 
was already there, but by what is not yet: the new and totality are thought as 
one and the same. I sought to concretise this reading by turning to Bloch’s 
novel appropriation of Kant and Hegel, in which, contra any type of 
syncretism, Bloch combines the two philosophers to create a new 
perspective on the process of rupture and order. In Bloch’s utopian form of 
materialism, the dialectical process of matter is sustained by the presence of 
an absence, namely the absence of totality as such, an absence for which, 
as the goal or fulcrum of matter’s journey, is in the process of being 
overcome. Bloch shows, then, that dialectics and the analogia entis need not 
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be severed at the hip but are, or can be, consubstantial, and gives to us a 
fuller awareness of the importance of the future as an ontological reality.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANACOLUTHON 
 
INTRODUCTION 
[T]he word matter originated from mater, meaning a fruitful world-womb 
experimenting with forms, figures, shapes of existence (M, p. 17). 
I began this study by asking what it would be to speculate on 
language’s materiality within the context of Bloch’s utopian form of 
materialism. My aim was thus not to produce an independently compelling 
materialistic ontology of language that would claim for itself pride of place 
among others, for that would somewhat contravene the openness that lies at 
the heart of Bloch’s understanding of matter. Rather, my aim was to 
understand what the utopian materiality of language might consist in within 
the philosophical perspective that Bloch affords us. My questioning arises 
from, firstly, the return to speculative-materialist modes of thought that 
philosophy is currently undergoing, and, secondly, the ongoing reluctance on 
the part of this return of the speculative to investigate language’s materiality. 
I also noted, however, that despite this reluctance, or better, because of it, 
two noteworthy responses to this conjuncture exist. These are worth 
rehearsing once again, for they serve as foils through which to begin to 
outline my utopian reading of the figure of anacoluthon, a figure I read as a 
linguistic expression of the main themes of Bloch’s materialism and, 
therefore, of matter itself—this at least in the context of Bloch’s philosophy.  
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On the one hand, Avanessian’s (2016) response to the conjuncture I have 
very briefly outlined above takes the following course: language’s realist-
materialist dimension lies in its being open to a realism of relations (plural). 
In light of the fundamental compositional structure of Bloch’s materialism, 
however, I threw into question whether language’s realist-materialist 
dimension might not lie in its being not merely open to a realism of relation 
(singular), but expressive of that relation, namely: the relation between 
incompleteness (openness) and outfall (possible realisation). This relation of 
process to a possible fulfilment places the emphasis on something new 
coming into the light of day: ‘a realism that does not realise anything’ is 
redundant according to Bloch (LE, p. 98). Reading the figure of anacoluthon 
will help me to chart this movement on the plane of language. 
On the other hand, Whistler’s (2010) response takes an in itself 
inexperiential generativity as what is key to any speculative-materialist 
appraisal of language. I have outlined why Bloch’s philosophical outlook is 
very sympathetic to this type of departure point insofar as, for Bloch and 
Schelling alike, one ought not mistake matter’s process of producing from 
what that process produces. Like Schelling, Bloch places the philosophical 
concern on the former: ‘Productivity is the switch box for a reality travelling 
toward itself’ (LE, p. 98). However, at the same time, I suggested that, at 
root, Whistler’s Schellingian approach is incompatible with Bloch’s form of 
speculation, for the temporal direction of its process tends toward the 
geological (i.e. it resonates with protology). In contrast to this down and back 
form of speculation, Bloch provides, I suggest, an alternative approach in 
which to construe this inexperiential generativity, namely: as one of out and 
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forward. Bloch’s ontological broadening and deepening of the importance of 
what has not yet been will have repercussions for a materialist appraisal of 
language after all, and it could be said that my study is an attempt to 
articulate this on the plane of language. To paraphrase Bloch, then, despite 
the merits of both Avanessian’s and Whistler’s respective responses, each of 
their perspectives is ‘deficient in utopian thought and lack[s] an adequately 
prospective view.’ (LE, p. 55; my emphasis) With the help of Bloch’s 
philosophy it is possible to contribute to addressing this deficiency.  
In order to bring to light what is at the root of this prospective view I have 
sought, in the previous two chapters and somewhat systematically, to 
disclose the sense behind Bloch’s assertion which he made very early on in 
the course of his philosophical career, namely: that ‘the world is gay spirit 
and urge to creative forms’ (Chapter I) and (Chapter II) that ‘the Thing in 
Itself is the objective phantasy.’ (PA, p. 5) In its “complete” form, then (for 
Bloch’s is an “open system”), I have argued that Blochian materialism 
essentially consists of a dialectic that is mediated by an ontological not-
yetness, i.e. what I have termed a utopian analogon. Now that the utopian 
substrate or the poetic correlate of Bloch’s philosophical thought has been 
laid-out as I see it, my concluding step below will be to open language up to 
the ‘blossoming field of questions’ (PHE, p. 6) which Bloch’s materialism 
presents to us. This will be done in three stages.  
Firstly, in §1 I will chart the direction that Bloch’s materialism points to vis-à-
vis materialist speculation on language, i.e. the sort of questioning it 
provokes; second, in §2, I will argue that the rhetorical figure of anacoluthon 
constitutes a concrete beginning for such speculative investigation into 
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language in the context of Bloch’s philosophy; and finally, in §3 I will 
substantiate the utopian cadence of language I spoke of at the beginning of 
this study by interpreting anacoluthon through the prism of my reading of 
Blochian materialism. In sum, I interpret anacoluthon’s syntactic discontinuity 
as expressive of utopian matter’s open intending for consummation. That is, 
anacoluthon expresses both the incompleteness of the fullness of being, and 
a real intending towards it. 
§1. LANGUAGE AS UTOPIAN MATTER  
 In this section I will set-out what I see as the general speculative direction 
that Bloch’s materialism provides for contemporary reflection on language. 
Doing this will help to refine the types of questions that I will then ask in the 
context of attempting to grasp the figure of anacoluthon as expressive of 
utopian matter’s open intending for consummation. From the findings of the 
previous two chapters, then, I think that a number of points may be made:  
[1] In view of Chapters I and II, the nature of language must, I think, in 
the context of Bloch’s philosophy, be derived from the open logic of utopian 
substance. This entails that language must be seen as a mode or a moment 
of forward-directed process-matter. I explained in Chapter I that, according 
to Bloch, no mode of matter is solid in itself but is a ‘figure of tension’ or a 
mode ‘of tendency’ in the process of becoming to an outfall that is in itself 
not-yet (PA, p. 259). Thus it can be said that the manner of being of 
language is as one still moving mode of matter, a qualitative mode (a 
moment) of the open process of utopian substance. As Bloch writes with 
reference to poetry: ‘The substance that finally can be adequate to poetry is 
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not merely mechanical, space filling matter, but that which blossoms forth 
historically, as a realisation of the possible.’ (LE, p. 113) 
One of the benefits of this approach to the materiality of language is its non-
essentialism: the nature of language, the nature of its materiality, it not fixed 
as one thing or another, but remains open and augmentative of new forms of 
linguistic existence (indeed, I will read the figure of anacoluthon as that 
linguistic site ‘where meaning’s former context is split open’ [LE, p. 100]). Of 
course, it could be objected that a Blochian speculative-materialist account 
of language presupposes that language constitutes a mode of matter’s 
Erlösungssehnsucht (longing for redemption), and that, insofar as this is the 
case, so then this approach is essentialist on the site that language must 
become, at some point, essential in itself. In other words, it might be argued 
that the essentialism of Blochian materialism lies in its presupposition that 
some kind of essence is reached in the end. This would then reflect itself in 
the Blochian determination of language’s materiality. That said, the eventual 
determination of essence remains open, as does the goal-directed 
performance of musicians in the mode of improvisation.  
To my mind, then, it is the case that, for Bloch, a utopian logic imbues both 
being and thought (LM, p. 451). And language must be defined by the same 
prospective logic. As an object of speculation, language therefore undergoes 
a similar re-conception as do being and thought under Bloch’s pen, such that 
language expresses the compositional structure of the ontology of not-yet 
being: Incompleteness → Process → (possibility of an) Outfall. The figure of 
anacoluthon will enable me to articulate the real presence of this open 
structure in that mode of utopian matter that Bloch calls language. 
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[2] The types of questions that emerge from this backdrop would be of 
the sort: how can Bloch’s underlying notion that ‘the horizon of the future […] 
gives reality its real dimension’ (PHE, p. 285; emphasis removed) be brought 
to bear on a materialist conception of language? Where can ‘a day break, a 
movement forwards’ (Bloch, 1980, p. 48; emphasis removed) be discerned 
in language, and how would this be connected to the kind of concept of 
matter that Bloch proposes? If, as I have argued, Bloch’s materialist 
metaphysics can be said to rise in the West and set in the East; that is, rise 
with the aporetics of an ontological incognito and set—as a possibility—in 
the dawning “Is” as final union with itself, then how does language harbour 
this process of possible outfall? I have already explained that determinations 
of utopian substance are produced or generated in and through a processual 
searching and finding the What of the That; that matter itself, as Bloch 
understands it, is an open process of searching for its own essence (‘[t]he 
whole of being’, Bloch writes, ‘is an inquiry into its own meaning’ [LE, p. 98]). 
I also noted how this process, as one of searching for a fulfilment that is not 
yet given in itself, necessarily entails exodus forms; that is, it entails the 
creation of forms that have nowhere yet been brought forth into existence. 
Another question would therefore be: are, and if so, in what way, are exodus 
forms discernible in language? In other words, in what way is language a 
process of searching for its own non-given essence? These are questions 
that Blochian materialism provokes within the philosophy of language, and 
they are questions which that materialism also provides answers for.124 
                                                          
124 These types of questions arise from the unavoidable problem of how best to lend precision to the 
notion that language’s quiddity—to recall the That-What relation—is precisely a searching for its 
quiddity. This is an important task to fulfil, because, despite Bloch asserting that ‘being is no universal 
gravy’ (TE, p. 285), the charge of monism has been directed at Bloch’s philosophy: 
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[3] To conclude these preparatory remarks, I would like to return to 
the Introduction of this study and reiterate the whole purpose of my 
investigation; doing so in the light of the journey taken so far will help to 
reconfirm what is at stake in this final stage. Recall that my broad aim is 
congruent with Avanessian’s (2016, p. 204) intention to theorise, in the 
context of Bloch’s materialism, a ‘realist or materialist linguistics’, in which 
language is seen as expressive of ontology. My claim here is that, in the 
horizon of Bloch’s materialism, language becomes shaped by that of which it 
is a part, namely, the ontological composition of matter, and that, as such, 
language expresses this ontological constitution. As a consequence of this, 
language’s being of matter shapes language according to matter’s becoming 
to what it is. Such is language’s ontological correlate, is what language is 
expressive of. It is this—to borrow Avanessian’s terms—that is the 
‘ontological thesis’ that language ‘always already’ contains: in the case of 
Bloch's philosophy, an immanent utopian knowledge of transcending in the 
real to what has not-yet become (ibid., p. 199).125  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
For just as there is nothing between heaven and earth that cannot be taken over by the 
psychoanalyst and given a sexual interpretation, so too there is nothing which cannot 
be regarded as a Blochian trace, and this indiscriminate use of everything comes close 
to meaning nothing. (Adorno, 1992, p. 210) 
It is not without significance, however, that Adorno reproaches Bloch for the abundance of utopian 
traces that the latter witnesses in the world—I believe anacoluthon is as good a departure point as any 
for thinking the materialism of language within Bloch’s philosophy precisely because, much like 
analogy, anacoluthon itself is a trace in Bloch’s corpus. In my mind, Adorno’s charge can only be 
countered by employing precisely the method Adorno is suspicious of. If Bloch’s materialism does 
consist of a monist account of matter, then, as I have hope to outline throughout this thesis, it must 
count as an open monism. 
 
125 This is admittedly not an entirely original observation of Bloch’s philosophy on my part. Holz (1965), 
for example, follows a similar line of inquiry, arguing that Bloch’s metaphysical materialism shows how 
linguistic-temporal modalities have an objective basis in reality:  
 
Language implicitly arises from precisely the presuppositions that are developed by the 
ontology of not-yet being: out of the nuance [Abstufung] of being according to grades 
[184] 
 
In this chapter, I develop these insights by showing that speculation on 
anacoluthon (speculation in Bloch’s sense of the word) can help to show that 
‘the capacities and mechanisms [sic] of language can capture its realist 
ontological dimension.’ (ibid., p. 200) And I will do so by exploring the 
materialism of language neither in the sign nor in the propositional form, both 
of which could be said to constitute products of linguistic productivity, but 
rather via syntax (or better, a break or rupture of syntactical normality), which 
could be claimed to constitute the process of linguistic productivity. But why 
begin with, and just what is, anacoluthon?126 
§2. Anacoluthon as Starting Point 
It is important to reiterate that much as Bloch does not possess a self-
standing aesthetic theory (Jung, 2012, p. 670), so he does not provide his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of reality, out of the presence of “Not” in being, out of the anticipation for the future in 
the present. (ibid., p. 117) 
 
However, Holz repeats a common feature of Bloch-scholarship in his neglect of the figure of 
anacoluthon as it is present in Bloch’s corpus. 
 
126 The consequences of Bloch’s ontology could be explored for semiotics. For example, in following 
the broad epistrophic tendency of classical metaphysics, Peirce (1998) envisages the sign’s basic 
function as one of re-presenting an absent object. By virtue of Bloch’s materialism, Peirce’s theory of 
the sign and of referentiality would require fundamental modification, in that its semiosis is tied to what 
Bloch terms elsewhere ‘an archaising recourse’ to retrospection (EM, p. 158). In accord with Bloch’s 
materialism, a utopian-semiotics would base itself on, perhaps, “pro-spection” (in the sense of the 
Latin prōspectus, “outlook-ing”—recall Bloch’s approach to speculation, referring to its original root 
rather than to the later link to mirroring, “speculari”). What this would mean is that the referentiality of 
the sign is not a “not-any-more” but a “not-yet” (see Kübler [1975, p. 273]). The sign’s temporal 
direction (Zeitrichtung) is no longer seen as a harking back, but as a harkening forwards to what has 
not-yet been (destinatory, day break). A Blochian semiosis would be a semiosis of anticipation as 
opposed to one of re-collection. One could also explore the implications of Bloch’s ontology for re-
configuring logical-grammatical and/or subject-predicate construction(s). It has been suggested that 
the conventional subject-predicate construction is coextensive with substance metaphysics (see 
White, 2014), and thus precisely the type of metaphysics Bloch is contrary to. Siebers has somewhat 
treated of this direction of travel, placing particular emphasis on Bloch’s category of the Novum: 
 
We have to somewhat qualify the normal pattern of substance and quality, and hence 
also the normal pattern of the S-P structures of propositions, to articulate this point, 
which bears structural resemblances to the speculative proposition in Hegel as a unity 
of opposites. The new does not lie outside of the entity as in a synthetic proposition, 
nor does it lie inside the concept as in an analytic proposition (Leibniz), for it is the new 
of that entity, and yet it is “really” new—it means for the entity, a moving beyond. 
(2013a, p. 66; see EM, pp. 39 & 41, where Bloch himself touches on this idea) 
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readers with an explicitly self-standing philosophy of language. What this 
entails is that, whilst of course staying as close to the corpus as possible 
(the materialist principle that one must explain the world from out of the 
world must be applied to the text in this instance), speculation on language 
in and through Bloch’s materialism must be exploratory; much like the 
principle of montage outlined in the Introduction, Bloch’s corpus here 
becomes ‘a kind of laboratory, an open experimental space’ (HT, p. 226) for 
the materialist philosopher of language. So much is this the case that my 
endeavour here could mirror the process of utopian teleology as outlined in 
Chapter I: the figure of anacoluthon is immanent to the open, intending logic 
of Blochian materialism. Experimentally probing Bloch’s corpus in the hope 
of arriving at, if not a definitive answer to my study-question, then an answer 
that brings something new to current debates. 
In this spirit I will do two things in the present section. I will [1] outline my 
reasoning for taking-up anacoluthon as a starting point, which consists of 
two related points: (a) anacoluthon’s lack of reception in extant Bloch-
scholarship and (b) the fact that—as already mentioned—this figure is a 
trace in Bloch’s corpus itself. Having established the merits of proceeding in 
this way I will [2] get to grips with what anacoluthon as a syntactical figure 
broadly signifies. From that stage on I will be able to outline, in the context of 
Bloch’s materialism, in what anacoluthon’s materiality consists. 
§2.1. ANACOLUTHON AS TRACE 
 [1a] My intention here is to establish the merits of beginning with the figure 
of anacoluthon for the task of discerning the materiality of language in the 
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context of Blochian materialism. To do this, I will begin by considering the 
figure as a trace that is immanent to Bloch’s corpus.  
Anacoluthon can be described as a Blochian trace, first, because little of 
substantive treatment of the figure has been undertaken in the relevant 
Bloch-scholarship. Those few who have treated of the figure in Bloch’s 
corpus stand as unworked-out intimations which therefore more or less 
follow Steiner’s lead (see Introduction) in the sense that, while they touch on 
the truth of the matter, they fail to systematically unfold the line of thought at 
play. Three instances of this exist in the relevant literature: Richter’s (2010), 
Witschel’s (1978), and Landmann’s (1965). I shall briefly survey them. 
Richter, for instance, suggests that anacoluthon may be related to ‘Bloch’s 
understanding of non-self-identity, both in the aesthetic and the materialist 
utopian sense’ (2010, p. 110; my emphasis). While this assessment is 
certainly correct it is not developed at all. Richter does not systematically 
explain why or how anacoluthon relates to the incognito that is the starting 
point of Bloch’s philosophy. I meet this task below by detailing how 
anacoluthon relates to matter as pre-categorial That-ness. The second case 
is that of Witschel’s. Witschel (1978, p. 103) also posits a confluence of 
utopian matter and anacoluthon, suggesting that anacoluthon ‘reflects 
[widerspiegelt]’ the reality of which it speaks. But once more the connection 
is stated only in the manner of a passing comment and merely repeats 
what—as I show below—Bloch says of the figure: again, the topic remains 
undeveloped. I meet this task below by showing that anacoluthon does not 
merely reflect, but expresses, that is, exemplifies the compositional structure 
of Bloch’s materialism. Finally, there is the much more interesting case of 
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Landmann. Landmann’s (1965) remarks on the topic of anacoluthon’s 
relation to Bloch’s ontology are in fact recollections of a lecture Bloch gave 
on the subject in Berlin in 1964. In that lecture, anacoluthon is associated 
with ‘spontaneous language’, with the ‘liveliness of speech’, and it is 
suggested that ‘reality always breaks through our logically smooth image of 
it’ (ibid, p. 354). But following the apparent rule, Landmann takes up the 
same general position as the two commentators above; he fails to move 
beyond what has already been said concerning the inextricable relation 
between anacoluthon and Bloch’s ontology of not-yet being. A systematic 
account is missed. Fulfilling this task is my intention below.127 
[1b] Anacoluthon is, however, a trace for a much more immanent 
reason than the one outlined above, for it is a trace in Bloch’s corpus itself. 
Together with Landmann’s recollections of the lecture mentioned above, 
which, incidentally, is itself a type of trace (for no text of the actual lecture 
exists), the only explicit presence of anacoluthon in Bloch’s corpus is a 
single essay (situated in the Literary Essays). Beyond this and the 
abovementioned lecture no explicit evocation of anacoluthon appears in 
Bloch’s texts. In itself this helps to explain why anacoluthon has been given 
                                                          
127 This logic of neglecting anacoluthon also goes the other way. What I mean by this is that while 
some commentators have insightfully treated of language in Bloch’s philosophy, they have failed to 
bring to bear anacoluthon’s importance to the whole topic. I have already, in the Introduction to this 
study, mentioned Steiner as a representative of this sort of omission, as too is Holz (1965) mentioned 
only a moment ago. Another, more recent example is Siebers’ comparative analysis of Bloch’s literary 
work Traces and Johann-Peter Hebel’s The Treasure Chest (1811). In his analysis, Siebers (2013b, p. 
190-1) not only intimates the utopian directedness of language, speaking of the ‘utopian core’ and the 
‘utopian horizon’ ‘necessary to human communication’, he also recognises that this temporal, 
anticipatory, prospective horizon of language emerges from and is only comprehensible within the 
structure of Bloch’s materialism (ibid., p. 204). What Siebers does not do, however, is incorporate into 
his discussion the centrality of anacoluthon. 
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such scant treatment in Bloch-scholarship: Bloch himself gave it little regard 
(it seems).128  
But it is precisely this, its inconspicuousness, which warrants us to treat of 
anacoluthon with real seriousness. Although the rhetorical figure occupies a 
seemingly marginal place in Bloch’s corpus it could in fact count for much 
more because of its marginality. The importance of that which is marginal 
and inconspicuous for Bloch’s thought becomes clear by turning to a 
composition of the parabolic text Traces (Spuren), a text which, as Boella 
(2012, p. 510) notes, Bloch chose to open his collected works with. In that 
composition Bloch gives a piece of advice: ‘One should observe precisely 
the little things, go after them. What is slight and odd often leads the 
furthest.’ (T, p. 5) The adage bespeaks a realism not of ‘reproductive 
naturalism’ (that is, mere mirroring), but concentration (PHE, p. 216). In other 
words, Bloch invites his readers to practice a Spurenlesen—a reading of 
traces. In and through concentration for inconspicuous traces one finds the 
incidental though ‘ineffable’ details where hope begins to blossom and, 
without guarantee, finds its confirmation (PHE, p. 302).  
                                                          
128 Incidentally, anacoluthon is not only an inconspicuousness residing both in Bloch’s corpus and in 
commentary on Bloch; anacoluthon is also a neglected figure within the field of rhetoric to which it 
traditionally belongs. Indication of its omission in this regard is exhibited in the index of rhetorical terms 
given in Vickers’ otherwise comprehensive study In Defence of Rhetoric (2002). As Sanders’ (2014, p. 
490) exception to this rule of omission notes, the reason behind anacoluthon’s universal neglect 
presumably lies in the fact that neither Donatus nor Priscian nor Quintilian treated of it. Naturally those 
rhetoricians who followed the masters did not think to either. In this context, there is something 
vaguely consequential when Bloch writes: ‘In his first attempt at a Latin grammar, M. Terentius Varro 
is said to have forgotten the future tense; philosophically, it has still not been adequately considered to 
this day.’ (PHE, p. 6) Indeed, perhaps fondness for the strictures of grammar in itself precipitates 
against the future tense: that is, against anacoluthon? 
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What was that? Something moved! And it moved in its own way. An impression 
that will not let us come to rest over what we heard. An impression on the 
surface of life, so that it tears, perhaps. (T, p. 6; my emphasis) 
This imperative for concentration, for an eye to the inconspicuous, can be 
practiced, in immanent fashion, on Bloch’s corpus itself (one should explain 
the philosophy from out of the philosophy). In this light, the figure of 
anacoluthon becomes an exemplary node by which to approach the 
materiality of language within a utopian horizon of speculation such as 
Bloch’s philosophy affords us. By observing and going after what is slight 
and odd one can “go the furthest.”129 
§2.2. PRELIMINARY DEFINITION  
[2] Having established two important reasons for deploying the figure of 
anacoluthon for present purposes, reasons that are immanent to Bloch’s 
philosophy, I now want to get a firmer grip on just what the figure of 
anacoluthon is, or rather, what the figure does to the “normal” operations of 
language. To get an initial bearing on this, I can turn to Sanders’ (2014) 
exceptional commentary on the figure:130 
                                                          
129 ‘Concentration as realism’ (PH, p. 249; emphasis removed). Much could be said of this move, not 
least that it is but an echo: ‘“Attentiveness [Aufmerksamkeit], Malebranche had said, “is the natural 
prayer of the soul”.’ (SO, p. 41; emphasis removed). Walter Benjamin also relies on a “detective-style” 
approach in his attempt to unearth the truth-content of everyday phenomena, a “micrology” as it were, 
one capable of discerning the “splinters of messianic time” scattered about the present. In an 
overarching register, all this recalls Bloch’s remarks concerning the Christian pathos of going after the 
mystery of smallness: ‘Classical love was eros towards the beautiful, the brilliant, Christian love turns 
instead not merely to the oppressed and the lost but to the inconspicuous among them.’ (PHE, p. 
1261)  
 
130 Incidentally, the editor of the book in which Sanders’ singular commentary appears is a one-time 
student of Bloch’s, Gert Ueding, a prominent figure behind the revival of rhetoric in the German 
academy. 
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Anacoluthon qualifies as a grammatical-rhetorical technical term for a linguistic 
“derailment in construction [Konstruktionsentgleisung]” or, if one wants to avoid 
a negative valuation, an “inconsistent syntax [Satzbau]”. (ibid., p. 485)131 
Anacoluthon, Sanders says, represents a ‘“non-consistent mode of 
expression [nicht folgerichtige Ausdrucksweise]”’ (ibid.). Indeed, this sense 
of “not following” or of a “lacking of sequence” essentially corresponds 
to the etymological derivation of the notion from the Greek ἀ(ν)- “not” and the 
adjective ακόλουθον (akólouthos), “accompanying [begleitend],” 
“corresponding [entsprechend],” “following [folgend]” (ibid.). 
Thus, anacoluthon’s ‘chief form [Hauptform]’ is a “not-accompanying,” a 
“non-corresponding,”132 a “not-following,” or more simply a ‘shift in 
construction [Konstruktionswechsel]’ in the flow of a sentence (ibid., p. 487). 
The German “ein Satzbruch” (a term coined by Eduard Engel) denotes the 
same sense albeit perhaps with more intensity. “Ein Bruch”: “a violation,” “a 
breach,” “an infringement,” “a flaw,” “a failure,” “a rupture,” “a fracture,” “a 
breakage, break, breaking(-off),” “a disruption,” “a crack,” “a discontinuity,” “a 
parting.” All these senses are corroborated by a number of other 
commentators’ definitions of the figure. Newmark (2012, p. 93; my 
emphasis), for example, defines anacoluthon as an instance in which ‘one 
syntactical pattern, one grammatical construction’ is discontinued ‘by 
another before the first [pattern] is allowed to complete itself.’ Anacoluthon 
                                                          
131 All translations of Sanders are my own. 
 
132 Recall that “correspondence” and “proportionality” are words inextricably tied to analogy, the latter 
of which, of course, has been shown to relate to such notions as “orderedness” and “harmony.” But 
such determinations of analogy are unfounded in doctrines such as Przywara’s, for whom analogia 
entis is at root an expression of a relation of alterity between God and creation. 
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therefore touches on the notion of incompleteness: ‘a deviation, a rupture or 
a break within an overall movement that could otherwise be integrated into 
one system of meaning.’ (ibid.; my emphasis) As another example, Richter 
(2000, p. 110; my emphasis) also defines anacoluthon as ‘what has no 
logical following in the syntax of a sentence’; it is a breaking ‘out of the 
scheme of sequential speech or writing to mark a point where the linearity of 
a discourse and its logic breaks down.’ Here the point is considered not as 
objectively augmentative of a new beginning (this is where I think Bloch 
places his emphasis), but rather as an objective breakdown (this is, I think, 
where Adorno places the emphasis [see my analysis of Adorno below]).133 
(This distinction highlights the productivity at the heart of the apophatic 
moment in Bloch’s materialism: for the not-yetness of being renders speech, 
not so much silent, as creative and productive of the new.)134 
In sum, an anacoluthon can be said to signify the following kinds of 
determinations: it is a point (perhaps a starting point), it lacks any clear logic 
(it is an evident illogicality), it is a deviation, a rupture, a break; it marks an 
incompletion, it is unsystematic, it is non-linear, it seemingly spurns the 
almost naturally integrative movement of a sentence.135 In light of my 
                                                          
133 Of the three forms of anacoluthia reviewed by Sanders (2014, p. 486), prolepsis (Latin: anticipatio) 
is as significant as is the more literal Satzbruch (the final form being the particle). In its most essential 
character prolepsis is ‘anticipation [Vorwegnahme]’—often used as a strategy with which to pre-empt 
and forestall potential objections of one’s interlocutor in debate (ibid.). In my reading below, 
anacoluthon connotes an anticipatory, proleptic cadence in language: it is anticipatory language, or 
better, it is anticipatoriness in language.  
 
134 Indeed, Sanders (2014, p. 487) stresses that the Satzbruch not be understood as a ‘termination 
[Satzabbruch]’, but as an ‘interruption [Satzunterbruch]’. Anacoluthia are thus not complete 
terminations, but turning points in speech, the disruption of syntactical order, precisely in order to find 
something new. 
 
135 Bloch, however, tempers any easy conflation of anacoluthon with irrationality:  
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findings in Chapters I and II it is unmistakable that anacoluthon significantly 
resonates with and echoes certain tenets of Bloch’s materialism, particularly 
that of incompleteness (not-having). I will expand on this claim in §3 below. 
The final point to make for now, one which I will return to, is that what is 
perhaps most curious about anacoluthon is its character of being a syntactic 
figure that marks an upheaval of syntactical normalcy: it constitutes some 
kind of border figure, and thus is open to being read as a Frontal figure, in 
the sense of Bloch’s category of the Front. The Greek derivation of syn-tax, 
as σύν- “together” and ταξις “an ordering,” highlights that anacoluthon is not 
necessarily a syntactic figure that is anti-syntactic, but neither is it strictly 
speaking syntactic. But in recalling the following passage we are reminded 
that, in the context of Bloch’s thought, rupture and order do not constitute 
mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather, insofar as order is that which is 
not yet, rupture is the proper manner of the becoming of order: 
In the goal which is being striven for it is the one necessity of, to use an 
outmoded expression, the highest good, which pacifies the unrest of the need 
and striving, that for which it would not be necessary to struggle if it were 
already available. This kind of totality, the non-existing all, not the existing 
whole, is the goal of the dialectical movement that holds it together, exactly as 
need is its impulse and motor. (Bloch, 1983, p. 303)  
My guiding question in this chapter concerns the ontologically immanent 
knowledge given in and through anacoluthon (in the context of Bloch’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The pattern of living speech that flows and flourishes as such, and that still sounds 
within lettered speech, is not inimical to reason; rather, it constitutes its own—or even 
more, the actual—music of reason. (LE, p. 501) 
 
Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to inquire into the musicality of the figure of anacoluthon, 
although doing so seems crucial to developing a reading of the figure which sees it as expressive of 
Bloch’s utopian teleology. 
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materialism), i.e. what does anacoluthon’s existence reveal of language’s 
materiality? My response will be that anacoluthon’s existence reveals, 
linguistically, the intending for a fullness of being that in itself is not yet.136 
Anacoluthon’s disruption of syntactical flow can be read, in the context of 
Blochian materialism, as a linguistic expression of the non-existence of 
ontological totality (ontōs on), but also the real, open intending towards it. 
Hillis Miller inadvertently touches on this when he writes that ‘interruption, 
like marks of punctuation, at once have nothing to do with signification and 
everything to do with it.’ (ibid.) This interpenetration of nothingness and 
being found dynamically crystallised in the figure of anacoluthon is exampled 
none more so than in Hegel’s opening to his Logic. A number of 
commentators have drawn attention to the fact that Hegel opens his Logic 
with an anacoluthon (Simoniti, 2015; Adorno, 1993): 
Being, pure being—without further determination. (Hegel, 2010, p. 59) 
For Simoniti (2015, p. 858), Hegel’s ‘non-predicative anacoluthon’ does not 
assert anything, but simply intends and means; it evokes a ‘form of recess, 
leap, or even event.’  
 
                                                          
136 This sort of question would certainly appear strange to analytically-inclined philosophers of 
language. As Davidson (2001, p. 223) writes: ‘Questions of reference do not arise in syntax, much less 
get settled.’ But anacoluthon is not strictly speaking syntax as the rupture of it. Hillis Miller provides 
leverage to go one step further and say that anacoluthon is the non-phenomenal, generative force of 
language: 
 
The rhythmical emphases of an oral sentence, like the marks of punctuation in a piece 
of written language, are without semantic meaning in themselves. A dash is without 
referential significance. You do not enunciate it when you read the sentence aloud. 
The rhythm of a spoken sentence does not alter the semantic content of the words 
taken separately. Such elements indicate joints, hinges, articulations, spaces, or 
pauses, the nonsignifying and nonphenomenal syntactic aspects of language without 
which language could not make sense. (1990, p. 110; my emphasis) 
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§2.3. ADORNO-STEINER-MIESZKOWSKI 
I am not, however, concerned with reading Hegel on the topic of 
anacoluthon here, but rather three other thinkers to have considered, to 
varying degrees, the importance of anacoluthon. The findings I will draw 
from these three considerations will then allow me to map out more precisely 
the way in which anacoluthon can be understood as expressive of matter 
from a Blochian standpoint. As the title of this subsection makes clear, the 
three interpretations in question are [1] Adorno’s (1992), [2] Steiner’s (1965) 
and [3] Mieszkowski’s (2009).  
[1] Adorno’s (1992, p. 138) analysis of a ‘paratactic method’ touches on 
anacoluthon as a figure that is radically opposed to synthesis, and therefore 
the figure is deeply related to Adorno’s guiding project of a metaphysics of 
non-identity: a negative dialectic.137 Whilst I do not go into any depth on 
Adorno's philosophical intentions in what follows, I will draw attention both to 
the diacritical differences and the consanguinity between Adorno and Bloch 
on the site of their respective readings of anacoluthon.138  
                                                          
137 Adorno speaks of his ‘desire to dissociate from fetishisation of the positive’, claiming that a 
‘negative dialectic as critique means above all criticism of precisely this claim to identity’, a claim 
towards which Adorno has ‘always felt a violent apathy’ (2008, pp. 18 & 20-1). Adorno’s negative 
dialectics makes a virtue of what Buck-Morss (1977, p. 47) describes as a rejection of Hegelian 
teleology. It is radically opposed to the smooth teleological unfolding of freedom and truth and places 
its bets on the breaks and gaps of the present, moving markedly closer to anacoluthon as a principle 
of philosophising. As Buck-Morss writes: ‘History [for Adorno] formed “no structural whole.” Instead it 
was “discontinuous,” unfolding within a multiplicity of divisions of human praxis through a dialectical 
process which was open-ended.’ (ibid.)  
 
138 For a treatment of the relationship between Bloch and Adorno, see Claussen’s Theodor W. Adorno: 
One Last Genius (2008). I cannot pursue in full detail the differences between utopian dialectics and 
its negative counterpart (what Adorno calls a “logic of disintegration” [2008, p. 69]). For a cursory 
treatment of this topic, see Münster (1986). 
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Adorno’s treatment of anacoluthon develops from his reading of Hölderlin’s 
late hymnic work, the ‘paratactical language’ of which Adorno sees as an 
objective expression of the ‘consciousness of non-identity’ (ibid., pp. 136-
41). For Adorno, parataxis, which, as Bloch also suggests of anacoluthon, is 
said to verge on the ‘music-like’, consists of ‘artificial disturbances that evade 
the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax.’ (ibid., p. 131) In Adorno’s 
eyes, the truth content of Hölderlin’s stylistic technique is its ‘anticlassicistic’ 
‘rebellion against harmony’ (ibid, p. 133), in which or through which a 
‘disintegrative moment’ reveals ‘the unattainability of the linguistic ideal’ 
(ibid., p. 137; my emphasis).139 Adorno (ibid., p. 142-4) associates the 
paratactic—to paraphrase Bloch, this antithesis to ‘classicist calm’ and  
‘classicist solidification’ (HT, pp. 199 & 200)—with the anacoluthic in that 
anacoluthon is a rupture through which identity, i.e. synthesis of subject-
object, the very ‘watchword of Idealism’, is cast aside.  
Of course, all this is very reminiscent of Bloch’s ontological incognito: I am. 
But I do not have myself. But even if there were a sign that Adorno’s reading 
is at one with the real incognito that is Bloch’s philosophy’s starting point, 
then Adorno’s speaking of a complete casting aside of identity opens up an 
unbridgeable difference between him and Bloch. While Adorno is fully 
conscious that existence nowhere has its essence, he seems to foreclose 
the intention toward and the possibility of attaining essence, of arriving at a 
fullness of being. This is a contentious claim, of course, but one nonetheless 
corroborated by the German original of Adorno’s essay on Hölderlin, in 
                                                          
139 It is thus no surprise that Adorno employs paratactic composition to convey his philosophical 
content (see Richter, 2000, p. 99). 
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which Adorno (1974, p. 480) claims that the ‘fragmentary [fragmentarischen] 
character’ of Hölderlin’s paratactic hymns perhaps marks a ‘constitutive 
inability to be complete [konstitutiv unvollendbar].’ Strangely, in another text, 
Adorno imputes precisely this constitutive inability to complete to Bloch’s 
style itself. Like Hölderlin’s language, which ‘manifests remoteness, 
separation of subject and object’ (Adorno, 1992, p. 128), so the 
[…] breaks in [Bloch’s] speech are an echo of a historical moment that compels 
a philosophy of subject-object to admit the continuing breach between subject 
and object. (ibid., p. 211) 
But how far must this admittance go? Adorno’s emphasis on a constitutive 
incompleteness, on an unsettling hiatus cut to the measure of an a priori 
(Adorno’s “historical conjuncture” notwithstanding), serves as the leading 
difference between his and what I take as Bloch’s own reading of 
anacoluthon. If Adorno’s parataxis-reading instils in thought and language 
and being itself the inescapability of antinomies (1974, p. 480), if it stands as 
an outstripping of the drive for identity as a very principle (ibid., p. 482), then 
the irredeemable as such is brought up to philosophical form in and by 
Adorno, and is thereby seen no more than to mirror a Kantian infinite 
striving: only Kant’s dislocation burns and flourishes here, there is too little 
possibility of arrival, not enough Hegel into the mix. But Bloch’s uptake of the 
figure is much more speculative insofar as it harbours a utopian cataphatic 
element, namely: the genuine possibility of real arrival.140 
                                                          
140 De Man’s (1979, p. 300 n. 21) reading differs slightly in the sense that he likens the eruptive unrest 
of anacoluthon to parabasis; parabasis being a figure more of digressions in narrative (particularly in 
ancient dramas) than total dissolution of a synthesising element. It thereby implies more of a reversion 
back to the normal flow of a narrative after an unexpected interruption. Nonetheless, the  
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Indeed, as I will show in more detail in the following section, Bloch’s position 
is subtly but fundamentally different from Adorno’s, something Bloch is well 
aware of when writing to Adorno the following important comment: ‘It is true 
that the utopian conscience […] has remained alive, quite explicitly, in your 
rich and successful writings. But the snag [is] the abandonment of the great 
line, the unum necessarium’ (quoted in Claussen, 2008, p. 272). The figure 
of the tear is in Adorno not linked as such to the possibility of an opening to 
redemption, to the overcoming of that abyss which separates the becoming 
of subject-object from the fullness of being for which they become at all. On 
balance, then, Adorno knows of the incompleteness but shuns the 
ineradicable invariant of direction in Bloch’s dislocatory style of 
expressionism. This is all the more remarkable insofar as Adorno in fact 
knew of this goal-quality permeating all of Bloch’s writings: 
Behind every word stands his resolve to break through the solid barrier which 
ever since Kant common sense has inserted between consciousness and 
things-in-themselves. (1992, p. 206; my emphasis) 
While Bloch’s expression is born of the “enduring gap” between subject and 
object, indeed of the incompleteness of the subject in itself and of the object 
likewise, so it also speaks of a necessary pathos to overcome non-identity. 
To paraphrase Bloch, ‘the dreaming surplus pours […] out of all “words” 
here’ and the main thing makes its presence felt (HT, p. 226). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
similarity between anacoluthon and parabasis stems from the fact that both figures 
interrupt the expectations of a given grammatical or rhetorical movement. As 
digression […] parabasis clearly involves the interruption of a discourse. (ibid.) 
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[2] To illuminate this more cataphatic, exploratory dimension of 
anacoluthon requires turning away from Adorno. In the Introduction I noted 
that my study is in a sense a systematic footnote to Steiner’s unworked-out 
intuition concerning the potentiality that Bloch’s philosophy harbours for 
speculating on language anew. And indeed, Steiner’s intuition allows for an 
approach to be taken on anacoluthon that is markedly different from that of 
Adorno’s aniconic reading. Steiner does this, I will argue, by considering 
anacoluthon’s rupture as intimately related to novelty of expression. In the 
context of Bloch’s materialism, this will allow me to cement the relation I 
have made between the figure of anacoluthon and the Blochian categories 
of Novum and Ultimum (recall that, in Chapter II, I showed how, to Bloch’s 
way of thought, existence’s arrival at essence would be no more than arrival 
at a Novum).  
Steiner (1965, p. 341) does not actually refer to anacoluthon but to what he 
calls the ‘Pythagorean genre’ (recall analogy’s Pythagorean inception). 
Nevertheless, I claim that anacoluthon is the very logic of this genre as 
Steiner conceives it. This can easily be seen when one notes that, in 
Steiner’s estimation, Bloch is the ‘foremost living writer’ of the “Pythagorean 
genre” because he has ‘broken the generically ponderous, clotted norms of 
German syntax’, and in so doing has given a ‘unique voice’ to an ‘an 
unprecedented need’ (ibid., p. 342; my emphasis). Immediately, then, the 
disruption of syntactical norms constitutes Steiner’s understanding of the 
“Pythagorean genre,” and this breaking through syntactical normalcy is said 
to be born of need. Now, the notion of the Novum comes into play at this 
point when Steiner suggests that Bloch’s stylistics represent a kind of 
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aubade-prose (Tagelied), i.e. considered within the horizon of Bloch's 
materialism, the need that gives birth to syntactical breaks is the need for 
totality and totality would be a Novum.141 Steiner does not say this himself. 
What he does clearly show, however, is that, above and beyond Adorno’s 
relating anacoluthon’s intent to a paratactic expression of non-identity, the 
“Pythagorean genre” in fact announces the eruption of an intent for new 
modes of expression. It constitutes a linguistic opening into the new, the site 
of the parturition of new forms of speech. Through Steiner’s contribution one 
is able to tease out that feature of anacoluthon that is not simply bounded to 
non-identity. 
This reading can be rendered more concretely by considering in more detail 
Steiner’s characterisation of the “Pythagorean genre.” Steiner’s discussion of 
this genre is prefigured with a claim that, as a literary mode of expression, 
the novel now constitutes an inadequate expressive form in the present 
socio-historical conjuncture. The novel is declared relatively bankrupt. Born 
of this inadequacy are new expressive-forms, tentative, but real: 
                                                          
141 Derived from the Latin albus, “aubade” denotes the overwhelming whiteness or clarity of dawn and 
is rooted in the old Occitan form of the alba: ‘Traditionally aubade is a joyful poem that celebrates the 
coming of morning’ (Anon, 2013, p. 1). As Fryatt writes: 
 
The category of the dawn song or poem is vast: they are found in almost all cultures 
and have been composed since the earliest times. Perhaps originally religious, dawn 
poems are also associated in most of these cultures with secular eroticism (2012, p. 
200). 
 
But an ambiguity of the aubade is ever present. As Rowe (2011, p. 171) notes, the aubade does not 
simply convey the positivity of a ‘joyful dawn song’ in the troubadour tradition; in fact, in much of the 
poetic tradition the emergence of a new day announces the need for lovers to part—the aubade can 
thus also be understood as a cursing of the dawn. This is taken further with Philip Larkin’s poem 
“Aubade” (published in 1977), which itself is a reflection on death, and thus in a sense emphasises 
entropy (no dawn shall dawn again). The different interpretations of anacoluthon provided by Bloch 
and Adorno are, I would suggest, therefore woven into the very history of the alba form, and in fact, 
the claim that Bloch’s whole philosophy (and its conception of reality) is a dawn song is not too far off 
the mark. Indeed, Bloch frequently expresses the drive to utopia with the Latin ex oriente lux (“light 
from the East”). As Bloch quotes Hebel: ‘“The Orient, where our faith, our fruit tree, and our blood 
reside.”’ (LE, p. 154) 
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Our culture has seen the rise and decay of the verse epic and of “high drama”; 
it has seen the retreat of poetry from a central mnemonic or argumentative 
function in society; it is at present witnessing the decline of the novel from 
essential purpose. But there are other possibilities of form, other shapes of 
expression dimly at work. In the disorder of our affairs […] new modes of 
statement, new grammars or poetics for insight, are becoming visible. They are 
tentative and isolated. But they exist like those packets of radiant energy 
around which matter is said to gather in turbulent space. (ibid., 336) 
Steiner holds the likes of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Karl Kraus and Walter 
Benjamin as belonging to these tentative explorations in expressiveness, in 
which old expressive forms shine in the light of their own inadequacy (again, 
the apophatic moment). But the ‘common factor in these works’, Steiner 
writes, is  
the reaching out of language toward new relations (what we call logic), and in a 
wider sense toward a new syntax by which to tempt reality into the momentary 
but living order of words. (ibid.; my emphasis) 
And, in their striving ‘toward new potentialities’ (ibid., p. 338) these nascent 
forms of expression are said to ‘modify, by the very fact of their existence, 
our sense of how meaning may be communicated.’ (ibid., p. 336) Bloch 
himself is privy to this new tendency in literary and philosophical expression: 
the ‘great cultural works […] expose “meaning” to its own utopian content’, a 
process in which ‘meaning’s former context is split open’ (LE, pp. 110 & 
100).  
Steiner, however, fails to question why all this takes place. No doubt Steiner 
hints at a response when he writes that new expressive forms “tempt reality 
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into the momentary but living order of words,” but just why does language 
need to reach out to discover new relations and new syntaxes? Just why are 
nascent forms of expression arising at all? What is the principal mode 
through which this need for new expression announces itself? Steiner comes 
close again but misses the importance of anacoluthon, and indeed the 
ontological composition of reality that is the condition of existence of 
anacoluthon and the “Pythagorean genre”: 
Wherever it reaches out toward the limits of expressive form, literature comes 
to the shore of silence. There is nothing mystical in this. Only the realisation 
that the poet and philosopher, by investing language with the utmost precision 
and illumination, are made aware, and make the reader aware, of other 
dimensions which cannot be circumscribed in words. (1965, p. 341; my 
emphasis) 
[3] Mieszkowski’s (2009) insights into anacoluthon neither mention 
Bloch nor materialism but they do inadvertently illuminate the fact that the 
figure is a prime candidate for the logic of what Steiner calls the 
“Pythagorean genre.”  By showing that anacoluthon’s very existence reveals 
something essential about language itself—that it is ‘a window onto an 
essential feature of signification’ (ibid., p. 649)—Mieszkowski helps me to 
show that anacoluthon just is a figure of language’s reaching out towards the 
new, and that this reaching out toward the new is inextricable from 
language’s ontological correlate: not-yet being. 
The first important point of Mieszkowski’s analysis is that anacoluthon’s 
intrinsic belonging to language is usually denied if it is not compositionally 
utilised as a rhetorical effect by a Shakespeare or a Cicero a consilio (that is, 
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intentionally, as opposed to a casu: accidentally). That is, it is commonly 
deemed an imperfection of speech, as opposed to an orderly flow that, 
perhaps the idea is implicit here, corresponds to an orderly world (ibid., p. 
649). Sanders (2014, p. 487) also points to anacoluthon’s negative valuation 
in this respect. Anacoluthon’s ‘“disruption [Störung] of syntactical texture”’, its 
‘“improper transformation of sentence construction”’, its ‘“transgression 
[Verstoß] of the written norm”’ are conventionally held to be conditioned by a 
‘“sloppy way of speaking”’, by ‘“excitation”’, ‘“forgetfulness”’, or by ‘“disjointed 
thought”’, by “spontaneous speech that is reducible to intellectual 
deficiencies”’ or simply by one’s ‘“losing the thread of a complex sentence-
formation [Satzbildung]”’ (ibid.). As I will outline in the following section, this 
spontaneity of speech is precisely what Bloch values in the figure of 
anacoluthon, and indeed what he values in writers such as Hebel, whose 
‘every word occurs […] as if spoken’, such that ‘Hebel’s voice is one of the 
least affected by the print medium.’ (LE, pp. 146-7)142  
The point for now is that anacoluthon is seen as an impropriety that 
infiltrates speech from the outside and is as such reducible to psychological 
or emotional interferences in the otherwise proper workings of language: it 
                                                          
142 As Bloch writes contra grammaticalness: 
There is a good German that is good when it expresses what it has to say. 
Grammatical transgressions can of course be allowed. Nevertheless, language can be 
good and great German insofar as grammatical mistakes are also necessary, because 
language has been ruptured until it was suitable and pliant enough to communicate 
what for usual grammar, for the usual, undialectical things, is incommunicable. (1985c, 
p. 14; my emphasis) 
[Es gibt ein gutes Deutsch, das gut ist, wenn es das ausdrückt, was es zu sagen hat. 
Grammatische Verstöße kann es natürlich geben. Trotzdem kann die Sprache gutes 
und großes Deutsch sein, indem die grammatikalischen Fehler auch notwendig sind, 
weil die Sprache gebrochen worden ist, bis sie dazu tauglich, schmiegsam genug war, 
das auszudrücken, was in der üblichen Grammatik, die für übliche, undialektische 
Gegenstände taugt, nicht auszudrücken ist.] 
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does not strike at an essential feature of language as such: ‘Language 
breaks down, but the fault is said to lie with the speaker rather than with 
language itself.’ (Mieszkowski, 2009, p. 649) Anacoluthic rupture is therefore 
conventionally considered non-representative of the essence of language: 
neither is it taken to say anything of importance on the score of the nature of 
linguistic beings nor of referentiality, nor of the ontological composition of the 
reality in which linguistic beings speak and communicate.  
However, Mieszkowski’s contribution to our understanding of anacoluthon 
lies not so much in the above than in the attention he draws to what, in my 
mind, constitutes the material generativity at the heart of the figure. As he 
writes, the figure of anacoluthon lies ‘[a]t the border of figuration and 
disfiguration’ (ibid, p. 653). He explains, anacoluthon is 
both super-figural—the extension of creativity in language use to 
transformations in the rules of syntax and grammar themselves—and sub-
figural, almost too deviant to register as a coherent representational gesture. 
As a figure for the difference between a departure from literal language and a 
mistake, anacoluthon is at once the figure of figures and a figure for the 
dissolution of figure, the collapse of sustained comparisons between figurative 
and literal instances of language that allows for figuration to emerge in the first 
place. (pp. 652; my emphasis) 
This passage crystallises the contention that the figure of anacoluthon 
constitutes not merely a material figure of linguistic generativity, but material 
linguistic generativity as such, insofar as it is the site of both figuration and of 
disfiguration. In the context of Bloch’s materialism, however, one might 
better put it: re-figuration, in the sense of new-figuration. Derrida (2002, p. 
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167) also touches upon anacoluthon’s speculativeness in this regard: 
‘Doubtless more than a figure of rhetoric, despite appearances, it signals in 
any case toward the beyond of rhetoric within rhetoric. Beyond grammar 
within grammar.’ The closest Mieszkowski comes to touching on this much 
more extensive reading of the figure of anacoluthon is, however, through his 
reappraisal of Kant’s concept of “self-affection” in light of his insights. 
Anacoluthon qua language’s “self-affection” is ‘the dynamic in virtue of which 
language becomes what it is by relating to itself as something that it has not 
yet become.’ (ibid., p. 654; my emphasis) But again, Bloch’s reading of Kant 
enacts an ontologisation of the latter’s findings. This translates into the 
following crucial claim: anacoluthon is not merely a subjective or aesthetic 
category; its upsetting the fabric of syntactical movement expresses reality 
because ‘reality itself is undergoing upheaval and breaking apart.’ (LE, p. 
503; emphasis removed)  
§3. BLOCH’S ANACOLUTHON  
The world was not built by schoolteachers, neither its poetry nor its forming-
transforming forces that provide the basis for a poetry of universal style. (LE, p. 
116) 
The sole essay in which the figure of anacoluthon is theorised by 
Bloch, “Spoken and Written Syntax: Anacoluthon” (LE, p. 497-504), broadly 
conveys anacoluthon as a figure of speech that depicts or re-presents 
process-matter’s dialectical transitivity (LE, p. 503). This could be a cause of 
confusion for Bloch’s reader. For, strictly speaking, this is not the kind of 
language one should be employing when speaking of anacoluthon in the 
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context of Bloch’s materialism; it seems to be terminology that can only paint 
the figure of anacoluthon as somehow separate from matter. But as I have 
shown in Chapter I, according to the very immanentism of Blochian 
materialism, no such thing as being beyond process-matter can be possible; 
apart from, that is, the non-place of utopia itself, which is said to be in some 
sense extraterritorial to process. Other than this extraterritoriality, which can 
be said to be that which sets process off in the first place insofar as it is the 
final cause of process, no such “beyond matter” is feasible in the context of 
Bloch’s philosophy. Whilst in what follows I will not be concerned to 
elaborate on Bloch’s own style vis-à-vis to its anacoluthic prose, I do want to 
read Bloch at his word, as it were, by considering anacoluthon as an 
immanent expression of his metaphysical materialism, and not as a style of 
speaking which depicts, reflects, or merely mirrors matter’s becoming. 
Anacoluthon does not depict matter: it is matter in its generativity.143 
                                                          
143 As Richter (2000, p. 107) points out, ‘the specific role that style and language play in [Bloch’s] 
oeuvre has not received the attention that it deserves.’ This is true, but such an undertaking, while 
potentially really striking at the immanent tendency of Bloch’s materialism, remains beyond the scope 
of this chapter. My approach is different. I want to read anacoluthon in light of Bloch’s concepts, 
showing thereby that this figure should count, in the context of that materialism, as a linguistic 
expression of matter’s becoming to its own essence. I have already commented on the prevailing view 
among Bloch’s intellectual circle that philosophy had to succumb to a new mandate so that it might 
renew its vision, its expression and articulation of reality (see Gluck 1985, pp. 143-73). Geoghegen 
intimates how Bloch’s searching for new forms of philosophical expression relates to the interruptive 
power of anacoluthon, in that  
 
[a]longside [the] highly technical, quasi-scholastic categorical distinctions [of his 
metaphysical materialism], Bloch introduces what for him was the aesthetic cutting 
edge of modernity, Expressionism—in the form of an oblique, staccato prose style. 
This was also deemed to befit a metaphysics which had broken with the static systems 
of the past. (1996, p. 30; my emphasis) 
 
Indeed, it is well to mention that Bloch’s utopian metaphysics was itself anacoluthic with regard to the 
history of philosophy, namely: it broke with longstanding presuppositions regarding conceptions of 
being in order to break out into the new (see PHE, p. 6). This point bears on Holz’s (1975, p. 38) claim, 
made in the context of Bloch’s materialism, that each philosophy has sought or seeks to formulate its 
own categories in an attempt to articulate what is beyond expression—beyond expression because 
novel to the word. ‘Adequate care to the matter’, Holz thus says, ‘requires [philosophy’s] own linguistic 
reproduction.’ (ibid., p. 43) In sum, style is integral to philosophical content which itself in turn is 
integral to the matter itself, to matter’s flow into the new: ‘how you say what you say is to a great 
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My intention, then, is to creatively extend Bloch’s materialism to a 
speculative appraisal of language’s materiality. The task consists of 
illuminating as clearly as possible the figure of anacoluthon as expressive of 
the compositional structure of Bloch’s metaphysical materialism. I will do this 
in two subsections, the first of which deals with anacoluthon as expressive of 
That-ness, the second, as expressive of an intending for What-ness. 
Naturally, in light of the previous two chapters, these two moments are 
inextricable in Blochian materialism.  
§3.1. THAT-NESS 
The extent to which the figure of anacoluthon is expressive of That-
ness can be gauged, in the first instance, by the very terms by which Bloch 
frames his discussion of the figure. Bloch’s anacoluthon essay is clearly 
based on the distinction he makes between classical and utopian 
metaphysics. Referring to anacoluthon, Bloch speaks of its expressing ‘a 
different state of mobility than that of the all too settled condition that 
subsists behind the past perfect of eternal letters.’ (LE, p. 504) The “past 
perfect” is of course that tense which expresses a past completed or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
extent what you say.’ (Webb, 1991, p. vii) On this point Bense (1978, p. 71) counsels Bloch’s readers 
to heed the difference ‘between the informative and the communicative significance’ of Bloch’s 
sentences. In fact, read in light of Adorno’s remarks below, it can be suggested that philosophy 
renews its expression each time it returns to its speculative mandate, for it does things to language, 
and does not merely tell us what language is: 
 
I believe that without speculation there is no such thing as depth. The fact that in its 
absence philosophy really does degenerate into mere description may well seem quite 
plausible to you. This speculative surplus that goes beyond whatever is the case, 
beyond mere existence, is the element of freedom in thought, and because it is, 
because it alone does stand for freedom, because it represents the tiny quantum of 
freedom we possess, it also represents happiness of thought. It is the element of 
freedom because it is the point at which the expressive need of the subject breaks 
through the conventional and canalized ideas in which he moves, and asserts himself. 
And this breakthrough of the limits set on expression from within together with the 
smashing of the façade of life in which one happens to find oneself—these two 
elements may well be the same thing. (Adorno, 2008, pp. 107-8) 
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perfected action. In other words, what is evoked here in Bloch’s framing of 
anacoluthon is the critique of classical metaphysics that underpins his own 
ontology as a principle. There is a dimension of language that is not reliant 
on an epistrophic orientation, an orientation in which what is being said is 
complete, finished and so perfected prior to the saying of it. One can 
imagine, at least at this stage, then, that anacoluthon constitutes a more 
free-flowing, experimentalist form of language. This gives reason to think the 
figure is expressive of That-ness, of searching, directed ontological 
incompletion (see Holz, 1975, pp. 44-5). Below I will outline in specific terms 
how this is the case.144 
[1] In the first instance, my reading of anacoluthon in the context of 
Bloch’s materialism thus views the figure as expressive of ontological 
incognito, or ontological incompletion.145 Indeed, by drawing on comments 
that Bloch makes elsewhere in his corpus, there is good reason to believe 
that anacoluthic interruption is expressive of the open That-ness that is the 
starting point of Bloch’s metaphysical materialism: 
                                                          
144 Insofar as Aristotle bases his metaphysics on the anteriority of actuality, as opposed to possibility, 
so Bloch bases his discussion of anacoluthon on the anteriority of the spoken word: 
The fact is, oral and written modalities have existed for different lengths of time. 
Speaking, storytelling, even singing appeared much earlier than writing; and even after 
its invention, writing was utilised as a record of oral storytelling. (LE, p. 497)  
‘[W]riting is a late development,’ Bloch writes (LE, p. 498) This might constitute a strange move on 
Bloch’s part. For, throughout this study I have shown that Bloch’s prospective, anticipative form of 
speculation is fundamentally opposed to explanatory arguments drawn from a logic of past-ness. And 
yet, paradoxically, here is Bloch giving precedence to spoken over written language on the basis that 
the former is said to have arrived first. In the first instance, then, the fissure disjoining the spoken word 
and the word ‘as mediated by written signs’ is said to lie in the obvious temporal anteriority of oral-
acoustic culture (LE, p. 498). My reading of the figure of anacoluthon does not, however, necessarily 
rely on this controversial position. My purpose here is not spoken language’s temporal anteriority, but 
anacoluthon’s expressiveness of Blochian materialism. 
145 This is perhaps why Bloch (1971, p. 160) defends the Expressionist avant-garde; its 
‘Ausdrucksform’ is said to be of the human incognito and its search for proper content, an outfall. 
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[I]t is at all times the immediate Am of the That that is throbbing beneath 
everything, that expresses itself in these utterances, that unfolds itself in these 
expressions. Only because this ground is not yet certain, is still speechless, 
does it come to voice, does it attempt to say and clarify itself. (LM, p. 208; my 
emphasis) 
[Es ist aber jederzeit das unmittelbare, das unter allem pochende Bin des Daß, 
das in diesem Aussagen sich äußert, in diesen Äußerungen sich entfaltet. Nur 
weil dieser Grund nicht stimmt ist, noch sprachlos ist, kommt es zu Stimmen, 
die ihn zu sagen, zu klären versuchen.]  
What this passage also indicates is the complementarity of the apophatic 
and the cataphatic in Bloch’s conception of the not-yetness of being, and 
indeed the possibility that the figure of anacoluthon crystallises this 
complementarity within itself. As Bloch writes, the figure of anacoluthon ‘best 
captures the difference between spoken and written syntax. For living 
speech always begins anew and breaks up along the way.’ (LE, p. 502; my 
emphasis) To refer this back to the discussion found in Chapter II, one could 
read this process as itself expressive of the utopian analogy of being, in the 
which the anacoluthic break expresses not an epistemic lack on the side of 
the human to express the transcendent divinity, but rather the real’s 
encountering its own incompletion. Thus, the figure of anacoluthon can be 
read as an expression of the ‘dark-open’ (PA, p. 72) of Blochian 
materialism—as opposed to what could be called the “dark-closedness” of 
Przywarian theolinguistics. This claim, in turn, can be made more fruitful by 
placing it in the context of contemporary debates in speculative materialism. 
Indeed, among a number of thinkers connected to the speculative turn, the 
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apophatic, the cataphatic and the relation thereof structures the manner in 
which the real is to be grasped. As one of these thinkers, Barber articulates 
it thus: 
What is compelling about the speculative turn, when viewed in relation to the 
question of how immanence is named, is its ability both to critique the human 
pretension to delimit access to the real and to affirm the capacity to name the 
real through an encounter with that which exceeds the pre-existing 
articulations. (2012, p. 144) 
The Blochian That-What relation is vaguely present here. But from this 
observation Barber goes on to stake out a kind of analogical mid-point 
between an apophaticism and a cataphaticism otherwise respectively pure 
unto themselves. And it is this that speaks to Bloch. Such a mid-point, which 
would best serve to grasp the dynamic naming of what is nameless, namely 
language’s ontological correlate of not-yet being, would be  
positioned neither in terms of the kataphatic (which would repress the 
enigmatic character of the real) nor in terms of the apophatic (which would 
abandon the real to the simply beyond). (ibid., p. 145) 
Moreover, what is at stake in such a conception, Barber continues, is ‘a real 
that is simultaneously non-manifest […] and non-inaccessible.’ (ibid) My 
contention is that Bloch’s form of speculative materialism speaks precisely to 
this way of conceiving the real. But Bloch adds something important that is 
otherwise missing from Barber’s account, which still assumes that the real is 
folded-up there, even if non-manifest. Bloch adds a way of grasping this real 
that is non-manifest but yet also non-inaccessible, and he does so by seeing 
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the real itself as not-yet, but whose “being” is possible. Non-manifestation is 
what indicates the real’s not-yetness. Non-inaccessibility is what indicates 
the real’s possibility of coming into being; and it is my claim that anacoluthon 
is a figure of language which puts us in touch with this structure. What opens 
up for view when one begins to see Barber’s formulation within the horizon 
of Bloch’s materialism, is a utopian form of witnessing the dynamic relation 
between the apophatic and the cataphatic. The drive to express, or to 
externalise, is born of the surd of the incommunicable. But this 
incommunicable surd, unlike some religious/theological tendencies, does not 
reduce the voice to silence, but exhorts it to creativity. The claim that 
apophasis is integral to understanding language’s materiality within the 
context of Blochian materialism is thus based on how this materialism 
conceives of the fullness of being: 
If one […] would like to designate here somewhat, one should consider that 
what has just been said must be crossed out each time, so that nothing can 
solidify. (SU, p. 194)  
But this is the case because of Bloch’s concept of the fullness of being as 
not-yet. As Bloch writes, what intends 
does not know the Intended-for [Gemeinte] positively as what it is, but 
negatively as what it is not. In such a way that it can be said after all, with 
things and solutions supplied: “that was not meant.” (PA, p. 75)  
[kennt es das Gemeinte nicht positiv in dem, was es ist, so doch negative, in 
dem, was es nicht ist. Derart daß immerhin gesagt werden kann, bei Dingen 
oder Lösungen, die sich anbieten: das war nicht gemeint.] 
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Thus the apophatic is re-structured in the light of the not-yetness of being: 
[…] again and again, diagonally through every meaning, there appears the 
one, the unnamed, unnameable, spiritualistically confounding the order, just as 
the true Gnostic Basilides said about precisely the “concept” and the “order” of 
the primordial word itself, quite destructively: “What is called inexpressible, is 
not inexpressible, but is only called so; but that of which we speak is not even 
inexpressible”; which denies, then, already in principle, that the ontic symbol-
contents ultimately are shaped like a representation, a world, or that they are fit 
for hierarchy. (SU, pp. 194-5)  
Bloch’s opposition to solidification, an opposition not without its echo in 
Adorno’s extreme aniconism (and the extent to which this aspect of Bloch’s 
thought was inspirational for Adorno himself is open), lies precisely in the 
open That-ness of being, of the not-yetness of a fullness of being. It is not in 
the name of a self-abasement that one unsays what has been said. Rather, 
the inadequacy of what has been said, the knowing that what has been said 
“does not follow” (anacoluthon), compels the finding of another way. Without 
this searching and finding there would be no language, no human history, 
indeed no nature nor reality, according to Bloch. 
[3] This notion of living speech that immanently goes beyond itself also 
plays itself out in Bloch’s conception of narration, the latter being an 
underlying theme of Bloch’s anacoluthon-essay. A narrative-style of 
language truly attuned to the reality from which it speaks, a reality 
incomplete but driving toward realisation, that is, a reality thus far free of an 
‘incestualised continuity’ (PA, p. 491), would be a narrative-style possessing 
an anacoluthic leap at its very heart. Echoing the recollections of Hegel 
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lecturing in Berlin146, for Bloch, a narrative form of continuity exudes 
falseness. In the Spirit of Utopia, leading up to Bloch’s imperative that Kant 
must burn through Hegel, Bloch critiques Hegel’s penchant for 
systematising, his ‘leaplessly mediated [eines sprunglos vermittelten]’ (GUe, 
p. 281) form of philosophising: 
At first, of course, we lose ourselves completely here; nothing about us is 
answered or resolved. Whether we suffer, whether we can be blessed, whether 
we are immortal as individual, existing human beings—the concept does not 
care. For the philosopher is on the way toward no longer being human; he 
leaves the worst of us and proudly departs an existence that so little affects the 
interests of abstraction. But the trouble with existence, as Kierkegaard says, is 
just that those who exist find existence endlessly interesting. It is easy to 
discern thereby whether a man tested by life is speaking, or a Münchhausen. 
Who only tells a story—say, “We left Peking and got to Canton; on the 
fourteenth we were in Canton”—is simply changing locations, not himself, and 
so the continuous form of narrative is in order [der verändert nur den Ort, nicht 
sich selbst und daher ist die unveränderte Form des Erzählens in Ordnung]. 
(SU, p. 180; GUe, 277)147 
                                                          
146 As Adorno quotes H.G. Hotho:  
 
Eloquence that flows along smoothly presupposes that the speaker is finished with the 
subject inside and out and has it by heart, and formal skill has the ability to glide on 
garrulously and most graciously in what is half-baked and superficial. This man, 
however, had to raise up the most powerful thoughts from the deepest grounds of 
things, and if they were to have a living effect then, although they had been pondered 
and worked over years before and ever again, they had to regenerate themselves in 
him in an ever living present. (1993, p. 120) 
 
147 As I mentioned, this passage is located in the section of the Spirit of Utopia in which Bloch tells his 
reader that Kant must burn through Hegel. The point at work here plays to the crux of the difference of 
theoretical perspective between Bloch and Lukács on the question of Expressionism. The conception 
of reality underlying Lukács’ critique of Expressionism is a ‘continuous [ununterbrochene] “totality”’ in 
which ‘the subjective factor has no place’; an ‘objectively-closed concept of reality’ without 
‘interruption.’ (Bloch, 1971, pp. 157-8)  
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The continuous form of narrative is a lie (a Münchhausen). Truthful 
speech is speaking discontinuously; only within anacoluthic narrative is one 
being changed, is one changing oneself in the process of narration (it is 
speaking speculatively, from within the process headed toward a not-yet 
determined outfall, it is not speaking as a detached observer).148 That the 
unity of subject and object is to be found in the not-yet manifestation of being 
leads to Bloch’s re-articulation of how the real is to be expressed truthfully: 
‘the passage of matter is not only an imaging [or depicting] [abbildendes], 
but a shaping-forth [Fortbildendes].’ (EM, p. 55) Bloch plays on the German 
verb fortbilden here, meaning “to continue education,” but also literally “to 
shape forth” or “to shape forward.” The notion of fortbilden, as Bloch 
employs it, is I believe an attempt to chart a course between what for him are 
two equally unacceptable paths. On the one hand, Bloch (1994, p. 383) aims 
to escape analytical philosophy’s arid approach to language. The 
‘Sprachkritiker’ utterly do away with the poetic, musical, and mystical 
elements of language, Bloch claims, and are satisfied instead to treat 
language as merely an instrument of knowledge (ibid., p. 384). Equally, 
however, Bloch is opposed to the ‘Sprachmythologie’ of the Romantics (and 
the tradition from which they stem), who enact a ‘metaphysicalisation 
[Metaphysizierung] of language’ (ibid., p. 387), such that the word is 
magically congruent with the world’s content, indeed on a cosmic-scale. 
                                                          
148 Indeed, as Landmann recognises, this point relates to Bloch’s opposition to the arid materialism of 
the mathematical sciences and their general mode of expression:  
The logical mastering [gebändigte] style [of these sciences] corresponds to the faith in a 
perfect, complete and harmonious world. Its perfection reflects itself in the closedness 
[Geschlossenheit], in the unbroken beginning [Aufgehen], in the smoothness [Ebenheit] of 
its expression. But for Ernst Bloch […] there is still work and ferment in all things, which are 
undetermined, un-concluded potentiality (1965, p. 345; my translation). 
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Neither such ‘worship of language [Sprachverehrung]’ nor such ‘contempt of 
language [Sprachverachtung]’ will do for Bloch (ibid., p. 387). What is most 
curious of all about this middle course is that Bloch designates the 
“Sprachkritiker” as subjective idealists, while he dubs the Romantics as 
objective idealists (ibid., pp. 387-8). Thus the answer to the aporia is once 
more: Kant must burn through Hegel. Truthful syntax is thus syntax ‘that runs 
ahead of itself, retreats, shifts the emphasis, reemphasises, and otherwise 
communicates by means of discontinuity.’ (LE, p. 503)149 As Bloch writes: 
The authentic mode of narration intended here cannot be objectified in itself, 
nor can it stand forth as a purely autonomous form, capable of serving as a 
counterforce against rational poetics (however much it has always burst 
through the limits of that poetics, whenever the latter has devolved to 
artificiality à la Gottsched). But otherwise, the well-conserved viva vox is the 
conditio sine qua non of every poetry that has not become an end in itself, and 
resounds throughout the art—not least as an anacoluthon within an ever so 
magisterially closed system. (LE, p. 502) 
Anacoluthon is the site of figuration and disfiguration, it is expressive of the 
open That-ness of Blochian materialism. Like material generativity itself, the 
figure cannot be objectified nor made into a purely autonomous form, for the 
figure constitutes the site of the generativity of expressive form as such: 
searching That-ness. Anacoluthon can thus be read as the expression of the 
non-existence of ontological totality. From the vantage of Bloch’s 
materialism, anacoluthon’s “it does not follow” stands as a “lack of 
                                                          
149 What is identical between language and matter is their shaping forth, and thus their identity is found 
in non-identity: there would be no need for shaping-forth if matter or being were already complete. 
Depiction as fortbilden, Bloch says, is ‘the simplest form of the bridge between Percipere and Esse’ 
(EM, p. 55). 
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togetherness and succession,” and marks a point—a starting point of 
openness—in syntax through which language comes up against its own 
unfinished state, a condition of un-enclosedness expressive of the figure’s 
ontological correlate. As Bloch writes: the ‘open That is the productive 
driving in all things’ (SO, p. 363). 
§3.2. WHAT-NESS 
 A sentence has wishes as an event.—Gertrude Stein (1973, p. 18) 
If, as I read the figure, anacoluthon points to a mode of ‘open 
expression’ (PA, p. 122) that finds its correlate in an ontology of not-yet 
being, then, in the context of Blochian materialism, the figure must constitute 
the threshold of linguistic conditionedness as such, and therefore it lies at 
‘the threshold of expression [der Schwelle der Äußerung]’ (LM, p. 256), at 
the border between what has become and what is not yet. As I have 
suggested above in my discussion of Steiner’s comments regarding the 
“Pythagorean genre,” the figure of anacoluthon touches on a linguistic 
expression of that point at which something new steht nun vor der Tür 
(“stands at the door”). In other words, the figure touches on What-ness, and 
‘ultimately the What itself is […] the Novum.’ (LM, p. 256) 
Indeed, if Bloch stands in the Heraclitean heritage, then his refunctioning of 
it, his novel contribution of its outlook, it is to have held on to the notion that 
‘the river is strongly oriented to the still outstanding outfall [Mündung].’ (EM, 
p. 30) Discontinuous process harbours an invariant of direction, an unum 
necessarium. But as I have shown throughout this study, particularly in 
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Chapter II, the outfall into which process-matter invariantly intends, the 
analogon, is also an intending in itself:  
There is precisely in the interruptions, concrete montages, appropriately 
utopian indeterminacies of open-systematic thought always an Invariant of 
direction, straight through all cross-connections and in particular all through the 
Open itself. (EM, p. 30) 
[Es gibt genau in den Unterbrechungen, konkreten Montagen, utopiegemäßen 
Unausgemachtheiten des offenen Systemdenkens allemal eine Invariante der 
Richtung gerade durch alle Querverbindungen und besonders durch das 
Offene selber hindurch.]150 
If one may read anacoluthic events as expressive of the ontological 
incompleteness of material That-ness that is the starting point of Bloch’s 
philosophy, then one may read the figure simultaneously as expressive of 
the ‘nameless a priori’ (SU, p. 192), that is, the brewing, fermenting 
analogon. Indeed, the very structure of Bloch’s materialism, as I have 
outlined it in the previous chapters, commends this position.  
A dawning, an inner brightening, trouble, darkness, creaking ice, an 
awakening, a hearing nearing itself, a condition and concept, ready, against 
                                                          
150 As Bloch writes elsewhere: 
 
Each predication in history is and remains in reference to and reliant upon a process of 
constant amendment, of a widening, of sublation through process. The still un-
predicated in the subject of predication […], the inadequateness of the subjects to each 
previously exhibited predicate is the true motor of the real dialectic and of the 
dialectical concept (ibid.). 
 
[So bleibt jede Aussage in Geschichte und ist, wie auf Prozesse bezogen, auf 
dauernde Berichtigung, auf Erweiterung, auf Aufhebung durch Prozesse angewiesen. 
Das noch Unprädizierte im Subjekt der Aussage […]; die Unangemessenheit der 
Subjekte zu jedem bisher herausgestellten Prädikat ist der wahre Motor der realen 
Dialektik und des dialektischen Begriffs] 
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the darkness of the lived moment, the nameless a priori brewing in us, near us, 
before us, in all of being-in-existence in itself, finally to kindle the sharp, 
identical light, to open the gate of looking in one’s own direction. (ibid.) 
So anacoluthon ought not to signal interruption for interruption’s sake, a 
condition of constant transgression: the starting point is not pointless. 
Anacoluthic syntax ought not to be tied to a ‘boundless analogy [uferlosen 
Analogie]’ sent hither and thither (PA, p. 125). Anacoluthic interruptions are 
rather moments at which syntax points beyond itself to something new, to 
the aurora of a still unknown end in the unfinished utopic process: 
anacoluthon opens out to the not-yet existent speculative totality. Thus it 
harbours a Wohin and Wozu. The figure of anacoluthon’s interruption of the 
normal flow of syntax creates a linguistic space in which experimentation of 
What-ness discloses itself. As Bloch writes of Bertolt Brecht’s employment of 
the figure: 
[I]t is precisely the interruption of the scene in Brecht’s experimental theatre 
that creates a space for spoken anacoluthon: a space of suspension, of 
probing, of deliberation, according to a different state of mobility than that of 
the all too settled condition that subsists behind the past perfect of eternal 
letters. (LE, p. 504)  
In sum, while for Adorno the fragmentary character of paratactic method 
exclaims a constitutive incompleteness, from the perspective Bloch affords, 
anacoluthon harbours a surplus over which it cannot be subjected merely to 
a constitutive—that is, irredeemable—non-identity. Behind anacoluthic 
interruption is the intention to consummate, to reach a terminus ad quem. To 
paraphrase Bloch, ‘freer movement and expressive need dwell here’ (SU, p. 
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35). The openness of expression that anacoluthon creates the conditions for 
is thus expressive of ‘the wonder at the front of immediacy [das Staunen an 
der Unmittelbarkeits-front]’ (PA, p. 147), it is the ‘experience of Front 
[Fronterlebnis]’ (PA, p. 147) on the plane of language. Indeed, if anacoluthic 
language is expressive of the darkness of the “That” of existence, then the 
‘advancing intention [das fortschreitende Meinen]’ of linguistic production 
(TL, p. 75) expresses the desire for the Ultimum—‘a Lösewort’ (PA, p. 214), 
the ‘fundamental concept [Grundbegriff] of utopian philosophy.’ (PA, p. 214) 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I have sought to read the rhetorical figure of anacoluthon in 
light of Bloch’s materialism. I have argued that anacoluthon, in its 
interruption of syntactical flow, is an expression of the ontological 
composition of Bloch’s materialism. What this amounts to is the following. My 
claim has been to suggest that anacoluthon exhibits one linguistic instance 
in which utopian materiality, as conceived of by Bloch, is a real presence in 
the life of language. Not only have I claimed that anacoluthon is a linguistic 
expression of material That-ness, that is, of real material generativity; I have 
also attempted to read this figure as constituting a real intending toward not-
yet totality: an expression of material intending to What-ness. Thus it is a 
speculative figure of speech, that is, speculative in Bloch’s sense of the 
term: it is a figure of speech that speaks outward toward a not-yet 
absoluteness. And thus, once more. Thus it can be said to constitute an 
exodus form of speech. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Neither has this study intended to make Bloch’s arguments 
philosophically plausible nor has it intended to prove that what I see as 
Bloch’s provision in philosophy of language constitutes a cogent theory. I 
have merely tried to show how the materialism of language can be thought 
within the horizon of Bloch’s corpus. In this final stage of the study, then, I 
will present my overall conclusions, drawing-out whatever original 
contribution to knowledge my thesis may well provide. I will clarify, moreover, 
the foregoing such that a number of possible paths of future research may 
become dimly visible—this will involve lending attention to the limitations and 
relatedly the unanswered questions of my study.  
In sum, then, my conclusion yields four points; while in points 1-3 I restate 
the findings produced thus far, in point 4 I will comment on a number of 
issues revolving around the question of future research, with particular focus 
on the political. Needless to say, there remains much to explore in Bloch’s 
underappreciated philosophy, as does much remain to be achieved for 
developing further the notion of a speculative-materialist philosophy of 
language. Nonetheless, I think focus on the political would in itself be a 
fruitful close to the study, not least because it helps shine a light on another 
inadequacy marking not only my study, but the speculative turn itself: its 
apparent a-politicality. 
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[1] At the beginning of this study I drew attention to two noticeable 
limitations marking contemporary Continental philosophy. The broad 
backdrop of these limitations can be described as a new blossoming of 
speculative-materialist modes of thought, the chief purpose of which is a 
desire to re-confer upon philosophy the great themes of speculation, i.e. 
such lines of questioning as what constitutes the ultimate nature of reality. 
Members of the turn—and they are many, both in number and in the 
directions they pursue—broadly agree that their common purpose is to 
overcome the restrictions on theoretical thought laid-down by Kant’s critique 
of pure reason. In fact, the philosophers of this new turn take Kant more 
seriously than Kant himself; the latter writes that there can be no 
‘appearance without anything that appears.’ (B xxvii) What for Kant is wholly 
unknowable is that which concerns living philosophers most of all: the thing 
in itself. 
My entry point into this context was, as I have said, two limitations. The first 
limitation of this newfound concern with speculation is the exclusion of Ernst 
Bloch from counting as a relevant figure in the discussions and debates that 
have thus far shaped what speculation is considered to be, and how this 
impacts upon one’s understanding reality, or ontology. I have noted how this 
neglect for Bloch’s work is particularly peculiar given that Bloch was one of 
the few figures of Continental philosophy during the past century to have 
callen for and practiced just such a renewal of speculation; thus, long before 
the contemporary turn had come to pass. The silence surrounding Bloch’s 
corpus, I argued, ought to be overturned for the much more substantive 
reason that contemporary forms of speculation, upon entering into dialogue 
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with Bloch, might enrich their perspectives through learning of Bloch’s 
utopian thematic. If speculative philosophy is at root an intention towards 
totality, then Bloch’s conception of totality as not-yet and thus at present 
non-existent could, I held, inform new insights into the nature of speculative-
materialist thought, and, subsequently, apprise a new understanding of and 
approach to language’s speculative materiality. This latter point brought me 
to the second limitation of the contemporary philosophical conjuncture. 
Indeed, on the other hand, I noted how, even though it constitutes a 
conscious counterpoint to the linguistic turn’s long dominant form of 
language-scepticism, speculative materialism—considered as a broad 
movement—has shown a distinct lack of interest in taking up reflection on 
the topic of language’s materiality. While this reluctance was partially 
understandable (given the long drawn-out dominance of linguistic monism), 
it certainly was neither ultimately tolerable nor sustainable given 
speculation’s aim of thinking absolutely. For what would it be to think 
absolutely without the slightest mind for that through which one commonly 
communicates this thinking? In this assessment I was broadly in agreement 
with two contemporary thinkers (Avanessian [2016] and Whistler [2010]) 
whose unique responses to this predicament—albeit different responses, 
both with regard to each other and with regard to what I have provided 
through my reading of Ernst Bloch and anacoluthon— acted as foils for the 
manner in which I proceeded to answer my study-question. I set much stall 
by them, then, and the upshot of my brief analyses of their contributions was 
as follows.  
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While, on the one hand, I argued for Avanessian’s correctness in his 
considering relations as ontologically prior to objects, and, moreover, in his 
holding language’s materiality to consist in being open to such relations, I 
invested much in the contention that, placed within the horizon of Bloch’s 
speculative-materialist thought, this fruitful conception can actually be 
reduced to the precedence of a single relation: the relation between 
incompleteness and realisation (more commonly expressed philosophically 
as existence and essence, but also articulated by Bloch as the fundamental 
relation between That-ness and What-ness). This then also allowed me 
concomitantly to think language’s materiality as inherently involving the 
processuality that is born of the becoming from incompleteness to realisation 
(or consummation). Indeed, on the other hand, Whistler’s response to the 
neglect contemporary speculation lends to reflection on language’s 
materiality (or language’s “naturality”) allowed me to think and identify the 
significance of processuality for a speculative-materialist reflection on the 
materialism of language. However, it was a key contention of mine that 
Whistler’s form of speculation, relying as it does on Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie, is fundamentally contrary to the whole purport of Bloch’s 
own form of speculation. The issue boiled down to the temporal direction of 
each respective form, and so, I think, the temporal direction of processuality. 
That is to say, whilst Whistler directed his attention to the past, in that he 
conceptualised the generativity of linguistic products back to geological 
formation, Bloch’s form of speculation is futurally directed: anticipative 
speculation. A guiding motif of Bloch’s whole philosophy is precisely an 
attempt to break free of a type of philosophical thought that would give 
privilege to what has been (Gewesenheit), as opposed to what is yet to 
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come (in fact, Bloch deems this logic of past-ness as definitive of much if not 
most of the history of philosophy). Against the background of these 
limitations to the speculative-materialist turn, and to be sure in light of 
Avanessian and Whistler’s fruitful responses to this lack of research, I 
suggested that the moment was appropriately ripe for a study that would 
seek to explore the materialism of language as that materiality could be 
thought of within Bloch’s philosophy. This, then, was my broad starting point. 
I went on to ask:  
Inasmuch as it can be claimed that the underlying perspective of Ernst Bloch’s 
materialism is the view that sees the world’s essence as ‘gay spirit’ and ‘urge 
to creative forms’, and which holds, moreover, that the Kantian Thing in Itself 
constitutes an ‘objective phantasy’ (ibid.), how then […] can the materiality of 
language be speculated on within Bloch’s utopian philosophical framework? (p. 
7 of this study)  
So as to provide a focused response to this question, I opted to read the 
figure of anacoluthon both as it appears in Bloch’s corpus and as one can 
creatively extend its significance through conceptual resources provided for 
by Bloch himself. My thesis was as follows. Insofar as anacoluthon’s logic 
overlaps with the fundamental compositional structure of Bloch’s 
materialism, so then it constitutes a linguistic expression of utopian 
materiality as conceived by Bloch. I contend that to have shown this to be 
the case is where one finds my original contribution to philosophical 
knowledge. Below I will summarise the steps I made in this study that 
allowed me to reach this conclusion. 
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[2] In Chapter I, I sought to get to grips with the building blocks of 
Bloch’s utopian materialism, i.e. it main categories. The categories of 
tendency (shorthand for process) and of latency (shorthand for realisation) 
are key to my understanding of that materialism. Moreover, these categories, 
I suggested, are incomprehensible without consideration of their dialectical 
interaction. Indeed, the real dialectical interaction between process and 
realisation of process renders the end for which process becomes at all an 
immanent end. The telic element in Bloch’s materialism is therefore seen as 
itself in the process of becoming what it is. This constitutes a distinctively 
Blochian approach to teleology.  
However, my intent was to properly specify the nature of this teleological 
process as conceptualised by Bloch. Again, my findings showed that Bloch 
grasps process neither as linear motion (as, in accordance with the 
mechanists, mere change of place), nor as repetitive movement (process is 
said to become in that which is not-yet, and therefore the category of Novum 
is crucial to Bloch’s understanding of matter as a really real creative 
processuality). Rather, process is contradictory (discontinuous); in fact, for 
Bloch, process is born of contradiction (in Bloch’s parlance, process is born 
of a not-having). Nevertheless, process as Bloch reasons it is not merely 
discontinuous, instead there remains a further determination of process as 
Bloch sees it, one anticipatory in its essence (to Bloch’s mind, there is an 
invariant of direction at work in process-matter).  
Together these findings suggest that, in the context of Bloch’s materialism, 
language’s materiality must consist of, I argued, a discontinuous, 
anticipatory process. In its most rudimentary expression Bloch’s materialism 
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consists of a process that bears within itself the real possibility of what I have 
termed an outfall. Such, on my reading, is the basic composition of Bloch’s 
materialism. It is this ontological composition with which language must 
express: Not-Having → Process → (possibility of an) Outfall. To my mind, 
anacoluthon is a linguistic expression of this composition, which Bloch 
otherwise calls the ontology of not-yet being. In other words, within the 
horizon of Bloch’s philosophy, the materiality of language resides in its 
expression of the That-What relation. Bloch writes: 
But that between That [existence] and What [essence] there can obtain a 
relation at all: this relation itself is the most fundamental category and all other 
categories merely perform it (EM, p. 71; my emphasis). 
[Daß aber zwischen Daß und Was überhaupt bezogen werden kann: diese 
Beziehung ist selber die Grundkategorie, und alle anderen führen sie nur 
aus…] 
The figure of anacoluthon is a figure of speech that embodies within itself 
this That-What expression. 
[3] Having clarified the basic structure of Bloch’s materialism, my next 
step was to suggest that my reading in Chapter I was more or less self-
evident to Bloch’s corpus and that, consequently, a more expansive 
interpretation was required so as to discern the metaphysical orientation of 
this materialism (its intention towards a totality that is not-yet). I was not 
content merely to commentate on Bloch’s materialism but sought instead to 
provide an independent and original account of its most fundamental 
purport. I considered this a necessary undertaking because the nature of 
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process-matter, as Bloch conceives of it in its anticipatory, discontinuous 
composition, transcends, from a place of immanence, that which is already 
given. Thus, mutatis mutandis, the processuality that is central to Bloch’s 
materialism must be considered a metaphysical, speculative process (when 
Bloch says that to think is to transgress, what is at stake here is a 
consideration of transgression as a cornerstone of being itself). In this light, 
the task was one of considering the proper nature of this metaphysically-
directed processuality, a task I undertook in Chapter II.  
The task was one of how best to grasp the end for which process becomes, 
and of how this end feeds into the nature of the process. In order to properly 
crystallise the for-the-sake-of-which of process, I investigated the 
metaphysical purport of Bloch’s materialism; I asked, What is this 
materialism’s metaphysical sens? The discontinuous, anticipatory nature of 
Bloch’s understanding of process-matter maintains within itself, I suggested, 
the possibility of an outfall into absoluteness. And I read the relation between 
process and this possible outfall as consisting of an experimental form of 
analogic metaphysics. Although explicit evidence for this reading is rather 
scanty in accordance with what is available in the corpus, I took it as a 
fruitful way to read Bloch’s conception of matter’s dialectical becoming, for 
the reason that dialectical becoming is in itself unending, whilst Bloch always 
entertains the possibility that this becoming is directed to or communicates 
with a common meaning or end, albeit that this common end is not-yet in 
existence. When Bloch claims that the subject-object relation is woven with 
an analogia entis of not-yet being, I interpreted this as Bloch’s take on how 
best to understand the Thing in Itself as the objective phantasy. Considering 
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the latter notion as an analogon that is radically eschatological in kind gave 
me a reasonably solid footing with which to think the occurrence of not-yet 
being within language. Admittedly, it is the case that much remains to be 
done to fully substantiate this reading. To my mind, particularly deserving of 
attention is the true compatibility between dialectic, whose imagination of 
thought is breaks and negation, and analogy, whose imagination is one of 
order. This compatibility was not fully answered-for in my study, but I 
consider a mode of thought that thinks the two together would be a mode of 
thought that helps clarify the novelty of Bloch’s metaphysics. 
[4] My final point bears on the question of possible future directions in 
research. As I have mentioned on numerous occasions throughout the 
study, the topic of the relation between materialism and language as that 
relation can be understood in the context of Bloch’s philosophy, is a topic 
which finds itself at its inception. I have chosen to focus on the figure of 
anacoluthon in order to tease out the sort of implications Bloch’s materialism 
harbours for a contemporary understanding of language and of human 
beings as linguistic beings. But Bloch’s corpus offers a number of directions 
not limited to anacoluthon alone, even if, as I claim is the case, anacoluthon 
is central to Bloch’s understanding language’s materiality. In conjunction with 
anacoluthon’s importance on this score one could also pursue a number of 
lines of inquiry which, while I may well have touched on their significance 
during my study, I was nonetheless unable to devote space to their 
consideration. To end my conclusion and to end my study, I will focus on just 
one of these potential lines of inquiry, namely: politics.  
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  [a] Politics. One of the entry points for my study was Avanessian and 
Whistler’s respective attempts to overcome the lack of attention given to the 
materiality of language in the new turn toward philosophical speculation. 
Whistler’s response to this problem assumes an added significance in light 
of the political. His response is important in this context because, informed 
as it is by Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, it is based on a fundamental 
rejection of Kant’s “ethicisation” of nature, and, as a logical consequence of 
this, an apparent rejection of the validity of the political as a pressing 
concern for contemporary speculation. Kant’s considering nature only as 
nature is in its appearances (that is, ultimately, in its being for the human 
being alone), must be set aside for a concern for how nature is in itself, that 
is, for the inexperiential generativity that is nature’s very core essence. Such 
is Whistler’s starting point for his speculative reflection on language. Of 
course, the difficult position which emerges from this hyper-naturalist stance 
is to then see language in a rather a-political inflection. While I have noted at 
various points in this study Bloch’s sympathy for the type of speculative 
consideration of nature that Whistler pursues here, the point is that the 
political is a central subject-matter for Bloch—its represents the real 
openness of the Humanum as such—and therefore cannot easily be swept 
to one side (doing so necessarily incurs, it seems to me, certain retrograde 
consequences, in the sense that the a-politicisation of the political usually 
carries with it oppressive tendencies). In other words, a speculative-
materialist account of language’s materiality ought to consider the way in 
which the political comes to bear on that materiality, without, however, falling 
into the ethicising trap that Whistler is right to want to avoid. The issue of 
whether this problem becomes less acute if the form of speculation guiding 
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reflection is oriented not to the past but, with Bloch, to the future, remains an 
open question, but, I think, this may well be where the nub of the matter lies. 
An intimation of the direction of this line of research can be partly provided 
by turning to a recent attempt at a Marxist philosophy of language.  
Indeed, given Bloch’s leftist allegiances, it seems suitable to touch on this 
issue with an eye to Marxism. I have already noted that Schelling’s 
conception of natura naturans and natura naturata takes on a markedly 
political inflection under Bloch’s pen, and that, relatedly, Harbermas has 
dubbed Bloch a “Marxist Schelling.” To my mind, this set of circumstances 
can translate into the following line of questioning: to what extent is the 
inexperiential generativity of linguistic products driven by communistic ends? 
A French thinker who has recently contributed a Marxist philosophy of 
language, Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2006), poses a similar question, without, 
however, remotely being concerned with the sorts of questions that are at 
stake in my study here. With Habermas as his foil Lecercle speaks of a 
‘messianic hope for communism in language’ (ibid., p. 63): 
Thinking with Habermas and, at the same time, thinking against him—i.e. regarding 
him as a major philosopher—subjects him to the same fate as Marx inflicted on 
Hegel […]: standing him back on his feet. And to do this is literally to operate an 
inversion on his philosophy: to consider it not as a first philosophy, bearer of myth 
of origins, but as a last philosophy, expression of an eschatological hope. For 
Habermas’s ethics of discussion can be criticised for betraying the facts, but the 
eminently desirable character of its realisation cannot be denied. […] what 
Habermas proposes to us is linguistic communism: not the fundamental structure of 
interlocution, but an idea of reason (ibid., p. 57). 
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It must be said, this line of questioning resonates not only with Bloch’s 
materialism, but with the findings of my study: my reading of the figure of 
anacoluthon as expressive of utopian materiality can be considered last 
philosophy in the philosophy of language. For I have read anacoluthon as 
expressive of a material generativity that is founded on a utopian hope.  
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